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Summary
This PhD thesis consists of five essays on the economics of Power System Flexibility, a topic that has
traditionally been addressed from a technical perspective by engineers, system planners, electricity industry
stakeholders and energy policymakers interested in the integration of Variable Renewable Energy. While
significant progress has been made in the understanding and characterization of flexibility, its economic
properties and the required incentives to provide it have not been sufficiently analyzed. The present work
aims at filling this gap.
In the first chapter, entitled “Business Models for Power System Flexibility: New Actors, New Roles,
New Rules”, Rahmatallah Poudineh (from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies) and I take on the task
of identifying and analyzing existing business models that enable power system flexibility, a requirement
that is not actually novel but is becoming critical for the successful integration of renewables. We find that
technological innovation - with the Smart Grid as catalyst - is essential to enable the flexibility of existing
resources in the power system and note that many of these developments are already taking place. We claim
that, as a result, an entirely different electricity industry is emerging: one in which new activities are being
added to the traditional supply chain, contesting the status quo. Incumbents, who rely on traditional,
large scale industrial assets are beginning to compete with entrants who depend on a non-traditional,
knowledge-based mode of operation.
In the second chapter, “Power System Flexibility: A Product Design Perspective”, by way of concrete
examples from the short-term operation of the Danish and Californinan power systems; I illustrate the
need for flexibility when integrating renewables. In addition, I review the existing literature on the topic,
which is mostly technically and policy-oriented and organize it according to the specific topics of interest
in the current state of the debate. Motivated by the technical characteristics of Power System Flexibility,
the paper then presents two simple, yet relevant contributions of normative nature. The first of these
consists in three economic postulates that should guide the economic modelling of flexibility. Specifically,
I claim that flexibility has multiple attributes, which are imperfectly substitutable and that flexibility is
an inherently heterogeneous commodity. The second contribution is a set of desirable properties that any
product design should have to actually enable flexibility, namely simplicity, measurability and relevance.
The chapter, which ends with a review of existing product designs for power system flexibility, serves as
a transition and establishes general guidelines for the three remaining chapters, which contain the core
economic modelling of the thesis.
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The third chapter, “Trading Demand-Side Flexibility in Power Markets”, which is joint work with
Peter Bogetoft and Peter Møllgaard (from Copenhagen Business School), is a first approximation to the
microeconomic modelling of flexibility. With a focus on the particular kind of flexibility that can be
harnessed from demand-side resources, as mediated by a technological solution that reduces transaction
costs to a negligible level, the paper proposes a baseline model of bilateral trade between a consumer and
an aggregator, which highlights their gains from trading. Using the Nash bargaining approach as solution
concept, the model and a number of extensions implemented, allows pricing flexibility but also achieves an
additional insight into the role of investment costs in a long-term perspective. In particular: relative to the
situation in which an aggregator and a consumer symmetrically share investment costs, a consumer is able
to obtain a better deal for the flexibility it offers, if it faces a relatively higher cost than the aggregator. By
extension, the model shows that economies of scale may be present in the aggregation business. This could
induce a network effect in which the gains from trading flexibility increase as the number of consumers
offering flexibility to a single aggregator increases. As a result, an open question remains: to what extent
can a flexibility marketplace be competitive?
In the fourth chapter, “Flexibility-Enabling Contracts in Electricity Markets”, Rahmatallah Poudineh
and I team again to study the procurement problem that a buyer (the principal) faces when acquiring
flexibility from a supplier (the agent) in a bi-dimensional adverse selection setting in which both parties
have non-separable utility and cost. The assumptions of the model stem directly from the economic
characteristics of flexibility (discussed in the second chapter) and relates to specific situations, along the
supply chain of flexibility services, in which the competitive procurement of flexibility is infeasible due, for
example, to the presence of transaction costs and limited capacity size of the resource provider. Relative to
the rent extraction-efficiency trade off conventionally studied under the assumption of separable functions,
the model of this paper relates more generally to situations in which the elements that determine the cost
of provision and the utility derived from a good or service cannot be separated. We find that, relative
to the separable case, this “non-separable externality” among activities leads to further distortion of the
inefficient types.
In the fifth and last chapter, “Product-Mix Exchanges, Efficiency and Power System Flexibility”, I de-
velop a number of extensions to the Product-Mix Auction, originally proposed by Paul Klemperer. These
are generalized under the name of Product-Mix Exchanges, which are double, multi-unit combinatorial
auctions in which participants are restricted to reporting substitutable preferences, and can be on the
demand side, the supply side or both sides of the market. The existence of equilibrium for the different
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variants of the exchange follows immediately from a previous result (coined as “the unimodularity theo-
rem”), but in the paper I propose a simple, linear programing-based approach to checking the existence of
equilibrium, given a set of participants’ concave valuations. However, the main contributions of the paper
are two. First, I show that Product-Mix Exchanges can be supported by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments,
which ensure that each market participant obtains its marginal product as payoff and that truthful bidding
is a weakly dominant strategy. This result is relevant for applications where sufficient market thickness
is not guaranteed, a setting in which manipulation of the results is more likely, as participants have the
incentive to report their true valuations. Second, I show an application of the exchanges to the design of
a marketplace for flexibility, namely the Delta Energy Market.
vii
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Dansk Resume´
Denne PhD afhandling best˚ar af fem essays som omhandler emnet Power System Flexibility (Strømsystems
fleksibilitet). Dette er et emne som traditionelt er blevet behandlet fra et teknisk synspunkt af ingeniør,
systemplanlæggere, folk med aktier i energi sektoren og politikere som har udvist interesse i Variable
Renewable Energy (variabel vedvarende energi). P˚atrods af, at der er sket store fremskridt i forhold til
forst˚aelsen og karakteriseringen af fleksibilitet, s˚aer dets økonomiske egenskaber endnu ikke blevet analy-
seret fyldestgørende. Denne afhandling forsøger at udfylde dette hul.
I det første kapitel “Business Models for Power System Flexibility: New Actors, New Roles, New Rule”
har Rahmatallah Poudineh (fra the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies) og jeg p˚ataget os den opgave
at identificere og analysere de eksisterende forretningsmodeller, som muliggør power system flexibility, et
system der ikke er nyt, men som efterh˚anden er helt afgørende for en vellykket integration af vedvarende
energi. Vi har opdaget, at teknologisk innovation, med Smart Grid som katalysator, er essentiel for et
energisystem der skal have et fleksibelt forhold til forskellige energiressourcer. Vi finder ydermere at
denne teknologiske udvikling allerede finder sted. Vi p˚ast˚ar, at dette vil lede til en markant anderledes
energisektor, hvor nye aktiviteter bliver tillagt den traditionelle forsyningskæde, hvilket udfordrer det
nuværende marked. De etablerede operatører, der hidtil har benyttet sig af traditionelle industrielle aktiver,
er begyndt at konkurrere med nytilkommende ikke traditionelle og vidensbaseret operatører.
I det andet kapitel Power System Flexibility: A Product Design Perspective, bruger jeg konkrete ek-
sempler fra korttidsbrug p˚adet danske og californiske strømsystem, for at eftervise behovet for fleksibelt
integration af vedvarende energi. Ydemere, laver jeg en systematisk gennemgang af Power System Flexi-
bility litteraturen, hvor jeg kategorisere de specifikke forhold der gør sig gældende i den nuværende debat.
Den nuværende litteratur fokuserer primært p˚ade tekniske og politiske aspekter af strømsystemet. Denne
afhandling præsenterer to simple, men relevante bidrag af normativ natur, som er baseret p˚aden tekniske
karakteristisk af Power System Flexibilty. Den første best˚ar af tre økonomiske postulater som burde være
afgørende for den økonomiske modellering af flexibility. Postulater der i enden betyder, at flexibility har
forskellige attributter, som er imperfectly substitutable, og at flexibility i sagens natur er en heterogen
vare. Det andet bidrag fremstiller en række af foretrukne egenskaber som et produkt specielt designet
til at fremme flexibility burde have. Disse egenskaber er; enkelhed, m˚albarhed, og relevans. Kapitlet
slutter med en gennemgang af de eksisterende produktdesigns af power system flexibility. Denne gennem-
gang tjener som en overgang der fastlægger de generelle rammer for de tre tilbageværende kapitler, hvori
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afhandlingens økonomiske kernemodel bliver opstillet.
Det tredje kapitel “Trading Demand-Side Flexibility in Power Markets” er skrevet i samarbejde med
Peter Bogetofte og Peter Møllgaard (fra Copenhagen Business School Handelshøjskolen). I dette kapi-
tel fremstilles det første forsøg p˚aen mikroøkonomiske modellering af flexiblity. Kapitlet fokuserer p˚aden
bestemte udgave af flexibility, som kan udnyttes gennem efterspør gselssidens resurser og som bliver formi-
dlet gennem teknologiske løsninger, der reducerer transaktionsomkostningerne til et ubetydeligt niveau.
P˚abaggrund af dette foresl˚as der en baseline model for bilateral handel mellem en forbruger og en aggrega-
tor, som netop fremhæver parternes profit ved denne form for handel. Ved at gøre brug af Nash bargaining
approach, kan man med denne model og et antal af implementerede udvidelser, tillade fleksible priser. Ved
brug af denne metode opn˚as der ydermere indsigt i investeringsudgifternes rolle p˚alang sigt. Særligt med
hensyn til den relative situation, hvor en aggregator og en forbruger deler investeringsudgiften symmetrisk,
er det muligt for forbrugerne at opn˚abedre fleksibilitet end hvis forbrugerne oplever relativ højere omkost-
ning end aggregatoren. Det ligger op til en diskussion om, i hvilken grad et fleksibelt energimarked kan
være konkurrencedygtigt?
Det fjerde kapitel “Flexibility-Enabling Contracts in Electricity Markets”, er endnu et samarbejde
mellem Rahmatallah Poudineh og jeg. Denne gang undersøger vi, hvorledes der ligger et problem for
køberen i forhold til anskaffelse af fleksibilitet fra en udbyder (agent) sat i kontekst af en bi-dimensional
adverse selection situation, hvori begge parter har indbyrdes uafhængige nytte- og omkostningsværdier.
Modelens antagelser stammer direkte fra de økonomiske karakteristika for flexibility (fremlagt i kapitel to).
Antagelserne forholder sig til specifikke situationer i forsyningskæden af servicer, med udgangspunkt i flex-
ibility, hvor competitive indkøb af flexibilty er umulige p˚abaggrund af fx transaktionsomkostninger og be-
grænset kapacitet fra udbyderens side. I forhold til de rent extraction efficiente handler som normalt bliver
belyst under antagelsen af indbyrdes uafhængige nyttefunktioner, s˚arelaterer modellen i dette kapitel mere
generelt til situationer, hvor i provisionsomkostninger og den nytte man opn˚ar fra forskellige aktiviteter
ikke er uafhængige. Vi konkluderer at, set i relation til de sager hvor der er muligt at opn˚aseparation, at
denne ikke uafgæninghedseksternalitet leder til yderligere forvrængninger for den ineffektive type.
I det femte og sidste kapitel, “Product-Mix Exchanges, Efficiency and Power System Flexibility, ud-
vikler jeg nye tillæg til Product-Mix Auction, som oprindeligt blev beskrevet af Paul Klemperer. Disse
er grupperet og generaliseret under navnet Product-Mix exchange, som er flerfacetteret kombinatoriske
auktioner, hvor deltagere er bundet til at oplyse deres ombyttelige præferencer og som kan tilhøre efterspør
gselssiden, udbudssiden eller befinde sig p˚abegge sider af markedet. Eksistensen af en ligevægt for de
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forskellige udgaver af udvekslinger er givet af et foreg˚aende The Unimodularity Theorem, men i denne
afhandling foresl˚ar jeg i stedet en simpel lineær programmeringsbaseret tilgang til at undersøge eksistensen
af ligevægt, der er givet ud fra deltagernes konkave værdiansættelser. I kapitlet har to hovedbidrag. 1, at
Product Mix Exchange kan understøttes af Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments, som sikrer, at oprigtige bud
er en svagt dominerende strategi for alle aktører. Dette resultat er relevant n˚ar det bliver anvendt p˚arelativt
tynde markeder, hvor manipulation af resultaterne ellers ville forekomme i højere grad, da deltagerne nu
har f˚aet et incitament til at afrapportere deres sande værdiansættelser. 2, viser jeg en applikation af de
transaktioner, som finder sted p˚aen markedsplads, der er designet med henblik p˚afleksibilitet, navnlig Delta
Energy Market
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Introduction
Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) is acquiring increased relevance in the energy mix of many countries
throughout the world, as part of their overarching goal to decarbonize their economies and, particularly,
their electricity industries. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2015a)) estimates that by the end
of 2012, 13.2% of worldwide total primary energy supply came from renewables. According to the same
source, renewables accounted for 22% of global electricity generation in 2013. Furthermore, the IEA
also forecasts that this share will increase to 26% by 2020 and their central policy scenario expects that
renewable electricity generation will triple between 2012 and 2040 (IEA, 2015b).
However, operating with greater shares of VRE exposes power systems to increased variability and
uncertainty. Not only does the amount of energy available from VRE sources, such as wind and solar,
changes stochastically over time but the accuracy of forecasts, on which operators rely, decreases. In
contrast to the traditional operation of power systems in which generation has been mostly dispatchable
(i.e. able to produce upon request) and demand (load) was the only random variable that operators
had to account for, a greater reliance on VRE sources requires operators to focus on net load. That is:
load minus the output from renewables, which depends on not one but two random variables. Observing
the short-term evolution of net load in power systems that rely on VRE sources (see Chapter 2 of this
thesis for concrete illustrations) reveals that keeping the system in balance requires that the non-renewable
generation base adapts to steeper ramps, which are the consequence of unexpected upward or downward
variations in renewable output, and shorter peaks, which result from giving way for VRE generators to
produce. In other words, with more VRE sources, power systems must become more flexible.
Because of the technical nature of power system flexibility, engineers, system planners, policymakers
and industry stakeholders have developed a substantial body of work that has helped to define it, measure
it and compare it (e.g. Makarov et al. (2009), Morales et al. (2013), Ulbig and Andersson (2012), IEA
(2014), Cochran et al. (2014)). More importantly, they have also proposed a number of solutions to enable
it (e.g. Valsomatzis et al. (2014)). Nevertheless, the approach taken by this literature is typically systemic,
in the sense that it sees flexibility as an exogenously-given trait that the power system either has or hasn’t.
It also tends to focus on the necessary technicalities of available solutions but overlooks a central economic
insight: that incentives matter.
In contrast, taking an engineering perspective to economics (Roth, 2002, 2008), this PhD thesis argues
for incentivizing the provision of flexibility. Consequently, it focuses on the design of contracts and markets
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- that is, on institutional arrangements - that enable power system flexibility. The thesis, which is composed
of five chapters, is applied in nature but builds on and makes contributions to several areas of the economic
literature, including contract theory, mechanism design, market design and combinatorial auctions. Because
of the topic it discusses, it relates generally to power system economics and policy, a sub-field of the
Industrial Organization literature.
The first chapter, “Business Models for Power System Flexibility: New Actors, New Roles, New
Rules”(Bosca´n and Poudineh, 2016a), which is joint work with Rahmatallah Poudineh from the Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies (OIES), identifies and analyzes existing business models that enable power
system flexibility. Rather than looking at these from an abstract perspective, we investigate a number of
recent developments happening in several parts of the world and find that new activities being added to the
traditional supply chain are not only fundamental to enable flexibility, but also constitute a technology-
driven layer of innovation, that is contesting the traditional power industry business model in which utilities
enjoy a relatively undisputed position. We claim that, as a result, an entirely different electricity industry
is emerging: incumbents, who rely on traditional, large scale industrial assets are beginning to compete
with entrants who depend on a non-traditional, knowledge-based mode of operation.
Chapter 2: “Power System Flexibility: A Product Design Perspective”, serves as transition and guide-
line for the remaining chapters, which contain the core economic modelling of the thesis. By way of concrete
examples from the short-term operation of two power systems with substantial shares of VRE - namely
Denmark and California - I illustrate what flexibility requirements are all about. The chapter also reviews
the existing literature on power system flexibility, which is mostly technically and policy-oriented, and
organize it according to the main topics of interest in the current state of the debate. I find that defining,
measuring and comparing flexibility in different power systems - what I call the systemic perspective to
flexibility - preoccupy the contributors of the existing body of work, while very few works refer to the incen-
tives to provide flexibility. Motivated by the technical characteristics of power system flexibility described
by the existing literature, the chapter then makes two simple but relevant normative contributions. First,
I propose three economic postulates to guide the economic modelling of flexibility. Specifically, I claim that
flexibility has multiple attributes, which are imperfectly substitutable, and that flexibility is an inherently
heterogeneous commodity. Second, I describe a set of desirable properties that any flexibility product design
should have to actually enable flexibility, which are simplicity, measurability and relevance. The chapter
ends with a review of existing product designs for power system flexibility, including California’s Flexible
Ramping Product and the Flex-Offer informations technology concept.
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The third chapter,“Trading Demand-Side Flexibility in Power Markets”, which I wrote together with
Peter Bogetoft and Peter Møllgaard from Copenhagen Business School, focuses on the particular kind of
flexibility that can be harnessed from demand-side resources. In contrast to price-based demand response,
the central contribution of the chapter is a model of incentive-based contracts in the presence of a technology
that reduces transaction costs to a negligible level. Using the Nash (1950) bargaining approach as solution
concept, the model and a number of extensions implemented, determines the price of demand-side flexibility
in a bilateral setting. Relaxing the assumption of single-shot transactions between a consumer - who offers
flexibility - and an aggregator - who acts as an intermediary between small-scale suppliers of flexibility
and the market - the model describes the role of investment costs associated to the deployment of the
technology. Relative to the case in which costs are symmetrically shared, the consumer is able to obtain a
better deal for the flexibility it offers if it has a relatively higher cost than the aggregator. By extension,
this finding speaks about the possibility of a network effect in the aggregation business, which requires some
degree of scale economies in the flexibility-enabling technology, and has implications for the possibility or
not of introducing competition in a potential market for flexibility.
In Chapter 4: “Flexibility-Enabling Contracts in Electricity Markets” (Bosca´n and Poudineh, 2016b),
which is another joint work with Rahmatallah Poudineh (from OIES), we study the procurement problem
that a buyer (the principal) faces when acquiring flexibility from a supplier (the agent) in a bi-dimensional
adverse selection setting. Unlike existing models of multi-dimensional screening with separable functions
(e.g.Armstrong and Rochet (1999), Rochet and Stole (2003)), the model proposed in this paper assumes
that both the principal and the agent have non-separable utility and cost. Not only is the setup and solution
of the model a theoretical contribution in its own right, but the assumptions of the model stem directly from
the economic characteristics of flexibility, discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. We find that besides the
fact that there are multi-dimensional types in the procurement problem for flexibility, the “non-separability
effect” leads to further distortion of the less efficient types relative to rent extraction-efficiency tradeoff
under separability. This effect is closely related to the work on non-separable externalities discussed by
Davis and Whinston (1962) and Marchand and Russell (1973). On the applied side, the model relates to
specific situations, along the supply chain of flexibility services, in which the competitive procurement of
flexibility is infeasible due, for example, to the presence of transaction costs and limited capacity size of
the resource provider. The paper ends with a simulation that elucidates the applicability of the model to
practical contract design problems in situations like a thermostat-based demand response program.
In the fifth chapter of the thesis, “Product-Mix Exchanges, Efficiency and Power System Flexibility”, I
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introduce Product-Mix Exchanges (PMEs) which are double, multi-unit combinatorial auctions that extend
the Product-Mix Auction (PMA) format proposed by Klemperer (2010) as a solution to the liquidity
provision problem faced by the Bank of England at the height of the 2007 financial crisis. Besides the
substitutable preferences inherent to both PMAs and PMEs, a fundamental characteristic of the latter is
that participants can buy and sell without having a fixed role, effectively swapping over the two sides of the
market. The chapter makes three contributions. First, applying existing Tropical Geometric techniques -
recently introduced to Economics by Baldwin and Klemperer (2012, 2016) - to the analysis of substitutable
preferences. To this end, I present several illustrative examples that not only help in the understanding
of the concepts but illustrate their advantages in applied work. Second, proposing a linear programming
approach to check the conditions under which a set of valuations is guaranteed to have an equilibrium
with indivisibility. Third, analyzing the conditions under which Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) payments
- which ensure that each market participant obtains its marginal product as payoff - support the efficient
allocation of a PME. Specifically, I find that truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy for all market
participants in any variant of the PME with VCG payments. Furthermore, because the kind of susbtitutable
preferences imposed on PMEs always satisify the Gross Substitute condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982),
VCG payments are always in the core of the coalitional game associated to any PME. This is an important
finding for applications in which insufficient market thickness is a source of concern, because results are
more prone to manipulation. The last contribution of the paper, which relies on the usage of “swap
bidding”, illustrates how the PME framework can be utilized to design a marketplace for flexibility based
on the Flex-Offer information technology concept, which is discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, I propose
an implementation of a Delta Energy market, which allows to trade two flexibility-enabling products, i.e.
“quantity flexibility” and “time shifting”.
4
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Chapter 1
Business Models for Power System Flexibility:
New Actors, New Roles, New Rules
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1. Introduction 
 
The significant increase in the share of renewables in the generation mix poses a number of planning and 
operational challenges to power systems, raising the need for flexibility more than ever. At the same time, 
the emergence of innovative solutions are catalysing the development of new, flexibility-enabling 
business models; adding activities to the existing supply chain. New actors, sparking innovation in 
software, hardware and market design, are defining new roles. For example, aggregators are linking small-
scale suppliers of flexibility to electricity markets. Likewise, consumers are not passive anymore, but 
instead are evolving into active participants: prosumers, with an active role in the supply side.  
The key element in the emergence of new business models for power system flexibility is, unequivocally, 
technological change. The context of this evolution is, in most cases, a post-liberalization power system, 
characterized by unbundling of activities, with transmission and distribution operating as regulated 
monopolies, and competition being promoted in generation and retail. After several years of experience 
with reforms throughout the world, market power has been mitigated, efficiency has increased, but many 
firms still retain a dominant position. On the other hand, market mechanisms are well established now 
and relied upon. Wholesale and intra-day markets are generally used to allocate and price electric energy. 
Ancillary services and capacity are also competitively procured. 
The chapter by Sioshansi (2016) explored current trends in power systems, including the rapid uptake of 
distributed generation and renewables, micro-grids, storage, and so on. With the increase in the cost 
efficiency and the competitiveness of renewable resources, they become a more serious alternative to 
traditional power plants. However, the operational challenges derived from power system operation with 
intermittent resources require planners to actively incentivize the adaptability of systems to the challenge 
posed by stochastic variability.1 The IEA (2014), for example, claims that integrating a significant share of 
renewables is dependent on an overall transformation that increases system flexibility, and advocates for 
∗ This chapter appeared as Chapter 19 in “Future of Utilities – Utilities of the Future” (ISBN: 978-0-12-804249-6), a 
book edited by Fereidoon Sioshansi. It is reproduced here in its entirety by express permission of Elsevier, the 
publisher of the volume.  
 
1 The technically-oriented reader is referred to Morales et. al (2014), who devote an entire book to the analysis of 
operational problems associated to the integration of renewables into electricity markets. Chapter five of their book 
studies flexibility, originating from different sources in the power system, as an alternative to deal with the stochastic 
nature of renewable sources of generation.  
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further development of market-based, short-term balancing mechanisms that create reliable price signals 
for it.   
In addition, the rapid progress of information systems, the declining cost of computing, and the swift 
evolution of software are creating the conditions for smart grid solutions to become feasible. Coupled 
with progress achieved in areas like electricity storage, home automation and electric vehicle 
development, synergies among energy sectors, such as transportation and heating, are also becoming 
viable. 
In light of recent developments, this chapter reviews the evolution of operational flexibility issues and its 
associated business models, with a particular focus on short-term flexibility services and the role of 
emerging players. Long term issues of market based capacity arrangements have been discussed in the 
chapter by Woodhouse (2016). 
Section 2 discusses the concept of flexibility and reviews the resources that can enable flexible operation 
of the power system. Section 3 reviews the issue of trading flexibility as a commodity and describes some 
of the challenges associated with contracting for flexibility services. Section 4 is about the emerging 
business models for flexibility services and the role of new players followed by the chapter’s conclusions. 
2. Flexibility in the power system  
In recent years, the technical literature has coined the term “flexibility” in relation to the requirements of 
power systems to integrate intermittent resources. However, its definition remains vague and implies 
different meanings depending on the context. In this chapter, flexibility refers to the ability of power 
systems to utilise its resources to manage net load variation and generation outage over various time 
horizons. Net load is defined as load minus supply from intermittent resources, such as wind and solar. As 
a commodity, flexibility has several dimensions including capacity, duration and ramp rate or lead time, 
for demand-side resources. Boscán and Poudineh (2015) distinguish between short-term flexibility, 
associated to real-time balancing of the grid, and long-term flexibility, which relates to the adequacy of 
generation capacity and investment.  
It is also helpful to distinguish between resource flexibility, which refers to the built-in flexibility of a 
particular resource, such as demand response; and system flexibility, which comprehends transmission, 
network flexibility, and market design. The transmission network is not an additional source of flexibility 
per se, but the lack of an adequate transmission network severely affects power system flexibility.   
2.1  Flexibility-enabling resources 
There are various options available to manage the variability of intermittent resources. As shown in Figure 
1, these range from storage technologies, interconnections, demand-side management to distributed 
generation and curtailment.  
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Figure 1: Options to manage variability of renewables 
 
 
Electrical energy storage technologies are among the most effective ways of absorbing net load variability, 
and although there are various options available, not all of them are commercially viable. Figure 2 (IEC, 
2011) classifies existing technologies into five main categories: mechanical, electrochemical, chemical, 
electrical and thermal. Of these, the most widely used form is mechanical: specifically, pumped hydro, 
which accounts for 99% of global energy storage (127 GW of installed capacity). Given its unparalleled 
start-up and ramp rate capability, it is a particularly attractive option to address variability from 
renewables. The second largest electrical energy storage in operation is compressed air but, compared to 
pumped hydro, it has a negligible global capacity (440 MW). Other means of storage such as batteries, 
capacitors or heat storage currently have very low penetration levels, but recent improvements in 
technology and cost of electrochemical batteries (particularly, Lithium-Ion) makes them a promising 
source of electrical storage with various benefits to the power system, including flexibility. However, the 
key to the success of storage technologies is the viability of business models that allow the industry to 
move forward, beyond demonstration cases and towards massive penetration (see Section 4.1.4). 
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Figure 2: Storage technologies classification  
 
Source: Authors, adapted from IEC (2011) 
 
The interconnectivity of power systems is a determinant factor in the extent to which power systems are 
flexible. In fact, not only interconnections have the potential to facilitate integration of variable generation, 
but also can contribute to energy security, decarbonisation and affordability. In Europe, for example, 
where there is a strong interest to create an integrated, sustainable and competitive energy market, there 
is a specific target to achieve 10% of interconnection (as a share of the installed production capacity) for 
each member state. Although the European interconnection capacity has increased considerably during 
the last decade, there remain member states that have less than the 10% goal and are thus isolated from 
the internal electricity market (EC, 2015). Figure 3 shows the countries with higher and lower than 10% 
interconnection. Countries such as the UK, Spain, Italy and Ireland need to invest in their interconnection 
capacity. In contrast, Denmark, which has a high penetration of wind power, has benefited significantly 
from the interconnection with countries such as Germany, besides the existing interconnections with 
NordPool countries. 2  The EU third energy package clearly states the need for cross border 
interconnections but for this to become a reality; it is required to design an efficient regulatory framework 
that incentivises investment. The existing legal framework seems to favour a regulated business model 
for interconnection expansion, but it also allows for private merchant transmission initiatives. 
2 Interestingly and widely cited by various media outlets, on 9 July 2015, Denmark generated 140% of its electricity 
demand with wind power. However, Denmark managed the excess production by exporting to neighboring Norway, 
Sweden and Germany. In relation to the relevance of interconnections, Green and Vasilakos (2012) perform an 
econometric analysis of Denmark’s electricity exports and find that exporting on windy days is a cost-effective way 
to deal with intermittency.    
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Because of its suitability for relieving network congestion and providing ancillary services, such as fast and 
long term reserve requirements, distributed generation, e.g. combined heat and power, is well-positioned 
to increase power system flexibility (IEA, 2005). Traditionally, large conventional power plants served this 
purpose, and depending on their types, have been an effective source of flexibility. The most important 
requirements of flexible operation for conventional plants are start-up time, ramp rate and partial load 
efficiency (Boscán and Poudineh, 2015), but these are not fully available in all types of conventional 
generation. For instance, cycling capability of most current coal power plants are limited and their ramp 
rate is generally low3. The same applies to nuclear power plants with even more degrees of inflexibility. 
The most flexible types of thermal generation are gas fired power plants but. However, cycling and 
ramping increase the wear and tear of plants, as well as their heat rate.  
In recent years, the need for an efficient portfolio of flexibility resources has drawn attention to demand-
side flexibility. In fact, with the advancement in information and communication technologies (ICT) many 
of the generation services can also be provided through demand response. In the UK, currently some 
forms of demand side flexibility are being traded in the balancing market. For example, through National 
Grid’s Frequency Control Demand Management scheme, frequency response is provided through 
automatic interruption of contracted consumers when the system frequency transgresses the low 
frequency relay setting on site. Furthermore, National Grid is utilising slower responding demand 
response for load following services. Similar arrangements exist in other countries as demand side 
schemes gradually find their way into balancing markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Coal power plants, however, can be designed to operate flexibility.  
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Figure 3: The European electricity interconnection as a share of total installed capacity in 2014 
 
 
Source: Authors based on the information from EC (2015) 
 
Curtailment, a form of negative dispatch in which the system operator reduces the output of wind and 
solar generation to maintain stability, happens more frequently in the absence of sufficient flexibility. The 
issues that trigger curtailment are related to system balancing, system dynamics or grid constraints and, 
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therefore, the level of curtailment can be used as a negative metric for measuring power system flexibility. 
Although many countries with increasing shares of renewables have attempted to improve the flexibility 
of their systems, there remain some with high levels of curtailment. For example, China had an average 
curtailment rate of 18% in 2012 (Li, 2015), whereas this figure was 4% for the US during the same period 
(NREL, 2014). As more renewables are integrated, these figures will rise, unless more flexibility is enabled. 
For example, the risk of over-generation in the afternoon (low demand periods) is high in California and 
this is likely to become even worse when the renewable portfolio requirement increases from 33% by 
2020 to 50% by 2030, as currently proposed.  
The use of flexibility services is not limited to addressing net load variation. Indeed, flexibility has three 
different functions in the power system and three final users of flexibility services. An important role of 
flexibility is to ease the integration of intermittent resources. The transmission system operator (TSO), 
which is responsible for balancing the grid, is thus one of the main procurers of flexibility services. Another 
function of flexibility is to manage congestion in the electricity distribution network for which the 
distribution system operator (DSO) is the buyer of flexibility. The third usage of flexibility is for portfolio 
optimisation. The market players (e.g., aggregators, suppliers, balancing responsible parties) can obtain 
flexibility services to fulfil their energy obligations in a cost efficient way by, for example, arbitraging 
between generation and demand response. Table 1 presents the parties involved in the procurement side 
of flexibility services in liberalised electricity markets. It is worth mentioning that although TSOs or DSOs 
procure flexibility services in a competitive manner, these companies recover their costs in a regulated 
fashion.  
Table1: Flexibility service and their final users 
Party 
 
Activity Business 
model 
Commodity Use Final objectives 
TSO 
 
Balancing 
the grid 
Regulated 
business 
System flexibility service System-wide Grid planning 
and operational 
efficiency 
maximisation 
DSO 
 
Managing 
distribution 
grid 
Regulated 
business 
System flexibility service Local, 
regional or 
national 
Grid planning 
and operational 
efficiency 
maximisation 
Market 
player 
 
Trading 
electricity   
Price set by 
market rules 
     Resource flexibility 
(Portfolio optimisation) 
System-wide Profit 
maximisation 
Source: Adapted from EDSO (2014) 
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3. Trading flexibility services   
The ability to trade flexibility services is important for the reliable operation of power systems. In the 
currently liberalised electricity sector, flexibility services are traded in intra-day and day-ahead markets 
as an energy product or in ancillary service markets as control reserve products (Boscán and Poudineh, 
2015). Market design has important implications for procuring flexibility in an efficient and reliable 
manner: even when there are sufficient resources available for managing variable generation, the market 
may not have been designed to incentivise efficient use of them. For example, in some US regions where 
there are no sub-hourly electricity markets, variations in the net load need to be met by regulation services 
which have a high ramping rate and thus are among the costliest flexibility services. This inefficiency 
results from the market design because it has been shown that variable generation requires does not 
require a faster ramping rate than the contingency reserves (Boscán and Poudineh, 2015). 4   
As the current electricity markets in many countries were not originally designed to manage a large share 
of intermittent resources, further penetration of variable generation might lead to increased market 
power, reduced competition and reliability degradation (Ela et al., 2014). Additionally, it is not clear 
whether the current market design can provide a sufficient level of flexibility when the need for it 
increases in the system. In the US electricity market, several mechanisms are in place to incentivise 
flexibility, e.g., centralized scheduling and pricing, 5-min settlements, ancillary service markets, make-
whole payments, and day-ahead profit guarantees (see Ela et al., 2014). However, a different design might 
be required to incentivise the right amount of flexibility resources both in the short run and the long run. 
Non-traditional resources such as demand response, storage and even variable generation itself can 
contribute to system flexibility when the incentives are provided. Evidence from the GB electricity market 
shows that, with more uptake of variable generation, the real time price volatility increases much faster 
than the day-ahead price volatility and flexible resources can take the advantages of this volatility (Pöyry, 
2014).  
Flexibility enabling contracts can be traded either directly between the final user and the resource 
provider or through an aggregator. The capacity of supply is an important factor for the way that trade 
can happen: transaction cost is an impediment for the small capacity resources to participate directly in 
the market. The small resource providers such as households thus can be aggregated and offered to the 
market through an intermediary. Figure 4 presents the way that demand side flexibility-enabling contracts 
can be traded in an electricity market. 
 
 
 
4 On November 1, 2014 California ISO has introduced an energy imbalance market (EIM) mostly to allow grid 
operators of adjacent areas to share and economically dispatch a broad array of resources for efficient renewable 
integration.  
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Figure 4: Trading demand-side flexibility services in the electricity market 
 
 
3.1 Designing contracts for flexibility services 
Flexibility is a multi-dimensional commodity and the marginal cost at each dimension is the private 
information of the resource provider. Therefore, the procurer should design the contract such that 
informational rents are minimised and the cost of integrating renewables is efficient. Designing optimal 
contracts for flexibility services under multidimensional information asymmetry is challenging and 
becomes even more important when the cost of balancing services increases with an increased uptake of 
intermittent resources.  
In bilateral contracts (between the resource providers and the final users or an aggregator), when the 
sellers differentiate themselves by concentrating on different dimensions, the procurer can design the 
contract in a way to extract all informational rents (Li et al., 2015). For example, consider a system 
operator who aims to control thermostats in two households’ premises and for this she offers a contract 
based on two parameters of lead time and duration of load control 5. Under the condition that the 
households are very similar in terms of the disutility they experience at each dimension (lead time and 
duration of load control), there is no way for the system operator to design a truth-telling contract which 
extracts all informational rents. In this case, the system operator needs to give up some rents by distorting 
downward the contract specifications (lead time and duration of load control) from the optimal level for 
one of the households. However, if the two households differ significantly at each dimension, the system 
operator can extract all the rents. This happens when, for example, the flexibility procurer knows that one 
household incurs a high disutility for the short lead time and the other for the long duration of load control. 
Naturally, the former household prefers a contract with higher lead time but can sacrifice on load control 
5 So the contract is in the form of a payment for specific lead time and duration.  
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duration, whereas the later value more a contract which has a shorter load control duration. In this case 
both households select a contract which is optimal for them.  
The above results also hold when there are multiple flexibility resource providers.  Therefore, more 
differentiation across the dimensions of flexibility by the resource providers benefits the buyer and vice 
versa. If the contract is designed (and offered) by flexibility resource provider rather than the system 
operator, the results are not necessarily symmetric to the previous case. For example, double 
marginalisation6 can happen although the supplier can change the specification of contract to avoid this. 
Additionally, when the resource provider enters into a contract with an aggregator who faces an uncertain 
demand for flexibility in the market,  the optimal mechanism requires reducing the specification of 
contract at each dimensions, i.e., it is optimal for aggregator to buy less compared to the case of a 
deterministic demand. 
An intermediary (for example, an aggregator) might face a demand for multiple flexibility products with 
various specifications in terms of capacity, duration, response time, and ramp rate. This is because the 
impact of intermittent resources on the power system can be considered in four time frames: frequency 
regulation, load following, scheduling and unit commitment (Boscan and Poudineh, 2015). Frequency 
regulation requires very speedy response and ramp rates and thus is costly. The requirement for speed of 
response decreases as the time frame moves towards load following and beyond. Therefore, for each time 
frame a different flexibility service and consequently flexibility contracts are needed. In this case the 
intermediary needs to make a decision between supplying all range of flexibility products or only some of 
them. Theoretically, there is a fundamental trade-off in the intermediary’s product selection decision in 
this case. This trade-off results from the market share of slower responding flexibility resources versus 
the revenue obtained from more expensive flexibility services (e.g. regulation services).  
3.2 Next generation utilities and system flexibility 
As the traditional utility model is evolving, next generation utility concepts emerge as a result of rapid 
advancement in ICT. Demand response, electric vehicles, energy efficiency and intelligent grid 
management will have an evolved function as described in table 2 (Hansen and Levine, 2008). For example, 
demand response which traditionally has been used for emergency curtailment to protect grid frequency 
under an emergency condition (load shedding), gradually enters the electricity markets as a capacity 
resource as well as balancing service at all time frames. In the current electricity markets the need for 
system flexibility may not be critical yet, but it is not clear that this will remain the case in the future, as 
long as renewables gain a greater share in the generation mix. Access to various sources of flexibility 
services both on the supply and demand side along with appropriate market design provide an 
opportunity to profit from short term spikes in spot prices, balancing markets and specific contracts with 
grid operators.  
It is likely that next generation utilities will be more reliant on ICT, which are already storming the industry 
with “smart”, programmable, communicable gadgets and “Internet of Things” (see the chapter by Cooper 
6 Double marginalization happens when the two actors across the supply chain apply their own mark-ups over the 
price which results in higher deadweight losses.  
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(2016).  Although ICT has always been important in the power sector, especially for system protection, 
with the need for more flexibility and a reliable real time operation, the role of ICT becomes even more 
critical. Smart grid, smart meters, intelligent home management systems and various forms of advanced 
technologies will enable utilities to profit from trading flexibility services.  
Table 2: Next generation utility concepts 
 Traditional approach Conventional wisdom now Next generation 
concepts 
Demand response    Emergency curtailment 
 
Peak shaving Resource for capacity 
and balancing service 
Plug-in electric vehicles R&D only 
 
Flexible load Vehicle-to-grid storage 
resource 
Intermittent resources Marginal fuel saving, 
no capacity value 
 
Some capacity value with gas 
fired firming 
Resource for capacity 
and balancing service 
Grid automation and 
intelligence 
Unidirectional from 
source to load 
Some intelligence to 
automate loads 
Omnidirectional web of 
sources &loads 
Energy efficiency Up to the customer Component-based utility 
programs 
Breakthrough-level 
system efficiencies 
Source: adapted from Hansen and Levine (2008) 
4.  New Business Models 
The electricity sector landscape is changing rapidly with the integration of renewables, technological 
advancement in ICT and the emergence of various new players. Amidst this environment, entrants are 
coming to participate in electricity markets, but in completely novel ways. Decentralized generation units 
are beginning to compete with traditional generators. Aggregators, acting as intermediaries, acquire the 
right to modify energy consumption from end users, and sell it in the form of available capacity. Software 
and technology developers offer energy management solutions, intelligent devices and storage capability. 
Ventures among these new players, teaming up to offer new services are becoming more frequent, and 
the sum of it all depicts a creatively chaotic picture. Yet, these entrants share some common features: 
relative to incumbents that rely on traditional, large scale industrial assets, entrants have considerably 
lower fixed costs, and depend on non-traditional, knowledge based assets.7 
Taken together, they constitute a layer of innovation that is being added to the existing structure of power 
systems and challenges the traditional business model, in which utilities enjoy a relatively undisputed 
position, and consumers act as the passive end of the supply chain. All of this contests the status quo, 
motivates incumbents to reconsider their roles and, potentially, adopt new ones in accordance with the 
changing environment. Regulators, in consequence, are being led to consider new, previously unforeseen 
sources of involvement and potential dispute among entrants and incumbents.  
 
7 Rodgers (2003) identifies three categories of knowledge-based assets, namely human assets: attitudes, perceptions, 
and abilities of employees; organizational: intellectual property such as brands, copyrights, patents, and trademarks; 
relational: knowledge of and acquaintance with communities, competitors, customers, governments, and suppliers 
in which the company operates.  
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4.1 A partial taxonomy of new actors, new roles and new business models 
The rapidly evolving nature of innovation and frequent function overlap prevents an exhaustive 
enumeration, and mutually exclusive categorization of agents involved. 8  To contribute in the 
understanding of business models leading to increased levels of power system flexibility, a simple, yet 
partial, categorization is proposed as follows: 
1. New actors are the constituents of the innovation layer, which is composed of entrants sparking 
innovation through new software, technology, and market design proposals. Firms, researchers 
and, to a lesser extent, regulators can also be identified here.   
 
2. New roles are defined by new actors, and are assumed by existing market participants and new 
actors alike. Aggregators and prosumers are two good examples of this category.  
 
3. Business models are the commercial outcome of innovation brought about by the new actors. In 
a well-defined business model, the sources of revenue, cost and, therefore, profitability are 
unambiguously defined. Furthermore, business models are subject to evolution and depend on 
the overall economic environment: some will appear, consolidate and evolve into new areas of 
action, while others will disappear, given their lack of viability (for more on this, see the chapter 
by Nillesen and Pollitt (2016)).  
 
4.1.1 Aggregation for Demand-Side Management  
Aggregation for demand-side management is one of the most consolidated existing business models for 
power system flexibility.9 The role of aggregator, fulfilled by energy management software developers 
and other traditional retailers with real-time metering, is to bundle ‘negawatts’ (unused capacity) 10 
offered by commercial and industrial (C&I), and residential consumers of electricity. In exchange for 
capacity and energy usage payments or rebates in their electricity bill, consumers adjust consumption at 
times of peak demand or when required by grid operators. Aggregators sell negawatts in different outlets 
including capacity, balancing, and ancillary services markets, or as part of demand response programs 
carried out by utilities.  
This business model has grown in several countries, including Europe and Asia, but has shown particular 
strength in the US. As an example of its relevance, consider the 2014 capacity auction results for PJM, the 
largest wholesale electricity market in the US: 10.9 GW of demand response capacity were procured, 
which is equivalent to more than 6% of the total. Nevertheless, in the latest episode of a legal battle 
8 In a recent discussion paper by Ofgem on the topic of non-traditional business models, they find the same 
difficulty.  
9 The term “demand-side management” is used to encompass both participation of demand as a resource in 
markets such in capacity markets; and in the conventional demand response sense, which includes interruptible 
loads, load management, peak shaving and so on.  
10 The term ‘negawatts’ has been attributed to Amory Lovins, cofounder and Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain 
Institute, by  a number of publications, including The Economist’s special report on energy and technology (2015), 
and Maurer and Barroso (2011).  
                                                          
20
between power companies and aggregators, demand response in the US has recently received a 
regulatory setback. The federal order that set demand response and generation on equal footing 
regarding payment received by grid operators was vacated last year on the grounds that demand response 
is being overcompensated, inducing inefficient prices that discriminate against generators.11 The final say, 
though, has not been declared yet: at the time of writing, the US Supreme Court of Justice has decided to 
re-consider the case.  
From a more general perspective, though, the role of aggregation for demand-side management goes 
beyond conventional demand response. Aggregators typically rely on software solutions and other 
hardware to realize efficiency gains and, therefore, they are shifting to developing integrated energy 
management solutions. As a result, some of them are rebranding themselves as software developers while 
others are emphasizing on the role of hardware as a tool for demand-side management, while retaining 
their role as aggregators. They are also entering agreements with utilities and grid operators to manage 
intermittency from renewables with demand-side resources, an element that emphasizes their growing 
role as a supplier of flexibility. For example, EnerNOC – a US based aggregator known for its demand 
response operations who is re-focusing its business towards software development – ran a pilot project 
with the Bonneville Power Administration to show the capabilities of demand response to deliver short-
term balancing. Such new services from demand response are especially valuable as the likelihood of over 
generation increases in places such as California. Also, as the role of distributed assets increases, 
aggregators will not only manage demand but will make a transition into virtual power plant managers.  
4.1.2 Thermostats as a Demand-Side Management Tool  
Although thermostats are key for controlling energy consumption in residential, and C&I buildings, they 
have rarely been a particularly interesting object of attention for retail consumers. With the majority of 
sales channelled through dealers offering service contracts, well-established products developed by long-
standing incumbents have taken the lead.  
Nevertheless, the usually undisrupted retail market for thermostats became invigorated once Nest Labs 
transformed this typically uninteresting device into an appealing gadget for tech-savvy consumers, 
through the development of user-adaptive technology and a well-designed marketing strategy.  
While the argument for significant product differentiation and technological breakthrough by the Nest 
thermostat is not easily argued for, 12  more significantly, their contribution has been to introduce 
innovative business models for flexibility, in which smart thermostats are the key element to enable 
demand-side management.  
According to these business models, smart thermostat users are given the choice to surrender control of 
their load at peak demand hours or when there are seasonal weather variations, and allow the utility to 
adjust consumption, following user-defined comfort levels. In exchange, utilities compensate consumers 
11 Order 745 issued by FERC (March 15, 2011) on the topic of “Demand Response Compensation in Organized 
Wholesale Electricity Markets”.  
12 Ecobee, a Canadian competitor to Google-owned Nest Labs, introduced the first WiFi connected thermostat at 
least two years before the Nest thermostat hit the market. 
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with rebates on their final bill or through direct payments. Not only have other smart thermostat 
developers followed suit, but utilities have also created bring-your-own-thermostat demand-side 
management programs. Moreover, non-traditional demand response services (increasing consumption as 
opposed to reduce demand) are also becoming increasingly important. These forms of demand side 
management can be particularly relevant for places with over-generation, like California, Texas, Denmark 
and Germany.  
Looking forward, there is ample room for these business models to develop further, as the penetration of 
programmable thermostats still remains very low.13 The upfront cost of deployment, though, is a barrier 
for many customers. As a solution, and in a similar vein to business models in the telecommunications 
industry where service carriers and hardware providers team up, utility companies are subsidizing the 
deployment of smart thermostats. In summary, thermostat-based demand-side management is setting 
new standards in the adoption of new technology and in the development of demand-side management 
models that could easily extend to other devices. 
4.1.3 Software Developers  
 
The emerging business models for power system flexibility are closely intertwined to smart grid 
development. Coupled with hardware, software is pervasive across processes and solutions. Remotely 
controlling devices, smart metering, and identifying consumption patterns to reduce demand charges, are 
just some of the many examples that highlight the role of software (for more details, see the chapter by 
Cooper).  
 
In some models, software is bundled with hardware as part of the complete solution. For example, on-
site energy storage vendor Stem describes its system as composed of three elements: software, batteries 
and a real-time meter. Others focus on software development and work with any kind of hardware. Such 
is the case of software vendor BuildingIQ, which specializes on demand-side management for heating, 
ventilation and air conditioning systems in C&I buildings. 
 
More generally, and as part of an emerging trend, many agents currently developing new business models  
for power system flexibility are expanding their role into software-as-a-service suppliers. This licensing 
and delivery model has consolidated in recent years among software developers, because it allows end 
users to reduce hardware, upfront and maintenance costs, and has enabled scalable usage and payment. 
On the other hand, vendors obtain a recurring revenue stream from subscription payments. Firms like 
EnerNOC, a leading aggregator, are following this trend as a growth strategy and are also creating 
interactions with other existing business models. In summary, software is already playing a central role in 
the new business models for power system flexibility and its relevance will only continue to grow.  
4.1.4 Storage Providers  
13 Consider, for example, the American market where (according to the US Energy Information), 85% of American 
homes with central heating own thermostats, but less than half of these are programmable. Similarly, 60% of those 
with central cooling own them, but approximately a half of these are programmable. 
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Location within the supply chain largely defines the scale, response time, size and, therefore, suitability 
of different storage solutions to increase flexibility in the power system. Although not fully consolidated,14 
recent years have witnessed a considerable expansion of electricity storage business models, with greater 
emphasis on behind-the-meter (distributed) than in front-of-the-meter (grid-level) solutions. A report by 
the firm GTM Research (2015), sponsored by the US Energy Storage Association, reveals that distributed 
storage deployments increased more than threefold between 2013 and 2014 in the US and the non-
residential sector accounted for the lion’s share of this amount. They expect the distributed storage 
segment to continue growing in years to come, outpacing grid-level storage, until it reaches 45% of the 
total market share by 2019. 
Distributed storage targeted at C&I, large residential, and institutional consumers is one of these models. 
In most markets, these clients pay for the energy they consume plus a share of their peak demand within 
a billing period. Coupled with software analytics and real-time metering to analyze peak-shaving 
opportunities, suppliers offer on-site storage systems to go off-grid when demand is high. Typical 
agreements between storage suppliers and their customers are based on revenue sharing, but initial 
investments, operational and price risk are assumed by suppliers.  
The economic case for residential energy storage is different and, given current conditions in most retail 
markets, difficult to make. To begin with, most residential customers have fixed price retail contracts and, 
therefore, price arbitrage and peak shaving become mostly irrelevant. Furthermore, in markets where 
residential solar PV systems are becoming widely adopted, it is sensible to acquire storage if customers 
wish to become entirely independent of the grid. Yet not only are such green-energy-oriented customers 
a well-off minority, but net metering – an incentive that is particularly relevant in many states of the US – 
is at odds with it: being completely off grid would imply cutting off a source of revenue that helps to pay 
the cost of the solar facility investment.  Unless the cost of residential storage is competitive enough or 
there is an economic incentive to install it, this business model is not viable.  
However, distributed energy storage is one of the most effective resources to enable power system 
flexibility, as it can instantaneously balance power supply and demand. The aggregated deployment of 
storage capability creates virtual power plants that, depending on market design innovations at the 
distribution level may create sources of revenue for owners of this kind of resources. Grid operators 
interested in the procurement of capacity, reactive power, and voltage management might well provide 
the necessary source of revenue to further boost the adoption of distributed storage, including residential 
applications. In fact, following the recent introduction of Tesla Motor’s batteries for C&I and residential 
applications, at an approximate price of $500/KWh, its partner company Solar City clarified that the 10-
year lease agreements, with which they typically operate, for solar and storage systems contemplated 
revenue sharing of grid service income.   
4.1.5 Market Design Innovation  
14 Energy storage, mostly pumped hydro, accounts for 2% of total US generation capacity.  
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Driven by technology, the new business models are already transforming the way in which power systems 
operate. However, given the crucial role of incentives, market design and regulation can either hinder or 
help their consolidation and evolution as a tool to increase flexibility.  
Regulators and system operators in areas where renewables are on the way to playing a more relevant 
role are considering different market design innovations. Many of these, though, still appear to have a 
piecemeal and tentative approach. Some of them prioritize the role of short-term balancing, whereas 
others emphasize the role of demand-side management and long-term resource adequacy. While there 
is no one-size-fits-all solution, restructuring existing electricity market designs to enable flexibility requires 
a holistic approach. Hogan (2014) argues that adapting existing markets to renewables requires, first, 
recognizing the value of energy efficiency, including demand-side management; second, upgrading grid 
operations to increase short-term flexibility; and third, incentivizing long-term flexibility investments, i.e., 
adopting flexible resources. 
An interesting example comes from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) which is 
currently developing a flexible ramping product, aimed at minimizing short term (5-minute to 5-minute) 
load variations. In contrast to conventional ancillary services, this product focuses on addressing net load 
changes between time intervals and not on standby capacity aimed at meeting demand deviations within 
a time period. In addition, an innovative feature of this proposal is that it is continuously procured and 
dispatched.   
Another interesting experience is Southern California Edison’s recent capacity procurement of 2.2 GW of 
behind-the-meter solar PV generation, storage and demand-side management to alleviate congestion in 
particular zones of the grid. Besides being a complex process because of the necessary cross-comparisons 
between technologies, location of assets and the diverse nature of contracts with suppliers, it reveals 
emerging business models in which generation and distributed energy resources are treated on a par with 
conventional generation. Of particular interest is the agreement with distributed solar generation 
company Sun-Power which assumes and enhances the role of aggregator. Upon requirement of the utility, 
the aggregator commits to achieving savings through solar power, which it procures at specific sites from 
generation facilities scattered throughout different grid locations –a Virtual Power Plant– without 
exporting it to the grid. 
Also, in the context of a comprehensive review of their power system, the single electricity market for 
Ireland has decided on a number of measures aimed at adapting it to the 2020 goal of 40% of renewables 
in Irish electricity demand. On the market design front, relying on a hybrid regulated tariff/auction 
mechanism to procure contracts with maturities between 1 to 15 years, it has been agreed to increase 
the number of ancillary services procured from 7 to 14, including specific ramping products with horizons 
of up to 8 hours. 
To sum up, market design innovation is already playing a key role and it will have a substantial impact on 
the consolidation of emerging business models.  
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4.2 New Business Models and the Future of Utilities  
The absence of large-scale economically viable storage and an entirely passive demand-side have justified 
the existence of the traditional power system business model, but technological breakthrough has begun 
to challenge this approach.  From this follows a central question for the future, namely: what is the impact 
of new business models on existing utilities? 
The immediate consequence is that the business-as-usual operation of utilities is challenged, but the 
extent of the impact depends on the strategic decisions that both incumbents and entrants make. 
Incumbents can choose a confrontational approach to deter consolidation of the emerging business 
models or can accommodate to entry (see the chapter by Burger and Weinmann).  
Evidence shows that confrontation is already happening. The extended legal battle between power 
producers and aggregators in the US over Federal Order 745 mandating equal treatment between demand 
response and conventional generators in wholesale markets is an example of this. In France, a similar 
conflict over imbalance mechanisms arose between retailers and aggregator Voltalis.  
Nonetheless, the line between confrontation and adaptation is not clearly delineated because several 
incumbents are extending their activities into new business models. Big players, including large vertically 
integrated energy holdings are entering the aggregation business, and are acquiring stakes in energy 
management developments, effectively extending their scope. For example, NRG, which owns 50 GW of 
fossil-fuel dominated generation assets in the US acquired Energy Curtailment Specialists in 2013, a 
leading US aggregator with a portfolio of 2 GW. In France, Schneider Electric acquired leading European 
aggregator Energy Pool in 2010, which controls more than 1.5 GW in demand response assets. Also, Swiss 
generator Alpiq, which owns a generation portfolio of 6 GW including hydro, fossil and nuclear, acquired 
British aggregator Flexitricity in 2014.  
Entrants, on the other hand, are partnering in their offers, bundling products in markets that show 
potential first-mover advantages. For example, Tesla and Advanced Microgrid Solutions (AMS) have 
recently announced a sales deal to install up to 500 MWh in battery capacity as part of a grid-scale storage 
project. EnerNOC and Tesla have also announced a partnership to bundle batteries with software 
solutions to enable demand-side management. Google’s acquisition of Nest Labs in 2014 for USD 3.2 
billion is yet another indication of the rapidly changing face of the new business models.  
The future will depend, mostly, on these strategic interactions and while it is impossible to predict the 
future, one thing is certain:  utilities as we know them today will definitely change. Table 3 summarises 
the emerging players and associated new business models for the flexible power systems of future. 
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Table 3: Summary of new business models for power system flexibility 
Business model Characteristics of the agreements 
Aggregation for demand-side-
management 
- Consumers obtain capacity and/or energy usage payments  
- Negawatts are sold in organized markets or as part of bilateral 
agreements with utilities 
Thermostats as a demand-side 
management tool 
- Consumers acquire the device with a subsidy from utility 
- Consumers enter direct-load control agreements, allowing 
load to be adjusted to pre-defined comfort settings.  
- Consumers are given rebates or paid for energy not consumed 
- Utility manages peak load with higher cost efficiency 
- Hardware sales increase 
Storage (C&I clients) - Consumers pay no upfront cost for software or hardware 
deployment. Alternatively, supplier delays deployment costs until 
first revenue streams are realised 
- Revenue from demand charge reduction is shared between 
consumer and supplier 
Storage (residential) - Upfront deployment cost is borne by households 
- Consumers benefit from going off-grid, price arbitrage or grid 
service payments 
Market design innovation - Utilities procuring services through a number of bilateral 
contracts with suppliers of flexibility 
- New ancillary services 
- New short-term services focused on short –term balancing 
Software - Software-as-a-service 
- Vendors collect subscription fees 
- End users reduce hardware, upfront and maintenance costs 
 
5 Conclusions  
Efficiently integrating renewables requires increasing flexibility and technological progress is facilitating 
this process. Over the last few decades, technology has pushed the operational boundary of utilities away 
from a traditional paradigm, but the changes happening now are paving the way for a next generation of 
utilities. According to this emerging paradigm, new actors sparking innovation are defining new roles and, 
as a result, interconnectors, distributed generators, storage providers and suppliers of demand response 
are competing with incumbents, while relying on the novelty of their business models to provide flexibility 
services. Meanwhile, the interaction of regulation, technological innovation, and business model 
evolution are shaping the strategic interaction among players, who have several pieces of private 
information. Markets, contracts and regulatory frameworks will have to change to become more 
compatible with the requirements of the new environment.  
These trends provide a sense of the forces shaping the emergence of a completely new state of affairs in 
which existing utilities will have evolved and will coexist with new players in the provision of flexibility. 
The final shape of power systems will not be unique, as it is path-dependent due to the effects of 
technological, financial, and institutional legacies. What is certain is that the change is inevitable and 
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utilities as are known today will definitely change. In the new environment, the opportunities for utilising 
competition among the suppliers of flexibility increase. In conclusion, as flexibility becomes scarce in the 
system, innovative flexibility-enabling business models initiated by new actors will be highly valuable and 
critical for the efficient provision of flexibility services. 
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Abstract
Power system flexibility, or the ability to adapt to uncertainty and variability, is
a desirable quality of systems operating with substantial shares of variable renewable
energy (VRE). Engineers, policymakers and industry stakeholders have so far devel-
oped an important body of work -which this paper reviews - describing and quantifying
what flexibility is, but its economic properties have not been analyzed thus far. To
address this gap, and informed by its technical properties, this paper proposes three
postulates that guide the economic modelling of flexibility for product, contract and
market design purposes. These are: the multi-attribute nature of flexibility, the imper-
fect substitutability among its elements, and the heterogeneity of the flexibility product
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1 Introduction
Following an upward trend, the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2015) reported that,
on a global scale, 130 GW of renewable capacity was added during 2014; the fastest growth
rate registered to date. Onshore wind accounted for more than one-third of all renewable
capacity additions, while solar photovoltaic (PV) and hydropower represented one-third and
one-fifth, respectively. Other renewable technologies grew at a slower pace but, overall,
renewable capacity accounted for more than 45% of all net additions in the power sector.
With a renewable share of total electricity generation standing at 22% by the end of 2013,
the IEA projects it to reach 26% by 2020.
The aforementioned figures confirm the predominant role that variable renewable energy
(VRE) has already gained and its expected increase in the years to come, as technological
improvements and cost reductions materialize while policy makers prioritize decarbonisation
in all economic activities, including electricity generation. However, increasing the share of
renewables exposes power systems to greater uncertainty and variability, particularly in the
short term. Not only does the generating source change over time, i.e. neither wind blows
always with the same intensity nor the sun shines equally at all times, but any forecast
will always include some degree of error, which tends to increase as renewable generation
becomes prevalent in power systems. (Katz and Cochran, 2015; Katz et al., 2015b).
Ever since power systems have existed, operators have dealt with the challenge of vari-
ability and uncertainty in demand and generation resources, and have developed a number
of tools to deal with it. With the advent of market mechanisms in the power industry,
many of these are well-established and respond to both physical and economic requirements.
But the perspective of relying on larger shares of VRE generation poses a challenge that
requires increasing the overall adaptability of the system to uncertain variations, including
changes in market design (Ela et al., 2014). In other words, as power systems become more
operationally flexible by increasing their ability to modify supply or demand within time-
frames that can vary between minutes and hours, they become more resilient to fluctuations,
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and VRE can become more efficiently integrated. As a result, the increased flexibility of a
power system becomes evident in the lower risk of renewable curtailment, negative pricing
and greater confidence on the revenue streams of power plants. Furthermore, besides its
relevance for VRE integration, flexibility matters because it can reduce overall system costs
and reduce the environmental impact of power system operations (Cochran et al., 2014).
In the second section of this paper, by way of examples from Denmark and California,
I illustrate the impact of VRE on the operation of power systems and how can flexibility
facilitate its integration. This serves as motivation for the third section of the paper where
I present a literature review on the subject of power system flexibility, which is organized
according to the main topics that have attracted the interest of academics, policymakers and
stakeholders writing about it.
Despite the fact that, in recent years, the technical literature has shown interest in
defining power system flexibility and quantifying it at a system-wide level, it can take different
forms and imply different meanings. As Ulbig and Andersson (2012) note: “...flexibility is
often not properly defined and may refer to very different things, ranging from the quick
response times of certain generation units, e.g. gas turbines, to the degree of efficiency of a
given power market setup”. Section 3 aims, therefore, to demystify the concept and present
an overview of the current state of the debate on the topic.
Another related issue is that flexibility has remained so far a chiefly technical concept
discussed by engineers, while its economic properties have not been sufficiently studied.
Although related to capacity and energy, two typically traded products in existing electricity
markets, a fundamental claim of this paper is that flexibility is a heterogeneous commodity
characterized by multiple, imperfectly substitutable attributes. This view is developed in the
fourth part of the paper, where the economic properties of flexibility are analyzed.
But precisely because flexibility can mean many things and the different sources from
which it can be obtained may excel in their different attributes, precisions regarding the
specific features of any product that is to be labelled with a “flexibility tag” must be made
32
if any fruitful market design developments are to be achieved. That is, rather than a general
definition of what flexibility is, traders of flexibility require a concrete service that fulfills
a specific technical purpose. The most studied market design problems in the economics
literature have involved designing marketplaces to address market failures where the traded
goods are self-explanatory: “doctors”, “kidneys”, “licenses” and “electricity”, to name just
a few. Yet, a product design stage might be required before proceeding to any actual market
implementation. Surprisingly, besides ad hoc product designs put forward (e.g. ?) and
unlike the existing summaries of lessons learnt so far about the practice of market design
(Roth, 2002, 2008), the economics literature hasn’t addressed so far the question of what
constitutes a set of best practices in the product design stage of a practical market design
problem. In section five of the paper, using flexibility as a guiding example, I describe the
ideal characteristics that a product design must have.
In the sixth section of the paper, using the guidelines outlined in section 5, I examine two
product designs that enable power system flexibility. First, I study the Flex-Offer concept
put forward by engineers and computer scientists to describe the flexibility associated to any
resource in the power system and describe how the flexibility contained in a Flex-Offer can be
transformed into a tradeable product, namely Delta Energy. Second, I address the Flexible
Ramping Product to be traded in the California Independent System Operator (CAISO)
real-time market. Section 7 concludes.
2 The need for flexibility in the operation of power
systems
With the greater reliance on VRE and its projected increase in years to come, stake-
holders, electricity industry analysts and academics have become interested in the question
of efficiently integrating these sources of generation into the grid (see, e.g., Morales et al.
(2013)). Operating systems with substantial shares of VRE increases the uncertainty and
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variability of power systems, particularly in the short term, which requires operators, busi-
ness, and policy makers to incentivize the provision of flexibility, if higher levels of VRE
penetration are to be achieved.
Traditionally, system operators have focused on forecasting system demand (load), which
varies randomly. In contrast, with large shares of VRE, it is sensible for operators to focus
on the net load - electricity demand minus VRE generation - which represents the demand
that must be met by non-renewable sources.
The impact of uncertainty can be readily perceived in the net load, given that it depends
on not one but two random variables (i.e. load and generation), reducing thus the accuracy
of forecasts. The effect of variability, on the other hand, becomes evident in the shorter
peaks, steeper ramps and lower turn-downs required from the non-renewable sources of gen-
eration (Cochran et al., 2015). In consequence, operators require flexibility-enabling assets
(resources) that can adapt to these patterns.
But because “sometimes examples of inflexibility are easier to document than flexibil-
ity” (Cochran et al., 2014), it is interesting to describe what happens when flexibility is
unavailable. On the technical side, the following impacts may be perceived:
1. Difficulty balancing demand and supply which result in frequency excursions and
dropped load.1
2. Significant VRE curtailments, as a result of excess supply or transmission constraints
3. Area balance violations which reflects that a system cannot meet its balancing respon-
sibility
In relation to markets, the following may happen:
1“The two fundamental characteristics of power delivered to a customer are frequency and voltage. As
long as these remain correct the customer will have access to the needed power, and it will have the required
characteristics” (Stoft, 2002). Integrating VRE challenges the stability of both frequency and voltage, which
are the responsibility - respectively - of transmission system operators and distribution system operators.
Flexibility is currently used to keep frequency within acceptable ranges. In the future, DSOs may have an
increasing role as end users of flexibility for voltage control purposes (EDSO, 2014)
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1. Negative market prices which might reflect that conventional generators are unable to
reduce output, demand that cannot absorb excess supply, surplus of renewable energy
or limited transmission capacity
2. Price volatility which can reflect insufficient transmission capacity, limited ramping
availability, insufficiently fast response or limited ability to reduce demand
Illustrating the need for power system flexibility can be understood better by way of
examples. The first of these comes from the Danish power system, which follows.
In the early hours of the 10th of July, 2015, wind blew in Denmark so strongly that
140% of electricity demand was met by the output of windfarms, exporting the excess power
generation through the interconnections with Sweden, Norway and Germany.2
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the Danish load, wind power output, net load (calcu-
lated as load minus wind power output) and the net exchange through all interconnections
with neighboring Germany, Sweden and Norway for both Danish bidding areas (DK1,i.e.
western Denmark and DK2, i.e. eastern Denmark), over the course of four days (08/07/2015
– 11/07/2015). The typical short-term features of systems operating with large shares of
renewables become evident in the figure.
Ideally, to make good use of VRE, generation and demand would have a positive correla-
tion, that is: demand is high when renewables are available or, similarly, demand is low when
renewables become scarce. However, a consequence of this situation is that non-renewable,
dispatchable generators face shorter peaks and, consequently, are compensated for less op-
erating hours, which adversely affects their cost recovery. As an example of this situation,
EURELECTRIC (2011) cites the Spanish case - where renewables are dispatched first and
at zero variable cost - which has led thermal units to have plummeting utilisation rates.
Specifically, in a comparison of this indicator for the 2005-2007 with the 2009-2010 period,
2Many media outlets rejoiced with the record figure, as it proved that relying entirely on VRE was indeed
feasible. For example, see the article in The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/
jul/10/denmark-wind-windfarm-power-exceed-electricity-demand
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the publication reports a 47% decrease for coal-fired power plants and a 30% decrease for
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) plants.
Back to the Danish example, as can be observed in figure 1, during the daytime hours of
Wednesday 8th, Thursday 9th and Friday 10th of July, 2015, the net load showed (relative
to load) shorter peaks which coincided with high levels of demand and generation of wind
energy. For example, between 10 and 11 on the 9th, net load peaked when 84% of total
demand was being satisfied by wind generation. On the same day, net load peaked again
between 17 and 18 when 90% of load was being met by wind.
Figure 1: Net load (load minus wind power generation) and net power exchange in the
Danish power system 08/07/2015 – 11/07/2015
However, VRE supply and load are not always positively correlated. In an empirical
study about the Nordic countries, Holttinen (2005) finds that wind power output and load
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were slightly positively (31%) correlated in the period 2000-2002, but when the sample is
restricted to the winter months, correlation is very close to zero.
In contrast to positive correlation between generation and demand, whenever these two
variables are negatively - and thus unfavorably - correlated, two different ramping effects on
the remaining generation base are induced.
If renewable supply decreases together with increases in demand, system operators must
dispatch generation that is able to ramp up quickly. In figure 1, this can be readily observed
from the afternoon hours of Friday 10th of July onwards, when wind generation began to
decrease at the same time that load increased. Specifically, between 17 and 22 on that date,
net load exhibited a steep ramp rate, whereas load declined.
In contrast, if renewable supply is high when demand is low, dispatchable generators face
deeper turn downs as they must give way for renewables to satisfy demand. In figure 1, this
becomes evident in the early hours of Wednesday 8th of July when net load declined consid-
erably more steeply than load, as wind power generation increased. In fact, the achievement
of the 140% record happened as a coincidence of low demand (during early morning hours),
high wind power output and the existence of interconnections with neighboring countries,
which explains the negative values for the net load. Instead of curtailing generation from
wind turbines - a sign of inflexibility - power was exported. Specifically, in relation to Den-
mark and its approach to manage the intermittency of wind power, Green and Vasilakos
(2011) find that on windy days, Denmark uses exports as a kind of electricity storage. In
coincidence with their finding “. . . that short-term fluctuations in wind output are highly
correlated with short-term fluctuations in net exports of electricity, which is exactly the
efficient pattern of operation dictated by (their) model”, net load and net exchanges are
almost perfectly correlated (98%) in figure 1. Beyond the lesson learnt about Danish system
operation with high shares of wind power their finding illustrates, more generally, the role
of interconnections as an asset to enable power system flexibility.
A second figure (see figure 2) completes the illustration of the Danish power system
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during the days of the record wind power output of July 2015. In it, the net loads of each
Danish bidding area (which differs from the aggregated Danish net load shown in figure 1)
are shown together with the day-ahead (Elspot) system price and Danish price (note that
prices coincided in both Danish bidding areas). Observe (in red) the prices that cleared
the day-ahead market when the record output was achieved. It is easy to see that western
(DK1) net load exhibits greater variability than its eastern (DK2) counterpart. Steeper
ramps and lower turn-downs (including negative values, associated to exports) in the west
than in the east can be explained by the greater concentration of windfarms in this area of
the country and to differences in weather conditions. Regarding prices it is interesting to
note that, relative to the Nordpool system price, prices in the two DK bidding areas were
always slightly below in the period 08/07/2015-10/07/2015, coinciding with the build-up of
wind power output. Sufficient capacity in the interconnections allowed exporting without
curtailing when there was excess supply. However, as soon as wind power output decreased
and net load (particularly in DK1) exhibited a steep ramp, the DK price increased. On
average, 92% of load was covered by wind power on the 10th of July, whereas only 8% was
covered on the 11th. The lower power output had to be compensated with imports on the
11th: on average, 62% of the load was covered by trade with neighboring areas on that
day. However, the remainder had to be covered with ramping capability. The fact that the
price average between the 10th and the 11th spiked so markedly3 shows insufficient flexibility.
Although it is difficult to make precisions with the data considered in this example, it is likely
that relatively inefficient dispatchable generators had to ramp up. Had there been other
flexibility options, such as demand-response or storage or other kind of market mechanisms,
the flexibility procured by the operator would have been less costly.
Another example comes from power system operation in California, the most populous
state in the US4, which has one of the most ambitious energy and environmental goals in
3The average DK price quadrupled, from 5.41 EUR/MWh on 10th of July to 21.83 EUR/MWh on 11th
of July
439.1 million inhabitants as of 2015, according to Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_
of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_population
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Figure 2: Net load (load minus wind power generation) in the DK1 (west), DK2 (east) bid-
ding areas together with system and DK Elspot (day-ahead) prices 08/07/2015 – 11/07/2015
the whole country, including a 50% of retail electricity from renewable sources by 2030.5
Consequently -in an analysis that has involved every single day of operation between 2012
and 2020 - the California Independent System Operator (CAISO, 2016b) has identified a
number of prospective operational challenges, including :
1. Short, steep ramps in both upward and downward directions, which requires either
dispatching or shutting down generation resources quickly and for short periods of
5According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA): “In 2014, California ranked fourth in the
nation in conventional hydroelectric generation, second in net electricity generation from other renewable
energy resources, and first as a producer of electricity from both solar energy and geothermal energy”
http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=CA
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time.
2. Risk of oversupply when excess generation, including renewables, exceeds real-time
demand
3. Reduced frequency response when less operating resources are available to automatically
adjust electricity output for grid reliability purposes
The first two elements of the previous list can be observed in figures 3 and 4, known
in energy circles as “duck curves”. In the first of these, actual and projected net load for
the 11th of January (i.e. a winter day) is shown. Note three ramps: the first (known
as the duck’s tail, estimated by the CAISO in an amount of 8000 MW) happens during
the early morning hours, builds up from around 4 AM and lasts until 7 AM, sunrise time.
The second (known as the duck’s belly) is downwards and reflects the increasing renewable
supply (particularly solar) displacing conventional generation. At around 4 PM, sunset time,
an upward ramp (known as the duck’s neck, estimated at around 11.000 MW) appears again
as demand increases again towards the night hours.
On spring days, as shown in figure 4, the risk of oversupply accentuates as the sun rises
earlier and sets later, inducing a more pronounced “duck belly”, where the afternoon ramp
is estimated in 13000 MW in approximately three hours.
Consequently, (CAISO, 2016b) requires flexible resources that are able to:
1. Sustain an upward/downward ramp,
2. Respond for a defined period of time,
3. Change ramp directions quickly,
4. Store energy or modify use,
5. React quickly and meet expected operating levels,
6. Start with short notice from a zero or low-electricity operating level,
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Figure 3: California’s “Duck curve” on a winter day (net load on January 11th 2012-2020).
Source: (CAISO, 2016b)
7. Start and stop multiple times per day, and
8. Accurately forecast operating capability
To summarize: with high shares of VRE, system operators require flexibility-enabling
assets (resources) that increase the flexibility in the short-term operation of power systems.
These must be able to adapt to the shorter peaks, steeper ramps and lower turn-downs
evident in the system’s net load.
3 Power system flexibility: a literature review
Flexibility has traditionally been associated to rapidly dispatchable generation: power
plants that, given their technological characteristics, can respond quickly at the request
of operators (IEA, 2014). However, a common feature of the existing literature is that it
recognizes that power system flexibility can be obtained from a wider array of resources
besides generation (see figure 5):
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Figure 4: California’s “Duck curve” on a spring day (net load on March 31st 2012-2020).
Source: (CAISO, 2016b)
“Sources of flexibility exist - and can be enhanced- across all of the physical and
institutional elements of the power system, including system operations and mar-
kets, demand-side resources and storage; generation; and transmission networks”
Cochran et al. (2015).
Not only has this been recognized since the publication of two early institutional reports
on VRE integration (namely IEA (2005) and EWEA (2005))6 but emerging business models
are clearly showing that flexibility may originate from different sources in the system (Bosca´n
and Poudineh, 2016a).
EURELECTRIC (2011), for example, claims that demand-side participation and storage,
interconnections, and market tools are all options to manage variability and ensure security
6These studies are considered by EURELECTRIC (2011) to be “the first comprehensive reports describ-
ing the flexibility challenge and possible options . . . ”. In particular, see Annex I in their report for a critical
overview of the existing publications about flexibility requirements.
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Figure 5: Sources of power system flexibility
of supply. The IEA (2014) admits that “while dispatchable power plants are of great impor-
tance, other resources that may potentially be used for balancing are storage, demand-side
management or response, and grid infrastructure”.
Clearly, not all technologies perform in the same way and have intrinsic features that
distinguish them from one another in several dimensions, i.e. a multi-faceted and differing
resource flexibility, also known as technical flexibility. As Ela et al. (2014) describe it: “dif-
ferent types of resource excel at different forms of flexibility, and they have different cost
impacts when providing flexibility”. Such costs, like in the provision of energy, can be fixed
(associated to capital expenses) or variable (associated to operational expenses).
According to the IEA (2014), a power plant is more flexible if it: 1) can start at short
notice (i.e. has a short lead time), 2) can operate at a wide range of generation levels, and 3)
can move quickly between different levels of generation (i.e. can ramp up or down quickly).
Similarly, in a comparison of the existing European generation fleet, EURELECTRIC (2011)
considered several relevant characteristics to assess the technical flexibility of nuclear, hard
coal-fired, lignite-fired, combined cycle gas-fired and pumped storage power plants. Specifi-
cally, they considered the following characteristics relevant to the provision of flexibility: 1)
Start-up time in “cold” conditions, 2) Start-up time in “warm” conditions, 3) Rapidity of
load change (ramp rate), 4) Minimum load level, and 5) Minimum shutdown time.
EURELECTRIC (2011) finds that pumped storage is the most efficient technology, given
its short lead time (i.e. time to dispatch) and fast ramp rate. By comparison, the second
fastest ramping technology are nuclear plants, which can increase or decrease output at a
rate of 5% per minute, but are considerably less efficient in their start-up time from “cold”
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or “warm” conditions.7
Along the same lines as the IEA and EURELECTRIC, Ulbig and Andersson (2012)
- building on the contribution of Makarov et al. (2009) - propose a flexibility trinity to
measure the “ technical capabilities, and related constraints, of individual power system
units to modulate power and energy in-feed into the grid, respectively out-feed out of the
grid”. Specifically, they suggest: 1) Power capability P for up/down regulation (measured in
MW), 2) Energy storage capability E (measured in MWh), and 3) Power ramping capability
R (measured in MW/min). The three metrics are related via integration and differentiation
over the time domain, as figure 6 shows. A fourth, related metric is ramping duration D,
which is defined as the ratio of power to the ramp rate, D = P/R.
Figure 6: The flexibility trinity. Source: Ulbig and Andersson (2012)
7An interesting finding of the study by EURELECTRIC (2011) is that “contrary to common belief,
nuclear power plants may perform in a rather flexible mode if the appropriate (technical) design has been
implemented (as witnessed in countries like Germany and France)”.
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An interesting feature of the flexibility trinity proposed by Ulbig and Andersson (2012) is
that it represents a sufficiently general framework to characterize the flexibility coming from
resources other than generation, as it illustrates the multi-dimensionality and heterogeneity
of flexibility, together with the imperfect substitutability of the elements that compose it.8
However, there are important differences between supply and demand resources. On the
technical side, it is not accurate to include the ramp rate as an element of demand-side
flexibility as this characteristic depends on purely technical constraints, whereas in the case
of demand the change is instantaneous. instead, a more sensible characteristic for demand-
side flexibility is the lead time, i.e. the time elapsed between scheduling and delivery, a key
element in the pricing problem of flexible electricity contracts discussed by Bjorgan et al.
(2000) and in existing demand-response programs, such as Nest thermostat’s “Rush Hour
Rewards”.
Furthermore, unlike supply-side resources, another key characteristic of demand-side flex-
ibility is that a significant human behavior component determines its provision, particularly
when it comes to residential and small and medium sized enterprise consumers, as recognized
by a number of experimental and quasi-experimental studies (e.g. Allcott (2011), Allcott
and Mullainathan (2010)). Consequently, any framework that adequately analyses residen-
tial demand-side flexibility must consider the incentives to voluntarily modify consumption
behavior, as suggested by He et al. (2013).
Relative to industrial consumers, small scale consumers have higher barriers to trade
as a result of higher transaction costs, technological differences, lower trading skills and
different objectives, which motivates the emergence of business models like aggregation: “a
commercial function of pooling de-centralized generation and/or consumption to provide
energy within the system”(EURELECTRIC, 2014).
Given that “flexibility is system specific” (Cochran et al., 2014), the majority of publica-
tions emphasize on a system perspective when defining flexibility (see figure 7) (e.g. Chan-
8Which are the economic properties of flexibility, discussed in section 4
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dler (2008), Silva (2010), Ma (2012), Lannoye et al. (2012), Bertsch et al. (2012), Katz and
Cochran (2015), Zhao et al. (2016)). In essence, they coincide in characterizing flexibility
as the inherent ability of an entity - the power system - to adapt to the challenge of facing
exogenously given, uncertain variations.
For instance, consider the following definition by the IEA:
“In its widest sense power system flexibility describes the extent to which a power
system can adapt to the patterns of electricity generation and consumption in
order to maintain the balance between supply and demand in a cost-effective
manner” (IEA, 2014)
The system perspective to defining flexibility stems from the interest on measurement,
which supports the assessment of a given system’s flexibility, the comparison among systems,
and informing policy decisions. Relevant questions like: “where does system A obtain its
flexibility from?”, “how does flexibility in system A compare to system B?” and “what can be
done to increase the flexibility of system A?” are underlying in this strand of the literature:
“The concept of flexibility often arises when policymakers ask system planners
how much wind and solar generation can be reliably added to the power system.
The question can lead to debate about how flexible a power system is and the
corresponding impacts of adding renewables” (Cochran et al., 2014).
Implicit in these definitions is the (technical) hierarchical assumption that “flexibility is
one element to reliability and . . . a subset of frequency stability; other stability impacts such
as voltage stability can arise when integrating wind and solar into power grids” (Cochran
et al., 2014).
A somewhat different - and influential 9 - perspective to defining flexibility is, for example,
that of EURELECTRIC (2014) (see figure 7) because it emphasizes on the individual behav-
ior of flexibility-enabling assets in response to an external signal, such as price or activation.
9Influential because it has been adopted by a number of power system stakeholders, e.g. EDSO (2014),
OFGEM (2015)
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Figure 7: Definitions of flexibility
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This perspective is more fruitful economically as it relates to the question of incentivizing
the provision of flexibility, rather than assuming that flexibility is a given characteristic of
power systems. Aside exceptions, such as the work by Ela et al. (2012, 2014) and Ela et al.
(2014), the power systems literature has left the question of creating the incentives to provide
flexibility largely unaddressed. This is in spite the fact that it recognizes that innovative
market designs are able to enable flexibility.
Measuring power system flexibility is yet another topic of interest in the literature. With
increasing levels of complexity, Cochran et al. (2014) review three different frameworks to
measure flexibility. The first of these are the visually oriented assessments of flexibility,
which are amenable to non-technical audiences willing to make quick flexibility comparisons
among countries and systems but are limited in scope and precision. Within this kind of
assessment, Yasuda et al. (2012) propose a flexibility chart - a polygonal radar - to measure
the existing installed capacities (GW) of resource flexibility in a given system, including
dispatchable power plants (hydropower, combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and combined
heat and power (CHP)), pumped-hydro storage and interconnection.
A second example of a visually-oriented flexibility assessment is the IEA (2014)’s Grid
Integration of Variable Renewables (GIVAR) project, which employed a visual comparison
tool of fundamental system properties that enable power system flexibility. Specifically, this
approach accounts for:
1. Power area size (total installed capacity of the system under consideration): the greater
the area and the more diverse the power mix is, the greater the likelihood for keeping
the system in balance and the lower the impact of variability and uncertainty is felt.
2. Internal grid strength (installed transmission capacity to transport power within an
area): if there is enough capacity to transport power from one place to the other
within an area, the lower the possibilities that congestion is experienced and thus
resources in the system are less likely to address the challenges of variability.
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3. Interconnection (available capacity to transport power to adjacent areas): if intercon-
nections are available, systems are able to use the flexible resources from its neighbors
4. The number of power markets: there is a trade-off between the number of markets
and the volume of trade. When several, un-coordinated markets exist, there is less
volume of trade and less possibilities of enabling flexibility. On the contrary, if markets
are integrated and coordinated, greater volumes are traded and higher possibilities of
enabling flexibility exist.
5. The geographical spread of VRE generation: the greater the dispersion of VRE genera-
tion facilities, the smoother output will be, as a result of divergent weather conditions
in specific areas within a system.
6. The flexibility of the dispatchable generation portfolio: if the generation fleet is flexible
enough, this impacts favorably the overall flexibility of the system
7. The existence of investment opportunities: power systems are stable if its prospects
for demand growth or renewal of infrastructure are low or inexistent, whereas they
are dynamic if investments are required regardless of VRE integration. Integrating
renewables into dynamic systems is easier because opportunities to create the necessary
infrastructure to efficiently integrate VRE exist.
A second approach to measure power system flexibility described by Cochran et al. (2014)
is the IEA (2014)’s Flexibility Assessment Tool (FAST2) which accounts for the fact that
“power system flexibility is a time-specific quality” (Cochran et al., 2014). Using time series
data of power demand and time-synchronized wind and solar generation, and given a fixed
time horizon and operating state (i.e. the operation level of power plants), this approach
measures the maximum upward or downward change in the supply/demand balance that a
power system is capable of meeting.
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The third approach to measure flexibility described by Cochran et al. (2014) are flexibility
assessments in the context of detailed power system planning, which requires detailed data
on:
1. Physical characteristics of the system including transmission constraints, balancing
area size, VRE source characteristics and generator
2. Institutional characteristics, such as system operation practices and economic and mar-
ket contexts
3. Integration with other energy systems, e.g. transportation, heat.
Nevertheless,
“the data requirements to calculate flexibility in this manner are significant . . .
and may be more appropriate for analyzing systems that might be flexibility
challenged . . . (which) could arise with higher penetration levels of renewable
energy, when flexibility is likely insufficient, or with low levels of renewable energy
being integrated into a portfolio of inflexible conventional generation (e.g., Japan,
Alberta)” (Cochran et al., 2014)
Another important topic in the discussion about power system flexibility refers to the
timescale in which it is provided. With a long-term (planning) perspective, the relevant
question is if the incentives to invest in resources with flexible attributes are in place. This
is important because “if flexible resources are never built, it does not matter what incentives
are introduced in the short-term market - the operator would clearly not have access to
resources that are not built” (Ela et al., 2014). However, according to the study by Bertsch
et al. (2012), no particular emphasis on flexibility must be placed because “any market design
that incentivizes investment in least (total system) cost generation investment does not need
additional incentives for flexibility . . . (because) flexibility (is an) inevitable complement”
of a least cost capacity mix. Bertsch et al. (2012)’s modelling approach is, nevertheless,
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problematic as it assumes that a benevolent social planner is able to minimize discounted
total system costs subject to a number of technical constraints, hardly accounting for actual
incentive issues.
With a short-term (operational) perspective, the question is if owners of the existing
flexibility-enabling assets in the system have the incentives to provide the necessary flexibility
to cope with the challenge of increased variability and uncertainty due to a higher reliance
on renewables. That is: if existing services, contracts and markets are enough to enable
flexibility. In relation to this issue, Ela et al. (2014) consider that “it is unclear whether
or not the current market designs have the right incentives to provide this (operational)
flexibility when the system flexibility need is increased with variable generation”, leaving
open the possibility of introducing market design innovations that incentivize the provision
of flexibility in short-term operations.
With regards to the users of flexibility, it is worth noting that:
“Today, TSOs procure flexibility in the form of ancillary services, mostly from
large power producers. In the future, DSOs could additionally procure ancil-
lary services from distributed generation and other distributed energy resources
(including demand response and decentralized storage) as one of the tools for
maintaining the quality of service and the security of supply in their networks”
(EURELECTRIC, 2014). 10
In addition to the previously mentioned, commercial parties (e.g. suppliers, aggrega-
tors, balancing responsible parties) may also trade with flexibility for portfolio optimization
purposes (EDSO, 2014).
Furthermore, the following describes how flexibility is traded today:
10The statement applies equally to Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and Independent System
Operators (ISOs). The former own and operate the high-voltage transmission network, whereas the latter
only operate it. Furthermore, the acronym DSO stands for Distribution System Operator, who operates the
medium and low voltage networks.
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“In liberalized power systems, operational flexibility is traded in the form of
energy products via power markets, i.e. day-ahead and intra-day spot markets,
as well as control reserve products, i.e. primary/secondary/tertiary frequency
control reserves, from Ancillary Services (AS) markets” Ulbig and Andersson
(2015)
Concerning the procurement method for flexibility services, Katz et al. (2015a) review ex-
isting administrative and market-based mechanisms with an emphasis on the US experience.
The former includes “contracts, requests for proposals and internal acquisitions to procure a
variety of grid services to support system flexibility”, while the latter comprehends “market
designs - with clear definitions of performance requirements11 - To incentivize the provision
of power system flexibility”. In addition, EURELECTRIC (2014) foresees that “the DSO
can procure ancillary services from local providers if there is a market. If there is no market
DSO must have other tools to maintain the stability of the grid”. Nonetheless, a dedi-
cated, economics-based study of the problem of designing products, contracts and markets
for power system flexibility has, so far, not been addressed by the literature. The papers by
Bogetoft et al. (2016) which analyses demand-side flexibility; Bosca´n and Poudineh (2016a)
which focuses on emerging business models that enable power system flexibility; Bosca´n and
Poudineh (2016b) which studies bilateral contracts to enable power system flexibility; and
Bosca´n (2016), which proposes a number of extensions to the Product-Mix Auction and ap-
plies it to the design of a flexibility marketplace, constitute an attempt to fill the previously
mentioned gap in the literature.
4 The economic properties of power system flexibility
As section 3 has shown, the existing literature has emphasized on the technical properties
of power system flexibility and has been advanced mostly by engineers. Significant progress
11That is, product designs.
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has been made but, so far, its economic properties have not been studied. Understanding
them is relevant because the adequate design of products, markets and contracts to incen-
tivize the provision of power system flexibility depends on the existence of well-reasoned
economic principles. Typically, these are based on simple economics but lead to fruitful
results.
Informed by its technical features, but based particularly on the work by Makarov et al.
(2009) and Ulbig and Andersson (2012, 2015), in this section I take on an axiomatic per-
spective and propose a number of postulates that guide the economic modelling of power
system flexibility. These are as follow:
P1: Flexibility F is a bundle of f1, . . . fn attributes that can be represented by an n-
dimensional vector F = [f1, . . . fn]
P1 allows applying standard consumer and production theory as well as their duality
results. A well understood property of these branches of microeconomic theory is that
utility maximization and profit maximization are mathematically equivalent problems, which
is recognized in textbook treatments such as Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Jehle and Reny (2011),
Simon et al. (1994) 12.
The modeler may assume that U(F ) is the utility that a user of flexibility derives from
bundle F . Alternatively, if Y (F ) is a production function, such that y = Y (F ), y is the
output that results from combining the attributes of flexibility, which may be used in an
internal production process or might be sold in a marketplace. Likewise, a cost function
C(F ) associated to, say, technology Y can also be specified. This simple postulate allows
modelling the two sides of a transaction where flexibility is traded, namely buyers and sellers.
Further assumptions regarding the presence or absence of competition can be left to specific
applications.
12For example, Jehle and Reny (2011) write in their opening comments to Chapter 3 (Theory of the Firm)
that “You will see we can now move rather quickly through much of this material because there are many
formal similarities between producer theory and the consumer theory we just completed”
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For example, in the baseline model proposed by Bogetoft et al. (2016), flexibility has two
attributes, namely quantity (load) - which is fixed to unity- and time, which can take on a
discrete set of values. Because in their model two parties bargain over the price of a flexible
load, it is equivalent to assuming that there is a bilateral monopoly. Similarly, in the bilateral
contracting model with bidimensional types of Bosca´n and Poudineh (2016b), flexibility also
has two continuous attributes, q and t, which can stand for ramp rate, duration, lead time, or
other flexibility attributes. In this model, which focuses on situations in which competition
among sellers of flexibility is infeasible, a principal -characterized by a multi-attribute gross
utility function - procures flexibility from an agent with a cost function that depends on
the elements of flexibility and a pair of unit cost parameters, which the principal cannot
observe. Also, the multi-unit nature of the Product-Mix Exchanges (PMEs) discussed by
Bosca´n (2016) -applied to the Delta Energy market design 13 - implies that participants bid
for bundles of goods rather than on individual goods.
P2: The attributes that compose flexibility are imperfectly substitutable
An alternative way of stating P2 is that consumers and producers of flexibility have,
respectively, convex indifference curves and convex isoquants. This postulate is based on the
technical fact that it is impossible to produce (or derive utility from) flexibility with only one
of its attributes, neither is it possible to perfectly substitute among them, nor are these to
be generally combined in production (or consumption) in fixed proportions. In other words,
the marginal rate of technical substitution (or simply the marginal rate of substitution, in
the case of indifference curves) of isoquants is not zero nor is it a constant number but a
function of the attributes. To illustrate the point more clearly, observe figure 8 and assume
that flexibility has only two attributes, namely f1 and f2. P2 states that isoquants (or
indifference curves) are similar to I1 with a curvature that can be somewhere between that
of I2 or I3 but, in general, rules out I2 (perfect complements) and I3 (perfect substitutes).
13Discussed in section 6
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Figure 8: Isoquants/Indifference curves
So, for example, if a system operator procures flexibility in the form of, say, ramping
duration (as described by Ulbig and Andersson (2012)14) two strictly positive quantities of
power and ramping rate are required, but there is imperfect substitutability between them.
This is in accordance with Makarov et al. (2009) who propose “a concurrent consideration
of the regulation and load following capacity, ramping and ramp duration requirements” to
account for the fact that “the regulation capacity and ramping requirements are inherently
related. Insufficient ramping capability could cause additional capacity requirements”.
Specific choices of functional forms could be the Constant Elasticity (CES) production
and utility function or the Cobb-Douglas, which is a special case of a CES. An example of
the application of P2 to model flexibility trading in a competitive setting is in the work by
Bosca´n (2016), where the participants bid for bundles whose components they perceive as
imperfect substitutes.
P3: Flexibility is a heterogeneous (i.e. differentiated) product
14See also section 3
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A key assumption of the competitive market model is that firms sell homogeneous (i.e.
identical) products across its attributes. Consequently, consumers perceive all goods as the
same and firms lack the incentive to raise their price above the market clearing price because
a customer can easily buy exactly the same good elsewhere at a lower price. In other words,
the demand faced by a single firm in a competitive market is perfectly elastic (i.e. a horizontal
line).
However, the homogeneity assumption about goods is unrealistic as “goods are almost
always differentiated by some characteristic” (Tirole, 1988). Accordingly, P3 states that
flexibility is heterogeneous. Nonetheless, in the case of flexibility, P3 is not suggested for the
sake of greater realism alone -which usually comes at a cost in the tractability of economic
models- but because there are technical reasons as to why flexibility should be assumed to
be heterogeneous. As noted in section 3, several authors coincide in stating that there are
different forms of flexibility with differing levels of efficiency, that it can come from different
sources and can imply different meanings. Therefore, any economic model should account
for the fact that there isn’t such a thing as the flexibility but several kinds of it.
It is necessary to make a further precision in relation to the kind of flexibility product
space differentiation that P3 refers to. “In a vertically differentiated product space, all
consumers agree over the most preferred mix of characteristics and, more generally, over the
preference ordering” (Tirole, 1988). A good example comes from petroleum markets, where
lighter varieties of crude oil are valued at higher prices than heavier ones because, inter
alia, the former have lower refining costs. That is, there is an objective attribute15 in the
commodity that determines if one given variety should be considered better than another.
Alternatively, when there is horizontal differentiation, “for some characteristics, the op-
timal choice (at equal prices) depends on the particular consumer. Tastes vary in the pop-
ulation” (Tirole, 1988). The analogy with flexibility is straightforward as not all users of
flexibility have the same purpose for it and will, therefore, have different requirements as to
15Namely, the API gravity index which measures the density of a petroleum liquid relative to water
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what sort of flexibility serves best their purpose. For example, a TSO might require ramping
capability at some hours of the day, whereas a DSO might require services for voltage con-
trol. The former can come from conventional generators whereas the latter can be sourced
from distributed generation or demand response.
In summary, P3 states that flexibility is a horizontally differentiated product but does
not rule out the possibility that in some well-developed markets for flexibility, final users
agree that one variety is preferred over a different one because of some objective attributes
that make it more desirable than others.
5 Best practices in product design: lessons from power
system flexibility
In the context of a product design proposal for the Colombian electricity market, Cramton
(2007) argues that:
“Product design is the critical first step in the design of any market. It defines
what is being traded. Good product design can play an important role in reducing
complexity and increasing liquidity in the market”
Despite the clarity of the claim but unlike existing reviews of the lessons learnt about
practical and theoretical market design that exist (e.g. Roth (2002, 2008)), a specific treat-
ment of what are the best practices in the product design stage of a market design problem
does not exist in the economics literature. The reason for this is, perhaps, that the best doc-
umented market design problems require very little clarification when it comes to the traded
product. Although the problems are theoretically involved, matching doctors to workplaces,
students to schools, kidneys to transplant recipients or allocating licenses to broadcasting
corporations are all understandable problems, if explained in layman’s terms. Similarly, in
existing electricity markets, the two best known traded products are energy (measured in
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MWh) and capacity (measured in MW). Yet in many situations, specifications about the
traded product are required. For example, kidney transplants require three medical tests
before a donor is considered apt. But when it comes to flexibility -currently traded in some
markets as ancillary services in the form of energy products-further precision is required
precisely because flexibility can mean many things, as follows from the literature review of
section 3.
In this section, I take a normative approach and attempt to answer the question of
what makes a good product design? Without making a claim of generality, I propose three
qualitative properties that make a good product design for flexibility services. These are:
1. Simplicity: A product design is simple if its description is precise, sets clearly de-
fined requirements on the parties involved and does not require additional knowledge,
information or skills to be understood and traded.
2. Measurability: A product design is measurable if there is an unambiguous unit of
measurement for each attribute that composes a flexibility bundle.
3. Relevance: A product design is relevant if it satisfies a specific technical requirement
that attracts the interest of a sufficiently large number of buyers and sellers. That is:
for the market to be thick enough.
In the following section, I use these properties to characterize existing product designs
that enable power system flexibility.
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6 A review of product designs in power system flexi-
bility
6.1 FlexOffers and Delta Energy
FlexOffers are an information systems concept initially developed by a group of engineers
and computer scientists in the European Union (EU)-funded research project MIRABEL16,
which emphasized on the development of Smart Grid infrastructure to enable power system
flexibility. Boehm et al. (2012) define FlexOffers as “an energy planning object” composed of
a profile, an earliest start time and a latest start time, associated to an energy-consuming or
producing appliance in the power system. According to the MIRABEL approach, all forms
of flexible demand (e.g. heat pumps, dishwashers, washing machines, freezers), supply (e.g.
from private solar panels) or supply and demand together (e.g. an electric vehicle that can
be charged and discharged within a period of time) can be expressed by a FlexOffer. Indeed,
a useful way to think about FlexOffers is as general tools to express the flexibility (i.e. in
the time and amount dimensions) which an issuer offers to give away in exchange for an
economic compensation.
In a successor research project, named TotalFlex17, the FlexOffer concept has been de-
veloped further and applied to a number of relevant questions, including flexibility aggrega-
tion. Another key question - which I briefly document in this subsection - has been trading
and demonstration, i.e. how to create a market-based approach to trade with the flexibility
contained in a FlexOffer? More specifically, how to translate the flexibility contained in a
FlexOffer into a tradeable product?
16The MIRABEL (Micro-Request-Based Aggregation, Forecasting and Scheduling of Energy Demand,
Supply and Distribution) was supported by the European Commissions Seventh Framework Program (FP7)
and had as its main goal developing “an approach on a conceptual and an infrastructural level that allows
energy distribution companies to balance the available supply of renewable energy sources and the current
demand in ad-hoc fashion”. Further information can be found in http://www.mirabel-project.eu/
17The TotalFlex research consortium has been funded by energinet.dk’s (Denmark’s Transmission System
Operator) ForskEL research and development fund. It envisions “a cost-effective, market-based system that
utilizes total flexibility in energy demand and production, taking balance and grid constraints into account”.
Further information can be found in http://www.totalflex.dk/
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To answer the previously mentioned questions, consider the following formal definition
of a FlexOffer, due to Valsomatzis et al. (2014):
“A flex-offer f is a tuple f = (T (f), profile(f)) where T (f) is the start time
flexibility interval and profile(f) is the data profile18. Here, T (f) = [tes, tls]
where tes and tls are the earliest start time and latest start time, respectively.
The data profile profile(f) = s(1), . . . , s(m) where a slice s(i) is a tuple
([ts, te] , [amin, amax]) where [amin, amax] is a continuous range of the amount and
[ts, te] is a time interval defining the extent of s
(i) in the time dimension.”
There are three types of FlexOffers: positive, which correspond to a consumption profile,
with all slices positive; negative, which describe a supply resource and have all slices negative;
and mixed with both negative and positive slices, which contain both demand and supply
offers of flexibility. Note, as well, that a FlexOffer can also contain a minimum energy
requirement, i.e. a constraint that establishes that the sum of slices adds up to a certain
number to reflect, for example, a minimum charging requirement of an electric vehicle. In
addition, it follows from the definition that FlexOffers with time flexibility only or amount
flexibility only also exist.
Figure 9, also due to Valsomatzis et al. (2014), illustrates a mixed FlexOffer f =
([1, 6] , s1, s2, s3, s4). The time flexibility in this FlexOffer is five periods, i.e. 6 − 1 = 5,
because the earliest period at which the profile can start is one, while the latest is six. The
amount flexibility of the FlexOffer is the sum of the amount flexibilities (i.e. amax−amin) over
all slices in the profile. In the example, this is: (3−(−1))+(4−2)+(2−(−4))+(−1−(−3)) =
14. Total flexibility, which is the product of the time and amount flexibility, is therefore 70.
It is worth noting that FlexOffers have infinitely many possible assignments, but figure 9
shows a specific one. The profile, which is composed of four slices, is drawn with actual start
period 2 and ending period 6, while timewise there could have been 5 other starting times
18“Data profile” is the term used in this informations system context but it actually refers to a load (or
supply) profile associated to the operation of a flexibility-enabling resource.
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Figure 9: A mixed FlexOffer. Source: Valsomatzis et al. (2014)
(i.e. periods 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6). Assuming that the dashed line in every slice is the actual
energy delivered, note that slice 1 is set at an amount of 1, slice 2 is set at an amount of 3,
slice 3 is set at an amount of -1 and slice 4 is set at -2. Furthermore, given that a FlexOffer
reflects an offer to supply flexibility, it is the user’s prerogative to decide on the actual usage
of the flexibility contained in it, that is: on the assignment that suits the final user best.
Which takes the discussion back to the questions posed before: how can a flexibility-enabling
product be designed if there are infinitely many feasible assignments to a FlexOffer?
The answer is the Delta Energy, which is the available energy contained in a Flex-Offer,
relative to a baseline assignment, determined by the issuer. In other words, in a transac-
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tion involving flexibility described by FlexOffers, the issuer offers the deviation in energy
consumption (or output) relative to a reference plan. This simplification allows specifying
flexibility-enabling products.
To illustrate the point, consider figure 10, which depicts a four-sliced positive FlexOffer
with time flexibility only and assume that the profile shown in the picture is the baseline
assignment.19 Establishing a baseline assignment for a FlexOffer like this results in a time-
shifting product. Given a FlexOffer like this, the final user is able to “place” the profile (i.e.
schedule and dispatch) anywhere between the earliest start time and the latest start time.
In Delta Energy terms, this is equivalent to a reduction (or increase) of energy consumption
at each of the time slices composing the profile, which is matched by an amount-equivalent
increase (or reduction) between the earliest and latest start times.
Figure 10: Flex-Offer with time flexibility. Source: TotalFlex internal documents
Another flexibility-enabling product that can be derived from FlexOffers is quantity flex-
ibility, as in figure 11, which shows a positive FlexOffer with quantity flexibility only.20 Note
that there can be negative or downward flexibility (the blue portion) relative to a baseline
assignment (the yellow line), which is a reduction in consumption. Alternatively, there can
also be positive or upward flexibility (the red portion), which is an increase in consumption.
19The baseline model of demand-side flexibility trading of Bogetoft et al. (2016) analyses a similar setting
to the one described by a time-flexible FlexOffer, but focuses on a one-sliced FlexOffer.
20I have illustrated FlexOffers with time flexibility only and with quantity flexibility alone, but other
FlexOffers with both kinds of flexibilities can also supply Delta Energy. To keep the discussion simple, I do
not discuss these cases.
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In Delta Energy terms, the issuer determines the baseload and offers the upward and down-
ward flexibility to the user of flexibility. The latter has the right to schedule and dispatch
an instance that lies within either the blue or red portion.
Figure 11: FlexOffer with quantity flexibility. Source: TotalFlex internal documents
Clearly, differing comfort levels associated to the flexibility expressed in a FlexOffer may
exist. Assume that figure 12 shows the FlexOffer associated to a heat pump or thermostat
user. According to comfort level 1 (the solid upward and downward areas), the user offers
less flexibility, whereas comfort level 2 (the hatched areas) indicates greater flexibility. The
issuer of this FlexOffer may wish to accept the second comfort level in exchange for a higher
economic compensation than what would have been required by comfort level 1 21.
According to the TotalFlex view, FlexOffers can be utilized in a flexibility marketplace
where the Delta Energy is the traded product as in figure 13. 22
Buyers of flexibility, in the form of Delta Energy, are DSOs (but also TSOs) who are
final users, and Balancing Responsible Parties (BRPs) who trade for portfolio optimization
purposes (see figure 13). On the supply side, large-scale suppliers may access the market
directly, together with aggregators who act as intermediaries between small-scale suppliers
21Similarly, each FlexOffer may represent the degree of flexibility of a specific supplier. The more flexible
it is, the lower the disutility it experiences and vice versa. However, the buyer of flexibility need not know
the disutility a supplier experiences, which creates an adverse selection problem. This relevant economic
issue in the provision of flexibility is studied by Bosca´n and Poudineh (2016b).
22The paper by Bosca´n (2016) describes how a Delta Energy market can be cleared with Product-Mix
Exchanges (PMEs).
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Figure 12: FlexOffer with quantity flexibility and differing comfort levels. Source: TotalFlex
internal documents
Figure 13: A Delta Energy marketplace. Source: TotalFlex internal documents
and the market.
To conclude, I evaluate the Delta Energy product design according to the categories
proposed in section 5:
1. Simplicity : Delta Energy is sufficiently simple to be understood by any market partic-
ipant of an electricity market. It translates flexibility into energy, which is convenient.
2. Measurability : As any energy product, it is measured in kWh or MWh.
3. Relevance: While FlexOffers provide a sufficiently rich and general way of expressing
the flexibility with which an asset can operate, so far it is unclear how do Delta Energy
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products fit into the existing market architecture of existing power systems, such as the
Nordic one. Open questions such as the timescale with which Delta Energy products
will be supplied, the geographical area that will be covered and the specific technical
requirements that will be satisfied are crucial to determine its relevance.
6.2 The Californian flexible ramping product
The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) runs a competitive wholesale
electricity market, comprised of both day-ahead and real-time processes in which energy,
ancillary services and congestion revenue rights are traded. Locational marginal prices are
calculated for all nodes in the network.
The day-ahead market opens seven days prior to the trading day and closes one day
before gate closure. In addition to energy, capacity is also traded in the form of ancillary
services and Residual Unit Commitment (RUC) to meet the gap between the operator’s
forecasted demand and supply-side economic bids from the day-ahead market. Committed
RUC resources are required to submit a bid for energy in the real-time market, which opens
as soon as the day-ahead market results are published, and closes seventy-five minutes before
the trading hour.
The real-time market, whose main purpose is to procure balancing energy to meet in-
stantaneous demand, is composed of the Fifteen-Minute Market (FMM) and the Real-Time
Economic Dispatch (RTED) which, respectively, clear every fifteen and every five minutes.23
Supplemental energy bids, to increase or reduce supply, and committed RUC resources from
the day-ahead market are the main inputs to the real-time market. For every run of the
FMM and the RTED, the operator optimizes over multiple intervals and dispatches resources
over the whole horizon. However, only the initial interval is financially binding, while the re-
maining are advisory. As conditions change, the real-time market often dispatches resources
differently from the previous runs.
23The FFM was implemented by the CAISO in response to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) Order No. 764, which required the operator to offer intra-hour transmission scheduling.
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Since December 2011, the CAISO has implemented an upward flexible ramping constraint
in the FMM to ensure that there is sufficient upward ramping capability in the RTED.
Although the arrangement has increased the available ramping capability, a limitation is
that it assumes that actions that should be taken in the RTED actually aren’t. For example,
in the pre-dispatch calculations it is assumed that generation will decrease in the current
interval to make more ramping capability available in future intervals but this actually
doesn’t happen. In response to this, it has been decided to replace the existing mechanism
(the flexible ramping constraint) with the enhanced Flexible Ramping Product (FRP) to
account for both upward and downward ramping uncertainty of net load forecasts in the
CAISO’s multi-interval optimization. (Bushnell et al., 2016). The FRP is defined as:
“The 5-minute ramping capability, which will be dispatched to meet the 5-minute
to 5-minute net system demand changes or net system movement in real time
dispatch” (CAISO, 2015)
Note in the definition that the target magnitude is net system demand (i.e. net load),
defined as “load plus export minus all resources’ schedules that are not 5-minute dispatchable,
which may include renewable resources, imports and self-schedules” (CAISO, 2015). The
FRP comes in two versions: a) procurement of ramping capacity for the forecasted net load
ramp, between a financially binding interval and the subsequent advisory interval, and b)
procurement of ramping uncertainty. According to the CAISO’s management final decision
to implement the FRP, the market will award, price, and settle the flexible ramping product
in both the FMM and the RTED, and resources that provide the ramping capability will
receive a separate payment for this capability. (CAISO, 2016a). To understand the two
varieties of the FRP, consider the following two illustrations.
Figure 14 shows the evolution of net system demand and its forecast, together with upper
and lower limits, during a binding interval [t, t + 5] and an advisory interval [t + 5, t + 10].
Suppose that the time currently is a point earlier than time t and that the RTED is being run.
From this standpoint, the next interval is binding and the net system demand is considered
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certain, that is: a random variable that almost surely will follow the shown trajectory (green
dashed line) during the interval. Consequently, resources to meet net load are dispatched.
In contrast, for the advisory interval, net system demand is a random variable that can take
any value between the lower and upper limit. The FRP rewards the real ramping need: the
potential net demand change between the two intervals. More precisely:
“If load or supply resources increase the forecast ramp, the market will charge
the load or supply resource for the flexible ramping product. If load or supply
resources decrease the forecasted ramp, the market will compensate the load or
supply resource” (CAISO, 2016a)
The desired outcome is that load serving entities are incentivized to have a portfolio of
dispatchable and non-dispatchable resources able to follow their load profiles.
For the upward ramping requirement, the calculation is:
Upward = max {Upper limit [t + 5, t + 10]− Net system demand in [t, t + 5] , 0}
and for the downward ramping requirement:
Downward = max {Net system demand in [t, t + 5]− Lower limit [t + 5, t + 10] , 0}
The spread between the upper and lower limits in the advisory interval reflects the op-
erator’s intended coverage but the actual realization of net demand might differ when the
advisory interval becomes binding (CAISO, 2015).
As with any forecast, it is uncertain and the CAISO plans to procure a flexible ramping
requirement to account for this fact. Figure 15 depicts the forecasted net demand, the
realization of the net demand and the lower limit of the forecast. The maximum downward
forecast error is the difference between the forecast and the lower limit. If the realized net
demand is greater than the lower limit, as in the upper picture of figure 15, the operator
procures the difference between the maximum downward net forecast error and the lower
limit of the forecast, which corresponds to the region between the green dashed line and
the orange dashed line. Otherwise, if the maximum downward forecast error coincides with
the difference between the forecast and the lower limit (see the lower picture of figure 15)
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Figure 14: Procurement of real ramping need between an advisory and a binding interval
such that the realized net demand lies below the lower limit, there is no need to procure
additional ramping capability.
Regarding settlement of the FRP due to uncertainty, and unlike the FRP between in-
tervals, there cannot be a direct settlement between those requiring ramping capacity and
those supplying it. Because the market may not use this capability, it is not possible to
attribute it to a specific resource. Instead, it will determine a resource’s contribution over
month. (CAISO, 2016a)
Two significant differences exist between the FRP and existing capacity products traded
in the CAISO markets. First, unlike ancillary services which consists of standby capacity that
is dispatched to meet demand deviations within an interval, FRP targets system demand
changes between intervals. Second, FRP is continuously dispatched through the RTED.
(CAISO, 2015)
Regarding the qualitative categories to evaluate the FRP design proposed in section 5, I
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Figure 15: Procurement of FRP due to uncertainty
consider the following:
1. Simplicity : The FRP definition is indeed simple because it does set precise require-
ments for the involved parties and does not require any additional knowledge or skills
to be implemented or traded. However, the CAISO market architecture is already
complex, as it includes a considerable number of simultaneous processes, which involve
optimization problems of large scale and asks bidders to submit a large number of
inputs. Although this is technically plausible and in line with the goal of increasing
VREs, an open question is if participants are acting strategically or not. That is, it
is difficult to establish the kind of incentive issues operating behind CAISO’s market
mechanisms. As Bushnell (2013) eloquently puts it:
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“What the Morgan story may say something about is the trend in US markets
for increasingly complex price-setting processes. For example, the California
market today is way more complex than the one Enron made infamous 12
years ago. Back then, the California power exchange took bids for price and
quantity, but not much else. Today, an offer to sell power from a generation
unit can contain all sorts of parameters describing what the plant can and
cannot do, from the “ramp rates” to a minimum running time. All these
parameters are fed into optimization routines such as mixed integer pro-
grams in which the system operator theoretically finds the “best” solution
for everyone, taking all these operating constraints as given.
The problem is, the “best” solution when everyone is telling the truth about
their costs and capabilities can be very different than the solution when firms
are strategically bidding those parameters.”
2. Measurability : The FRP measures the ramp rate in MW/min as is the standard, but
because the FRP is traded and priced in an energy market, settlements are made in
dollars per MWh.
3. Relevance: The very introduction of the ramping constraints and its later enhancement
in the form of a FRP clearly shows that the CAISO deems the operational challenges
associated to the “duck curve” relevant. Furthermore, the fact that the FRP is traded
in CAISO’s real-time energy market, a mature market, ensures a sufficiently large
number of transactions. However, an open question that requires further (empirical)
analysis is if potential suppliers of ramping capability -a form of flexibility - have greater
incentives to participate as a result of the introduction of the product. In other words:
it is not clear if suppliers of this ramping capability find the opportunity relevant per
se.
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7 Conclusions
Power system flexibility is an increasingly relevant quality for power systems operating
with greater shares of VRE, as these require becoming resilient to the challenge of uncertainty
and variability. Engineers have successfully developed a rich literature filled with models that
describe what flexibility is and how to measure it but have, so far, left the question of how
to incentivize its provision largely unaddressed.
However, the question of creating incentives is a topic beyond the realm of the technically-
oriented. Instead, economists - armed with an engineer’s perspective - are better suited for
the task of designing products, contracts and markets -in a word: institutions- that enable
flexibility in a power system. Informed by the technical features of flexibility, this paper has
taken a product design perspective and has contributed to the analysis of flexibility from
an economic perspective to inform the design of concrete services that can be traded and
valued by markets. According to this view, flexibility is a heterogeneous product, which has
multiple attributes among which buyers and sellers cannot perfectly substitute.
Another contribution of this paper has been normative, namely three simple character-
istics that an ideal flexibility-enabling product should have. These are: simplicity, measura-
bility and relevance. Using these as guidelines, I have explored two specific product designs
put forward to enable flexibility.
First, I have described FlexOffers, an information systems concept that can express the
flexibility of any energy-consuming or supplying appliance in the power system with a great
degree of generality. In connection with FlexOffers, I describe a simple way to translate the
flexibility contained in any FlexOffer, that is: the Delta Energy or the deviation in energy
consumption relative to a baseline. With this, it is straightforward to define flexibility-
enabling products such as time shifting and quantity flexibility. I deem the Delta Energy
approach as simple and measurable but question its relevance on the grounds of insufficient
details regarding the integration with existing market architecture, such as the Nordic.
Second, I review the Flexible Ramping Product put forward by the California Inde-
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pendent System Operator (CAISO), as an enhancement to the existing flexible ramping
constraint. This proposal, recently approved by the operator’s board of governors and soon
to be implemented, seeks to procure and reward ramping capability between intervals in the
(5-minute) real-time market as well as ramping capacity to address the uncertainty caused
by forecast errors. I consider that the flexible ramping product is an example of good prod-
uct design in all three categories, but raise questions regarding the overall simplicity of the
Californian market design in general.
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Abstract
This paper focuses on the particular kind of flexibility that can be harnessed from
demand-side resources, as mediated by a technological solution, i.e. Smart Grid, which
reduces transaction costs to a negligible level. In contrast to price-based demand re-
sponse, the bilateral baseline model of flexibility trading of this paper models incentive-
based contracts in which consumers are remunerated for their willingness to modify
demand. With a Nash bargaining approach, the baseline model of this paper shows
that it is possible for an aggregator and a consumer to gain from trading flexibility in
single-shot transactions. Taking a long-term perspective, the model shows that agents
must be able to trade for a sufficiently long period to cover investment costs. Further-
more, the way in which these are shared determines how favorable the conditions are
for consumers. Relative to the case in which costs are symmetrically shared, when the
consumer faces a relatively higher cost than the aggregator, the consumer is able to ob-
tain a better deal for its flexibility. Such a finding relates to the possibility of a network
effect in the aggregation business, which requires some degree of scale economies in the
flexibility-enabling technology. This result speaks about the possibility of introducing
competition among aggregators in a potential market for flexibility.
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1 Introduction
The need to account for the time and space-varying valuation and cost of electric energy in
its pricing and trading has been acknowledged for a long time. With the liberalization of the
electricity industry throughout the world and the adoption of market-based arrangements,
electricity has come to be understood as a commodity, and price signals tend to reflect its
relative scarcity (Joskow, 2008; Joskow and Schmalensee, 1988; Newbery, 1997). While this
clearly is a sign of progress that has led to increased economic efficiency, a critical element
of any well-designed marketplace, namely “a demand side with varying demands which can
adapt to price changes”(Schweppe et al., 1988) has not been successfully implemented so
far. A number of technical and economic reasons explain this fact.
From the early days of the electricity industry, supply has traditionally responded to
demand requirements but not vice versa. Power plants were usually located close to centers of
demand and output - mainly from coal - was swiftly modified in accordance with consumers’
requirements. Seen as a fundamental sign of economic progress, end users would rarely
reflect on the environmental impact of generating electricity or the fact that its cost could
vary. In the modern-day industry, even after the inception of wholesale electricity markets,
the majority of residential and commercial end users are charged per kilowatt-hour retail
prices that do not reflect wholesale price variations and have their consumption measured
through conventional meters, which register aggregate measurements, and pay on the basis
of periodical readings, i.e. monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, and so on (Joskow, 2012). In
contrast, because of the impact that energy consumption has on their cost structure, large
scale consumers have a greater potential to adapt to the fluctuations in wholesale prices.
Indeed, in many places, these customers are metered in real-time and pay prices that more
closely reflect the dynamically-varying marginal cost of electricity.
However, the emergence of Smart Grid1 solutions is becoming a reality and considerable
1Despite diverse definitions, Agrell et al. (2013) find consensus in relation to six areas in which Smart
Grids operate, namely: (i) optimization of grid operation and utilization, (ii) optimization of grid infras-
tructure, (iii) integration of decentralized energy resources, (iv) enhanced information and communications
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emphasis is being placed by policymakers to put it in place. In the UK, for example, at
least 53 million smart meters will be replaced between 2015 and 2020 in homes and small
businesses, at a cost of £10.9 billion and expected net benefits of £6.2 billion (DECC,
2014).2 British customers will thus have the possibility to obtain real time information
about their electricity consumption and its cost, but whether they will choose to modify
demand accordingly is another matter.
Besides the technical barriers to have an active demand-side in electricity markets, there
are economic reasons that prevent small-scale consumers from modifying their behavior,
even if there are potential economic gains from reacting to dynamically varying prices, and
taking real-time metered electricity consumption for granted. Transaction costs associated
to monitoring the evolution of price and adjusting energy-consuming appliances might hinder
these gains from being fully realized, as Joskow and Tirole (2006) note. Therefore, consumers
on real-time meters and dynamically-varying prices can be assumed to be reactive as long
as they rationally trade off transaction costs and savings in their electricity bill (Joskow and
Tirole, 2007).
But economic efficiency is not the only motive to promote an active demand-side in power
markets. The electricity industry throughout the world is undergoing a process of techno-
logical change, as decarbonisation has climbed up on the list of priorities of policymakers.
As a result, variable renewable energy, such as the generated from wind turbines and solar
panels, is becoming more relevant to attain this goal. However, integrating large shares of
energy from these sources into the power grid poses challenges that call for designing and
adopting innovative business models that enable flexibility (Bosca´n and Poudineh, 2016a).
That is, the modification of generation injection or consumption patterns in reaction to an
external signal (price signal or activation) in order to provide a service within the energy
technology, (v) active distribution grid, (vi) new markets and end-user services. This paper adheres to this
multi-faceted view of the Smart Grid.
2In contrast, using French data, Le´autier (2014) estimates the yearly surplus of high-elasticity residential
consumers at less than 1e, and of high elasticity households at 4e. This view challenges the benefits of
mandating the roll-out of smart meters.
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system (EURELECTRIC, 2014). As power systems increase their flexibility, they become
more resilient to the uncertainty posed by the inherent variability of renewables and are able
to integrate them more efficiently.3
In light of the greater need for flexibility to integrate renewables into power systems, this
paper focuses on the particular kind of flexibility that can be harnessed from demand-side
resources, particularly from small and medium scale consumers of electric energy. In addition,
the paper studies the aggregation business model, which consists on pooling loads from
consumers or output from de-centralized generation assets to provide energy and services to
actors within the system (EURELECTRIC, 2014).
Also, because of its relevance for the feasibility and consolidation of the aggregation
business model, the paper studies the role of the Smart Grid as a catalyst for demand-side
flexibility. Through its progress in applications like lightning, temperature control, and smart
appliance development, the home automation industry - a key element of the Smart Grid -
is on its way to reducing the transaction costs associated to modifying consumption behav-
ior. Consumers now have the possibility of revealing preferences for electricity-consuming
services and activities, while relying on technology to adjust demand. Furthermore, if two-
way communication capabilities exist, dishwashing, laundry-making, heating, among other
activities, can be remotely controlled, according to the requirements of a third party, e.g. an
aggregator.
More specifically, the paper tries to answer the following two questions: what is gained
from trading demand-side flexibility? what is required from an aggregator and a consumer to
gain from trading it?.
In contrast to price-based demand response, the bilateral baseline model of flexibility
trading of this paper models incentive-based contracts in which consumers are remunerated
for their willingness to modify demand (Cooke, 2011; DOE, 2006). The proposed framework
encompasses specific instances of these agreements, such as direct load control programs,
3For a review of the current debate on power system flexibility and its economic properties, the reader
is referred to Bosca´n (2016).
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interruptible supply contracts and dynamic load capping contracts, as described by He et al.
(2013). The model also applies to the Delta Energy-based agreements for time shifting and
quantity flexibility described by Bosca´n (2016).
The model that this paper proposes relates to the literatures on power system flexibil-
ity, renewable energy integration, demand response and the Smart Grid, which are mostly
engineering-oriented, e.g. the work by Morales et al. (2013),Kiviluoma (2013) Silva (2010),
Nicolosi (2012). Many of these studies evaluate policies under alternative scenarios, using
optimization models from a centralized energy planner’s perspective and, therefore, take on
a systemic view.
In contrast, this paper takes a microeconomic perspective to analyze the incentives to
trade flexibility. Because of the bilateral Nash (1950) bargaining approach utilized, it relates
generally to the vast body of theoretical and applied work that has followed from Nash’s
seminal contribution, e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Muthoo (1999). For example,
the model by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) relates to ours because, like them, we focus on
“relations between suppliers and buyers that are often characterized by elements of bilateral
monopoly” which may arise when “the supplier’s product is an intermediate good that is
specially tailored to the needs of the buyer”. These elements are key in the vision of demand-
side flexibility trading that this paper develops. First, the main inputs for an aggregator
to produce flexibility that can be valued by a final user are disaggregated loads. Second,
competition among suppliers is typically infeasible due to transaction costs and scale issues,
i.e. a single household may be too small to participate in a marketplace. Because of their
focus on contractual agreements from a bargaining perspective, the papers by Lippman
et al. (2013) and Yu et al. (2012) are also examples of related work. By assuming a partial
equilibrium approach as the model of this paper does, light is shed into the market structure
of the aggregation business and, in this way, a general link with the industrial organization
literature (Tirole, 1988) is established.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the assumptions of the baseline
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model of flexibility trading, explains the aggregator’s delivery policy and presents two simple
but fundamental results, namely the price of flexibility in single-shot transactions, and a
proof that it is possible for an aggregator and a consumer to gain from trading flexibility.
Given that the set of assumptions on which these conclusions depend are reasonable but
restrictive, section 3 modifies them to validate the generality of the claims. The key message
of the section is that under less restrictive assumptions, such as a non-unitary load and
the aggregator’s role being fulfilled by a retailer, single-shot transactions of flexibility lead to
gains from trade. In contrast to the previous sections, section 4 takes a long-term perspective
and analyzes the role of investment costs. The claim that flexibility trading is welfare
enhancing is based on the assumption that a transaction cost reducing technology, i.e. a
Smart Grid solution, is in place. But the question of who pays for this technology remains
unaddressed up to this point. Therefore, the results from section 4 present a more nuanced
vision of flexibility trading. That is: flexibility trading is welfare enhancing as long as the
investment cost is sufficiently low and consumer and aggregator are able to trade for a
sufficiently long period of time. Moreover, a consumer can obtain a better deal if it trades
flexibility with an aggregator of a certain scale, such that a kind of positive network effect
operates. 4 Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
4 Weiller and Pollitt (2014) suggest that “the electricity supply can be conceived of as a platform-
mediated, two-sided market” which may stimulate competition and innovation. The network effect view of
the aggregation business we suggest relates to theirs.
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2 Baseline model: time-shifting of an indivisible unit
load
2.1 Assumptions
The baseline model of flexibility trading satisfies the following assumptions:
BL1: There is one consumer (C).
Small, medium enterprises and households are naturally thought of as consumers of electric
energy, who can take the role of itsuppliers of demand-side flexibility if incentivized to shift
demand in time or to modify the amount of energy they consume.5
BL2: Part of C’s demand for electric energy is inherently inflexible, while another part of
it is potentially itflexible. With regard to the latter, C is indifferent concerning the
time n of delivery as well as the exact amount of energy that it will consume at each
moment as long as a desired final outcome (e.g. laundry is done, vehicle is charged) is
achieved within a itflexibility time frame F = [1, . . . , N ], i.e., insofar as n ∈ F , N > 1.
Note that if N = 1, C does not offer any flexibility, i.e. F = [1].
Inflexible demand is associated with appliances whose usage cannot be modified, unless
C experiences disutility as a result of interrupting the service associated with it. In contrast,
flexible demand is related to appliances for which C is capable of modifying its usage without
experiencing loss of utility. Matching our definitions of flexible and inflexible demand to the
categorization of loads proposed by He et al. (2013), we find that inflexible loads are non-
shiftable (e.g. computers, TV sets, lightning). In contrast, flexible demand is either storable
or shiftable. The former is characterized by a decoupling of power consumption and end
5Provided that the adequate regulatory framework and technology are in place, consumers can also take
the role of producers if they own generation facilities and sell energy to the system, in which case they would
be adequately called itprosumers, a portmanteau word that subsumes the roles of consumer and producer
into a single economic agent. However, this paper focuses on the particular form of flexibility that arises
from modifying consumption behavior.
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use, typically mediated by battery storage or thermal inertia (e.g. electric vehicles, heating),
while the latter is associated with non-interruptible processes that can be shifted in time
(e.g. laundry-making, dish-washing).
More fundamentally, BL2 states that the consumer is risk-neutral regarding the time and
exact amount of energy consumed. Furthermore, the model assumes that the demand for
energy is derived : C does not obtain utility from the energy it uses but from the goods and
services associated with its delivery, such as transportation, heating or entertainment (see
Hausman (1979) for more on this assumption).
BL3: There is one aggregator (A) to whom C gives control of the delivery of the flexible
load. That is, both parties can enter a contract in which C lets A decide on the time
of delivery n, provided that this is chosen from the flexibility time frame F that C
has specified. If A gains control over the flexible load, C pays A a price p per kWh of
energy it consumes.
Note that BL3 refers to a contract for a one-time delivery of the load. Extensions to the
baseline model that relax this assumption and consider several deliveries over longer periods
of time are analyzed in section 4.
Moreover: despite the fact that retailers, not aggregators, are responsible for delivering
electricity to consumers, BL3 states otherwise for analytical simplicity and to highlight the
gains from trading flexibility experienced by the consumer through savings in its electricity
bill. This is equivalent to assuming that p is the price of electric energy that C consumes
minus the flexibility remuneration that it receives from A. Figure 1 illustrates the transac-
tions in the single-shot contract for flexibility between A and C (solid lines reflect a flow of
indivisible commodities, while the dashed line reflects a flow of money).
BL4: C has a contract for delivery of electricity with a retailer (R) which establishes a known,
fixed price p per kWh of inflexible demand.
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APays p per kWhSupplies flexibility Supplies electricity
C
Figure 1: Transactions in the single-shot contract between A and C
The price p that C pays for electricity illustrates C’s outside option, that is, the price that it
would pay for energy if it kept flexibility to itself. Under the retail contract, C unilaterally
decides when to consume energy and how much of it. In summary, C faces a choice between
remaining as a conventional, inflexible consumer and becoming a supplier of flexibility. In
line with BL3, and for comparison purposes, BL4 refers to a one-time delivery of the inflexible
load. Figure 2 illustrates the transactions in the contract between retailer and consumer (as
in figure 1, a solid line indicates a commodity flow, while the dashed line indicates a flow of
money).
R
Pays p per kWh Supplies electricity
C
Figure 2: Transactions in the single-shot contract between R and C
BL5: C’s load, flexible and flexible, is indivisible and equals one kWh.
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BL6: Both parties bargain a` la Nash (1950) over the value of p and have symmetric bargaining
power.
Besides its simplicity, the bargaining approach emphasizes the incentives of both parties to
cooperate: by agreeing to trade flexibility, consumer and aggregator can be better off.
BL7: A’s activity is independent of R’s.
Implicit in this assumption is that the flexible load and the inflexible load are two distinct
products which give rise to two separate economic activities. In the flexible load business,
the aggregator buys flexibility and makes a profit from managing risk. In the inflexible load
business - which is exogenous to the model - the consumer is the passive end of the traditional
electricity supply chain. Note, however, that nothing prevents a conventional retailer from
entering into a different but related line of business: that of flexible loads; a development
that is actually happening in the electricity industry 6 and is analyzed in subsection 3.2, as
an extension to the baseline model.
BL8: The wholesale price wn per kWh of electricity, at which A and R buy the load, is a
sequence of independently and identically distributed (iid) random variables, which
follow a uniform distribution between zero and one. That is to say, wn ∼ U(0, 1), n ∈
F .
BL9: There is a Smart Grid solution in place that reduces the transaction costs associated
to adjusting consumption and delivering the load to a negligible level. Neither A nor
C are liable to any costs associated to the deployment of this technology.
In the absence of such a technological solution, to be flexible, the consumer would have to
cover transaction costs associated to monitoring the evolution of price and adjusting demand,
and the aggregator would be unable to automatically control delivery.
6Bosca´n and Poudineh (2016a) cite as an example the fact that NRG, a US utility which owns 50 GW
in fossil-fuel dominated generation assets, acquired in 2013 an aggregator with a 2 GW portfolio.
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Before ending this subsection, as a reality check, consider the following view of the
aggregation business by EURELECTRIC (2014) :
“Aggregation is a commercial function of pooling de-centralized generation
and/or consumption to provide energy and services to actors within the system.
Aggregators can be retailers or third parties. They may act as an intermediary
between customers who provide flexibility (both demand and generation) and
procurers of this flexibility. They would identify and gather customer flexibili-
ties and intermediate their joint participation. This could be done via flexibility
products or simply by selling and buying aggregated energy (kilowatt-hours) at
optimal points in time”
2.2 Aggregator’s Delivery Policy
Suppose that C and A have bargained over the value of p, given a flexibility time frame F
specified by C, and have thus agreed on the terms of the contract for delivery of the flexible
load, which equals one kWh. Accordingly, C has given A the option to decide on the time
n of delivery. The aggregator, who is obliged to deliver within the time frame, bears all the
price risk resulting from variations in wn and has the incentive to deliver it when conditions
are most favorable. A’s problem is to choose, over a discrete set of periods, the best moment
to deliver a load with a stochastically varying price. Technically, this is an optimal stopping
problem for which dynamic programming gives a simple structure and solution. See, e.g.,
Lindley (1961) for a theoretical discussion on the topic and an introduction to the “marriage
problem” of which the following results are instances.
Let EDn(N) be the expected cost of delivery at the beginning of period n in a flexibility
time frame F of length N .
At n = N , the last period in the time frame, the aggregator cannot postpone delivery
unless it breaches the agreement. Therefore, his expected cost of delivery is:
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EDN(N) = E(wN)
At time n = N − 1, the aggregator has two opportunities to deliver: now (at N − 1) or
later (at N). Consequently, A observes wN−1 and determines if it is favorable to postpone
or not. If wN−1 < EDN(N), A prefers to deliver now. If wN−1 = EDN(N), it is indifferent
between the two periods, but if wN−1 > EDN(N), it will postpone.
w1 wN−2 wN−1 wN
1
ED1(N)
N − 2
EDN−2(N)
N − 1
EDN−1(N)
N
EDN(N)
Figure 3: Aggregator’s delivery policy with a flexibility time frame F of length N
The expected cost of delivery at n = N − 1 is:
EDN−1(N) = E(wN−1 | wN−1 ≤ EDN(N))Pr(wN−1 ≤ EDN(N))
+ E(wN | wN−1 > EDN(N))Pr(wN−1 > EDN(N))
where E(wN−1 | wN−1 ≤ EDN(N)) is the expected value of wN−1, conditional on wN−1
being less or equal than EDN(N), in which case it is best to deliver before N .
If, on the contrary, wN−1 is greater than EDN(N), then A expects to pay for the wholesale
price wN , conditioned on the event that wN−1 is greater than EDN(N), i.e., E(wN | wN−1 >
EDN(N)).
In the previous expression, Pr(wN−1 ≤ EDN(N)) is the probability that wN−1 is less
than or equal to EDN(N) and Pr(wN−1 > EDN(N)) is its complement.
From the expression for n = N −1, applying recursion, it is straightforward to derive the
expression for n = N − 2:
EDN−2(N) = E(wN−2 | wN−2 ≤ EDN−1(N))Pr(wN−2 ≤ EDN−1(N))
+ E(wN−1 | wN−2 > EDN−1(N))Pr(wN−2 > EDN−1)
Similarly for N − 3, N − 4, and so on. Note the recursive structure of the decision in
which the expected cost of delivery at n is conditional on the expected cost of delivery at
n+ 1.
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The following formalizes the argument:
Proposition 1 Given the flexibility time frame F = [1, . . . , N ], N > 1, specified by C, the
optimal delivery policy for A is:
 At n = N , deliver and face expected cost of delivery EDN(N) = E(wN).
 At n ∈ F such that n ∈ [1, . . . , N − 1]:
If wn ≤ EDn+1(N) =⇒ deliver
If wn > EDn+1(N) =⇒ postpone
The expected cost of delivery at n is:
(1 )
EDn(N) =
∫ 1
0
min {wn, EDn+1(N)} dwn
=
2EDn+1(N)− (EDn+1(N))2
2
= EDn+1(N)− (EDn+1(N))
2
2
A consequence of this delivery policy is that as flexibility increases, the expected cost of
delivery decreases. More precisely, fix n = 1 to define an instance of EDn(N), i.e. ED1(N),
which is the expected expected cost of delivery at period 1 in any time frame F when its
length is N . In the sequel, we shall refer to this magnitude as the expected unitary cost of
delivery with N periods of flexibility.
Thus, without flexibility, i.e. when F = [1], N = 1:
ED1(1) = E(w1) =
1
2
When there are two periods of flexibility, F = [1, 2], N = 2:
ED2(2) = E(w2) =
1
2
ED1(2) = ED2(2)− (ED2(2))
2
2
=
3
8
, from equation (1)
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With three periods of flexibility, F = [1, 2, 3]:
ED3(3) = E(w3) =
1
2
ED2(3) = ED3(3)− (ED3(3))
2
2
=
3
8
ED1(3) = ED2(3)− (ED2(3))
2
2
=
39
128
where ED2(3) and ED1(3) follow from equation (1)
Note, more generally, that as the length N of F increases, ED1(N) decreases:
ED1(1) = E(wN) =
1
2
ED1(2) = ED1(1)− (ED1(1))
2
2
=
3
8
ED1(3) = ED1(2)− (ED1(2))
2
2
=
39
128
...
...
ED1(N) = ED1(N − 1)− (ED1(N − 1))
2
2
which defines a sequence {ED1(N)}N≥1.
Proposition 2 The sequence {ED1(N)}N≥1 is monotonically decreasing and convergent to
zero.
Figure 4 summarizes the intuition behind the aggregator’s delivery policy: as the flexibil-
ity offered by the consumer increases, the expected cost of delivery faced by the aggregator
decreases.
An interesting feature of this delivery policy is that deciding on myopic information is
almost as good as having perfect information. To see this, suppose that A knew all the prices
w1, . . . , wN that will actually happen during a flexibility time frame F of length N and, thus,
it could rank them from lowest to highest, assigning each of them the number associated
with its rank, i.e. 1 corresponds to the lowest, 2 corresponds to the second lowest, and so
on. The N prices divide the unit interval [0, 1] in sub-intervals of average length 1
N+1
, i.e.
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Figure 4: Expected cost of delivery at n = 1 with N periods of flexibility (ED1(N))
each price has an expected value of 1
N+1
. In particular, the second lowest price has expected
value 2
N+1
. Simple numerical examples show that as N increases:
ED1(N) ≈ 2
N + 1
As an illustration, note that if N = 70, ED1(70) = 0.026 and
2
71
= 0.028. In summary,
the delivery policy is almost expost efficient.
2.3 Single-shot Contracts
With the setup established so far, this subsection describes the terms of the single-shot
contract between A and C and its welfare implications.
On the demand side, C can buy the load from R and choose to remain as a conventional
customer who doesn’t act flexibly. In this case, his payoff is UC . Otherwise, if C decides to
be flexible, his payoff is U˜C :
UC =
 v − p ≡ U˜C if C acts flexiblyv − p ≡ UC if C does not act flexibly (2)
where v is the value that C obtains from consuming energy. For our analysis, we assume
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that v > p, p.
On the supply side, A must procure the load it will deliver to C at the wholesale price
wn. If it acquires the right to control delivery of the load, it faces ED1(N): the unitary cost
of delivery with N periods of flexibility ED1(N). If it doesn’t, A remains out of business
and makes a profit of zero. Hence, A’s payoff is:
UA =
 p− ED1(N) ≡ U˜A if A gains control0 ≡ UA if A does not gain control (3)
Note that the problem is of interest if v > ED1(N). The price of the contract is the
solution to a Nash bargaining problem:
Proposition 3 Under assumptions BL1− BL9, the single-shot contract between C and A
has a price:
p =
p+ ED1(N)
2
(4)
per kWh
The result of Proposition 3 is appealing because p stands at the midpoint between the
retail price p and A’s expected unitary cost of delivery ED1(N) with N periods of flexibility.
Hence, C and A are able to gain from trading flexibility.
In addition, the more flexible C is, as measured by the length N of F , the lower the price
p is and the higher total welfare is. In simple terms, as Proposition 4 shows, the “size of the
pie” can be made bigger if the two parties (C and A) cooperate.
Proposition 4 Under assumptions BL1−BL9, C and A enter a single-shot contract leading
to total welfare:
TWflex = v − ED1(N)
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which is higher than total welfare under the alternative of not entering the contract:
TW = v − ED1(1)
3 Extensions to the baseline model
The baseline model presented in section 2 allows formalizing the claim that A and C can
be better off by trading flexibility which, in consequence, increases total welfare. However,
the statement relies on a set of reasonable but restrictive assumptions. First, the baseline
model assumes that A and C have symmetric bargaining power. Second, A and R are
assumed to be two independent entities. Third, it was assumed that the load is indivisible
and equal to one. This section investigates the generality of the results of section 2 by
relaxing some of the assumptions on which they are based.
3.1 Asymmetric bargaining
According to BL6, A and C have symmetric bargaining power. Instead, assume now
that either A or C are in a position to make an ultimatum offer, which would be the case if
there were one aggregator and several identical consumers or, vice versa, many aggregators
and one consumer. The agreed price differs from the result of Proposition 3 and total welfare
is lower:
Proposition 5 Let  be an arbitrarily small positive number:
1. If A makes an ultimatum offer to C, it proposes:
p = p−  (5)
such that UC =  and UA = p− − ED1(N)
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2. Similarly, if C makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to A, it suggests:
p = ED1(N) +  (6)
such that UA =  and UC = p− − ED1(N).
In both cases, the contract between A and C leads to total welfare:
TWflex = p− ED1(N)
which is lower than v − ED1(N) because v > p, p.
3.2 Role of A is fulfilled by R
According to assumption BL7, A’s role is independent of R’s. Alternatively, in this
subsection let us assume that A’s role is fulfilled by R with whom C has a contract. In
consequence, A’s outside option is to deliver the load as a retailer. Thus, instead of equation
(7), A’s payoff is:
UA =
 p− ED1(N) ≡ U˜A if A gains controlp− ED1(1) ≡ UA if A does not gain control (7)
Thus, if A acquires control of the flexible load, it gets paid the lower p, and faces the lower
ED1(N). In contrast, as a retailer, A receives the higher p but faces the higher ED1(1).
Proposition 6 If A’s role is fulfilled by R, the price of the contract between A and C is:
p = p+
ED1(N)− ED1(1)
2
(8)
or equivalently
p =
p+ ED1(N)
2
+
p− ED1(1)
2
(9)
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Re-arranging terms, we obtain the following expression:
p− p = ED1(1)− ED1(N)
2
From Proposition 2, which established that ED1(1) > ED1(N), it follows that p < p and a
profitable deal to both parties can be reached.
Akin to the result with an independent aggregator, as the number of flexibility periods
(N) offered by the consumer increases, the price becomes lower. Unlike the asymmetric
bargaining assumption considered in section 3.1, total welfare remains unchanged when the
role of aggregator is fulfilled by the retailer.
Corollary 1 If A’s role is fulfilled by R, Proposition 4 holds.
Nonetheless, because A can charge now a higher p for the flexible load, the division of
surplus changes to his advantage. Note that the first term on the right-hand side of equation
(9) is equation (4). In consequence, it is clear that:
p =
p+ ED1(N)
2
+
p− ED1(1)
2
>
p+ EDN(N)
2
This result relates to the presence of economies of scope: asR participates in a distinct but
related economic activity, its bargaining power increases, which works to the disadvantage
of C.
3.3 Size of flexible load depends on p
According to BL5, the baseline model has assumed that the flexible load that C consumes
is indivisible and equals one kWh. Furthermore, no consideration about the price elasticity
of flexible demand has been made. Instead, it is now assumed that C has a downward-sloping
demand curve for the flexible load:
q = max [0, 1− p] (10)
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and
q = max [0, 1− p] (11)
for the inflexible load. This allows delving into the implications of a load different from
unity, which may be divisible, and a price-elastic demand.
In addition, we resort to consumer surplus CS(·) and producer surplus PS(·) as adequate
measures of welfare.
For C:
CS(p) =
(1− p)2
2
, if C pays p for the flexible load q
CS(p) =
(1− p)2
2
, if C pays p for the inflexible load q
For A:
PS(p) = (p− ED1(N))(1− p), if A is paid p for the flexible load q
Therefore, C’s payoff is:
UC =

(1−p)2
2
≡ U˜C if C is flexible
(1−p)2
2
≡ UC if C is not flexible
(12)
Similarly, the aggregator’s payoff is:
UA =
 (p− ED1(N))(1− p) ≡ U˜A if A gains control over the flexible load q0 ≡ UA if A does not gain control over q (13)
Unlike for the baseline model and extensions already studied, a closed-form solution for
p was not obtained. Instead, from the following expression for p as a function of p and the
expected unitary cost of delivery ED1(N):
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(1− p)2 = (1− p)2
[
1− 2p+ ED1(N)
1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)
]
(14)
it is possible to show that the same results of section 2 hold qualitatively 7.
Specifically, bargaining between A and C leads to a price p that is always below the price
p that R would charge as a pure monopolist. Moreover, p decreases as the length N of the
flexibility time frame F increases. These results are summarized in the following:
Proposition 7 Under the assumption of a downward-sloping demand curve for C given by
q = max [0, 1− p], the price p agreed by A and C:
1. Is such that CS(p) < CS(p) for p < 1+ED1(N)
2
2. Is a decreasing function of ED1(N)
Given that a closed form solution for p was not obtained, the condition that p <
1+ED1(N)
2
= pm in Proposition 7 sets a benchmark price to illustrate the point that trad-
ing flexibility always leads to higher consumer welfare, relative to C’s outside option to
remain as conventional, inflexible consumer of electricity. Note that pm is the price that A
would set as a pure monopolist (i.e. without bargaining). In addition, if N = 1 and R were a
pure monopolist8, then pm = p because the retailer delivers the load without any flexibility.
To illustrate the results obtained in this subsection, we estimated the roots of the cubic
polynomial from the first order condition of the Nash bargaining problem (see equation 22
in the Appendix). Specifically, table 1 reports numerically obtained values of p for given
pairs of expected unitary cost of delivery with N = 2, . . . , 5 periods of flexibility, i.e. for
ED1(2), . . . , ED1(5), and retail prices p = {0.75, 0.70, 0.65}. Note that p = 1+ED1(1)1 = 0.75
corresponds to the monopoly price that R would charge: the highest possible price. For the
sake of completeness, we also use values of p below the monopoly level in our estimations.
7For details of the derivation of equation 14, see the Appendix
8An admittedly strong assumption which, nonetheless, serves well for illustrative purposes.
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p ED1(2) = 0.38 ED1(3) = 0.30 ED1(4) = 0.26 ED1(5) = 0.22
0.75 0.51 0.46 0.42 0.40
0.70 0.50 0.45 0.42 0.39
0.65 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.38
Table 1: Numerical values of p for fixed p and ED1(2), . . . , ED1(5). Independent A.
As stated in Proposition 7, p < p and, as more flexibility is offered by C, the agreed price
p becomes lower. For example: given a retail price p = 0.75, and two periods of flexibility
(such that ED1(2) = 0.38), the agreed price for the flexible load is p = 0.51. For the same
retail price as before, and five periods of flexibility (such that ED1(5) = 0.22), the agreed
price is p = 0.4. Likewise, if the retail price is lower (say, p = 0.65), and C offers 4 periods
of flexibility (such that ED1(4) = 0.26) the price of the flexible load is p = 0.4.
As a consequence, relative to the inflexible case, both A and C gain from trading flexibility
and total welfare is greater:
Proposition 8 Under the assumption that C has a downward-sloping demand curve of the
form q = max [0, 1− p], the contract between A and C leads to total welfare:
TWflex =
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
which is greater than the alternative of not entering a contract?
TW =
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(1)) (1− p)
3.4 Role of A is fulfilled by R, size of flexible load depends on p
One further extension of the model results from modifying assumptions BL5 and BL7
simultaneously. In addition to assuming, as in subsection 3.3, that the flexible load is different
from unity, now we add the assumption that A’s role is fulfilled by R. By implication,
equation (13) is now re-written as:
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UA =
 (p− ED1(N))(1− p) ≡ U˜A if A gains control over the load q(p− ED1(1)) (1− p) ≡ UA if A does not gain control over the load q (15)
Note that (15) is similar to (7) in subsection 3.2 but differs because the load is not unitary
anymore.
If A and C do not agree on a contract, now its outside option is to operate as a retailer.
As in subsection 3.3, a closed-form solution for p was not obtained, but from an expression
of p as a function of p, ED1(1) and ED1(N):
(1− p)2 = (1− p)2
[
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))(1− p)
(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N))(1− p) + 2(p− ED1(1))(1− p)
]
(16)
the conclusions outlined previously (in the baseline model, and in Propositions 7 and 8)
carry over to the modified set of assumptions just outlined (see Appendix for further details).
Consequently, the following:
Corollary 2 Propositions 7 and 8 hold under the assumptions that:
1. C has a downward-sloping demand curve q = max [0, 1− p]
2. A’s role is fulfilled by R.
The fundamental difference is that the price agreed in bargaining between A and C is
always higher than if A’s role remained independent of R. This coincides with the result of
section 3.2, given that A’s outside option is now better and, therefore, its bargaining power
has increased. In table 2 below, we report analogous9 results to the ones shown in table 1.
With two periods of flexibility offered by C, the expected cost of delivery of the flexible
load faced by A is ED1(2) = 0.38. But A’s outside option is to deliver the (inflexible) load
9Table 2 shows the roots of the third degree polynomial associated to the first order condition of the
Nash bargaining problem (equation 23 in the Appendix) under the assumptions outlined above. Reported
values are numerical calculations of p given p, R’s expected unitary cost of delivery ED1(1) = 0.50, and
pairwise combinations of ED1(2) . . . ED1(5) and p = {0.75, 0.70, 0.65}.
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p ED1(2) = 0.38 ED1(3) = 0.30 ED1(4) = 0.26 ED1(5) = 0.22
0.75 0.59 0.53 0.49 0.46
0.70 0.57 0.51 0.48 0.45
0.65 0.55 0.49 0.46 0.43
Table 2: Numerical values of p for fixed p, ED1(N) and ED1(1) = 0.5. Role of A is fulfilled
by R.
as a monopolist retailer for which it would charge p = 0.75 while facing an expected cost of
ED1(1) = 0.5 per kWh. Symmetric bargaining between C and A leads to a price p = 0.59
for delivery of the flexible load, which is higher than the price agreed if A’s role remained
independent of R (i.e. p = 0.51, as shown in table 1). As a result, while total welfare is
always greater with flexibility trading than without it, if A is independent of R, welfare is
higher than if A’s role is fulfilled by R.10 The following example clarifies this point.
Example 3 Consider a consumer who has a contract with a retailer for delivery of the
inflexible load for a price p = 0.75 per kWh. The payoff to C is UC = CS(0.75) =
(1−0.75)2
2
=
0.03 while that of R, who faces unitary cost of delivery ED1(1) = 0.5 with no flexibility, is
UR = PS(0.75) = (0.75− 0.5)(1− 0.75) = 0.06. Hence, TW = 0.09. Figure 4 illustrates this
initial situation as the sum of areas A and B.
Suppose C offers A a flexibility time frame of length N = 10, i.e. F = [1, . . . , 10]. Thus,
A’s expected unitary cost of delivery is ED1(10) = 0.14.
If C agrees on a contract with an independent A (as per assumption Bl7), then p = 0.34
and the payoff to C is UC = CS(0.34) =
(1−0.34)2
2
= 0.22 while the payoff to A is UA =
PS(0.34) = (0.34 − 0.14)(1 − 0.34) = 0.13. Therefore, TWflex = 0.35. In figure 6 this
corresponds to A′ +B′, including both (yellow and green) hatched areas.
In contrast, if C enters a contract with an A whose role is fulfilled by R, the price
is p = 0.39. The payoff to C is UC = CS(0.39) =
(1−0.39)2
2
= 0.19 and A’s payoff is
UA = PS(0.39) = (0.39 − 0.14)(1 − 0.39) = 0.15. This leads to TWflex = 0.34. In figure 5
10The reason behind this result is that A operates where demand is inelastic and, hence, its revenue is
increasing in price.
104
ED1(1) = 0.5
q = 0.25
p = 0.75
A
B
q
p
Figure 5: Total welfare without flexibility. Downward-sloping demand curve for C
this is indicated as area A′ + B′, minus the yellow hatched area. The green hatched area is
transferred from C to A.
4 Long-term contracts
Up to this point, this paper has focused on single-shot bargaining situations between A
and C, under a number of variations. So far, as per assumption BL3, the contracts between A
and C are for single-shot transactions. In contrast, this section analyzes long-term contracts
between both agents. In addition, according to assumption BL9, there is a technology in
place that reduces transaction costs to a negligible level, allowing both parties to gain from
trading flexibility. However, the analysis has overlooked the investment cost (I) required to
deploy such technology before both parties are able to realize an increase in their payoffs.
To account for this, this section assumes instead that I = IA + IC , where IA and IC are,
respectively, A’s and C’s investment costs required to establish a bilateral trade of flexibility.
Clearly, for any A to be in business, it should be able to control a sufficiently large number
of loads but this is exogenous to the model. Thus, IA refers to the specific bilateral trade
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Figure 6: Total welfare with flexibility. Numerical example with length of flexibility time
frame F = [1, . . . , 10]. Downward-sloping demand curve for C.
with C.
In addition, let T > N be the duration of the contract and suppose that flexibility trading
happens at times t ∈ [1, . . . T ] such that there is a flexibility time frame F1, . . . ,FT associated
to each t. Note that while both T and N refer to time, it is safe to assume - without loss of
generality - that they are measured in two different units, e.g. days and hours, respectively.
For example, a flexible C can offer N = 5 hours of flexibility to A over the course of T = 60
days, that is, 60 time frames of length N , i.e. F1, . . . ,F60. Instead of bargaining at each time
t, i.e. repeatedly, A and C can agree on p for the whole duration of the contract. Indeed, as
simplifying assumptions, the analysis of this section assumes that the flexibility time frames
are of equal length and that A and C bargain over the terms of the contract once: before
flexibility trading takes place in the period [1, . . . T ].
4.1 Unit load
Assuming that C commits to supplying N periods of flexibility in each transaction at
time t, its payoff over T periods is:
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T∑
t =1
(vt − pt)− IC , if it enters a contract with A
If it doesn’t, then C’s payoff is:
T∑
t =1
(vt − pt)
But because it is assumed that vt, p remain unchanged throughout the duration of the
contract, and p is the outcome of bargaining, it is simpler to write:
T (v − p)− IC , if C enters a contract with A
T (v − p), if C doesn’t enter a contract with A
Therefore, C’s payoff is:
UC =
 T (v − p)− IC ≡ U˜C if C is flexibleT (v − p) ≡ UC if C is not flexible (17)
Similarly, if A gains control over delivery of the flexible load, it obtains a payoff of:
T∑
t =1
(pt − ED1(N)t)− IA
but if it does not, then A does not enter into the load aggregation business. For the
same reasons as before, and the fact that the expected unitary cost of delivery ED1(N) is
determined before the parties trade with flexibility, it is correct and simpler to write:
T (p− ED1(N))− IA
Thus, the payoff to A is:
UA =
 T (p− ED1(N))− IA ≡ U˜A if A gains control0 ≡ UA if A does not gain control (18)
The conditions of the long-term contract are established before any flexibility trading
takes place. But, specifically, the price p remains fixed for the duration T of the contract
and it’s determined by Nash bargaining between A and C:
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Proposition 9 Over a period T > N and with investment cost I = IA + IC, the price of the
contract between A and C is:
p =
ED1(N) + p
2
+
IA − IC
2T
The price p for the long-term contract has two terms. The first coincides with equation
(4): the midpoint between the expected unitary cost of delivery ED1(N) with N periods of
flexibility and the retail price p. The second is a fixed term that depends on IA, IC , and T ,
with which p is inversely related: the longer the duration of the contract, the more periods
that are available to distribute the impact of the investment cost, IA− IC , on the long-term
price of flexibility.
An interesting feature of the agreed price is that three possible cases emerge:
1. If IA = IC , two cost-symmetric agents trade and the price agreed over T periods of
trading equals the price agreed in a single transaction, which is shown in equation 4.
2. If IA > IC , A faces a greater cost than C and the agreed price is greater than equation
4
3. If IA < IC , C faces a greater cost than A and the price is less than equation 4
Although the bargaining model of this paper has not made any assumption about the
specific technology with which A and C trade with flexibility, the size of IA and IC says
something about it. If the technology is such that there are scale economies, as the number
of loads that A controls increases, both IA and IC should decrease too. That is, a network
externality effect operates: if more consumers agree to let an aggregator control its load, it
is possible for A to distribute its total investment cost among more consumers and IA should
decrease. By the same argument, the more consumers trade with a given aggregator, the
lower the investment cost IC that C faces should be. In light of this, the third case gives
the consumer a better deal: C is able to obtain a lower p over the lifetime of a contract
108
if it trades flexibility with an “established” A. On the other hand, the presence of scale
economies may imply some degree of market power for A.
In summary, relative to the single-shot contracts analyzed earlier in the paper, a more
nuanced vision emerges when long-term contracts are considered. One in which flexibility
trading increases welfare relative to the welfare without flexibility trading, but depends on
the size of the required investment:
Proposition 10 If C, who faces investment cost IC, and A, who faces investment cost IA,
enter a long-term contract of duration T to trade with flexibility, total welfare is:
TWflex = T (v − ED1(N))− I
where I = IA + IC
In contrast, if C and A do not enter a contract, total welfare is:
TW = T (v − ED1(1))
TWflex > TW holds if I < T (v − ED1(N))− T (v − ED1(1))
4.2 Downward-sloping demand
Following the approach of section 3, in which baseline model assumptions are modified
in turn, this subsection investigates the validity of the results of the previous subsection
(4.1) under the assumption of downward-sloping demand, as in equations 10 and 11. In the
same way described in subsections 3.3 and 3.4, consumer surplus and producer surplus (as
functions of price) are used to measure the welfare of C and A, respectively.
If C agrees to offer flexibility, then his payoff is the sum of consumer surpluses over the
duration T of the contract:
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T∑
t=1
CS(pt)− IC =
T∑
t=1
(1− pt)
2
− IC
Alternatively, if C does not offer any flexibility and remains as a conventional consumer,
his payoff is:
T∑
t=1
CS(pt) =
T∑
t=1
(1− pt)
2
But because the valuation v and the price p remain fixed while the contract is valid and
p is determined via bargaining, the payoff to C is written as:
UC =
 T
(1−p)2
2
− IC ≡ U˜C if C is flexible
T (1−p
2)
2
≡ UC if C is not flexible
(19)
On the other hand, over T periods of flexibility trading, A obtains a payoff of:
T∑
t=1
PS(p)− IA =
T∑
t=1
(pt − ED1(N)t)(1− pt)− IA
Because the expected unitary cost of delivery is determined before trading and p is
determined in bargaining for the contract duration, A’s payoff is written as:
UA =
 T [(p− ED1(N))(1− pt)]− IA ≡ U˜A if A gains control0 ≡ UA if A does not gain control (20)
As in subsections 3.3 and 3.4, closed form solutions for the flexibility price were not
obtained. However, the following expression, which follows from the first order condition
for the Nash bargaining problem (see the Appendix), allows establishing connections with
results proven earlier in the paper.
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(21)
[
(1− p)2
2
(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N))
]
+
1
T
[IA(1− p)− IC(1− 2p+ ED1(N))]
=
[
(1− p)2
2
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
]
Note in the equation that p, as in (14), is a function of the expected unitary cost of
delivery ED1(N) and the retail price p but also of IA, IC and T .
Corollary 4 If A and C enter a long-term contract of duration T to trade with flexibility,
Proposition 7 holds
However, in accordance with Proposition 10, total welfare with flexibility trading is
greater than without it, only if the investment cost I is sufficiently small:
Proposition 11 If C, who has downward-sloping demand q = max [0, 1− p] and has in-
vestment cost IC enters a long-term contract for flexibility trading of duration T with A, who
has investment cost IA, total welfare is:
TWflex = T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
]
− I
where I = IA + IC.
In contrast, if A and C do not enter a long-term contract
TW = T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
]
TWflex > TW holds if
I < T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
]
− T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
]
To illustrate the results of this subsection, the following three tables (namely, tables 3, 4
and 5) present agreed long-term prices of flexibility under different situations. In all cases,
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assume that T = 90 days is the duration of a contract for flexibility between A and C and
that I = 10. Furthermore, the prices reported in the following tables are estimated from
equation 24 in the appendix. As in the results of tables 1 and 2, the reported results are
calculated given the expected unitary cost of delivery for flexibility time frames of length 2
to 5, i.e. ED1(2), . . . , ED1(5) and retail prices p = [0.75, 0.70, 0.65].
Table 3 assumes that IA = IC = 5, a situation in which A and C face equally-sized
investment costs to trade with flexibility over T periods.
p ED1(2) = 0.38 ED1(3) = 0.30 ED1(4) = 0.26 ED1(5) = 0.22
0.75 0.53 0.48 0.44 0.42
0.70 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.41
0.65 0.50 0.45 0.42 0.40
Table 3: Agreed prices of long-term contracts for flexibility between A and C. Symmetric
investment costs.
p ED1(2) = 0.38 ED1(3) = 0.30 ED1(4) = 0.26 ED1(5) = 0.22
0.75 0.59 0.52 0.48 0.46
0.70 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.45
0.65 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.43
Table 4: Agreed prices of long-term contracts for flexibility between A and C. Investment
costs are asymmetric towards A.
Table 4 assumes that IA = 7, IC = 3, a situation in which A faces a greater investment
cost than C to trade with flexibility. Note that relative to table 3, prices are consistently
higher in table 4.
Table 5 assumes that IA = 3, IC = 7, a situation in which A’s investment cost is lower
than C’s.
In accordance with the discussion of subsection 4.1, the numerical results shown in the
previous tables give a more nuanced vision of flexibility trading in a long-term setting. First,
the total investment cost must be sufficiently small and the trading period sufficiently long
to be able to realize a profitable trade. Second, the distribution of investment costs between
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p ED1(2) = 0.38 ED1(3) = 0.30 ED1(4) = 0.26 ED1(5) = 0.22
0.75 0.48 0.43 0.40 0.38
0.70 0.47 0.42 0.39 0.37
0.65 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.36
Table 5: Agreed prices of long-term contracts for flexibility between A and C. Investment
costs are asymmetric towards C.
the two agents has a direct impact on the agreed prices. Relative to the situation in which
both parties bear the same cost (table 3), the situation in which A faces a greater cost
than C is (table 4) is the least advantageous for C. In contrast, whenever IA < IC , the
agreed prices are the lowest. Although not directly modelled in this paper, this feature says
something about the presence of scale economies and network externalities in the aggregation
business. The more loads A is able to aggregate, the lower the investment cost required in
each long-term bilateral contract. Similarly, the more consumers offer their flexibility to an
aggregator, the lower the required IC . The key economic message is that some degree of
market power may be required to cover the investment cost associated to the establishment
of the necessary technology to trade flexibility.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has dealt with power system flexibility from demand-side resources, focusing
on the contractual relationship between an aggregator and a consumer. Under a number of
reasonable but restrictive assumptions, the key message of the paper is that flexibility trading
is welfare enhancing to both parties. Such is the consequence of the aggregator’s optimal
delivery policy, which gives him the possibility of managing price risk, together with the
consumer’s possibility to reduce its electricity bill.
Under a set of relaxed assumptions, discussed in section 3, the same conclusion - with
caveats - stands. For example, if a retailer enters the related but distinct business of delivering
flexible loads, essentially expanding the scope of its economic activity, the gains from trading
flexibility can still be increased but the agreed price of flexibility is higher, which operates
to the disadvantage of the consumer. Likewise, if one of the parties is able to make an
ultimatum offer, welfare can still be increased relative to the situation in which no flexibility
trading exists, but one of the parties appropriates the gains from trading.
Taking a long-term perspective, in which single-shot transactions are not the focus of
the contracts, and accounting for the required investment costs to put in place a technology
that reduces transaction costs, i.e. a Smart Grid solution, gives a more nuanced vision of
the key result of the paper. First, aggregator and consumer must trade for a sufficiently
long period of time to cover the investment cost and be able to realize the single-transaction
gains from trading flexibility. Second, the agreed price depends on the way that costs are
shared. Relative to the case in which they are symmetrically shared, when the consumer
faces a relatively higher cost than the aggregator, the consumer is able to obtain a better
deal for its flexibility. Such a finding relates to the possibility of a network effect, which
requires some degree of scale economies in the flexibility-enabling technology. Clearly, a
trade-off may exist between the presence of scale economies and the possibility to introduce
competition among aggregators in a potential market for flexibility.
The analysis presented in this paper, naturally, has its limitations. First, all of the results
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are under symmetric information and risk neutrality.11 It might be useful to modify some of
these assumptions in further extensions. Second, apart from the impact of wholesale prices
on the aggregator’s revenue, the full impact of demand uncertainty in the aggregator’s profit
function has not been explicitly modelled. That is: the aggregator is an intermediary and,
consequently, faces double uncertainty. On the cost side, it must optimize its acquisition of
loads. On the revenue side, the flexibility it “assembles” may or may not be desirable by the
final users. A third limitation relates to the insufficiently detailed analysis of the investment
cost sharing arrangements, i.e. well-designed contracts for flexibility should not avoid this
crucial topic.
Last but not least, from a methodological perspective, what we have presented is just a
theoretical economic model which, after all, is not much more than what Rubinstein (2012)
calls an “economic fable”, a tale that seeks to impart a lesson about an economic situation
by “clarifying concepts, evaluating assumptions, verifying conclusions and acquiring insights
that will serve us when we return from the model to real life”. But, as with any fable, its
message should be applied judiciously.
11The work by Bosca´n and Poudineh (2016b) addresses the asymmetric information issue. Their model
studies the procurement problem under adverse selection problem. Their results can be applied to, inter
alia, the aggregator’s problem when procuring loads from consumers.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
We prove the claim by backward induction. Let F = [1, . . . , N ] be a flexibility time
frame of length N,N > 1.
At n = N , A must deliver the load and cannot postpone any longer, unless it breaches
the agreement. Therefore, it faces the expected cost of delivery:
EDN(N) = E (wN)
At n ∈ [1, . . . , N − 1], A compares wn with EDn+1(N). If wn ≤ EDn+1(N), A delivers.
If wn > EDn+1(N), A postpones. This results in the following recursive expression for
EDn(N):
EDn(N) =
∫ 1
0
min {wn, EDn+1(N)} dwn
=
∫ EDn+1(N)
0
wn dwn +
∫ 1
EDn+1(N)
EDn+1(N)dwn
=
(EDn+1(N))
2
2
+ (EDn+1(N))(1− EDn+1(N))
=
(EDn+1(N))
2 + 2EDn+1(N)− 2(EDn+1(N))2
2
=
2EDn+1(N)− (EDn+1(N))2
2
= EDn+1(N)− (EDn+1(N))
2
2
Proof of Proposition 2. We will use the monotone convergence theorem12, which states
that if a sequence is monotonic and bounded then it converges, to prove the claim that
{ED1(N)}N≥1 converges to zero.
1. By induction, we show that the sequence is monotonically decreasing in N :
12For a proof and discussion of this theorem see, for example, de la Fuente (2000) or Hoy et al. (2001).
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For N = 1 and N = 2 we can easily verify that:
ED1(N) = ED1(1) =
1
2
> ED1(2) =
2ED1(N − 1)− (ED1(N − 1))2
2
=
3
8
Assume that ED1(N) > ED1(N + 1) holds for N sufficiently large.
From:
ED1(N) =
2ED1(N − 1)− (ED1(N − 1))2
2
, it follows that:
2ED1(N)− (ED1(N))2
2
= ED1(N + 1)
> ED1(N + 2) =
2ED1(N + 1)− (ED1(N + 1))2
2
2. By assumption BL8,wn ∼ U [0, 1], it is clear that the sequence is bounded below by 0
We have proved that the sequence converges and now we evaluate its limit:
lim
N →∞
ED1(N) = lim
N→∞
2ED1(N − 1)− (ED1(N − 1))2
2
=
2
2
lim
N→∞
ED1(N − 1)− (ED1(N − 1))2
= lim
N→∞
ED1(N − 1)− (ED1(N − 1))2
Letting limN→∞ED1(N) = L we can write:
L = L− L2
L = 0
Proof of Proposition 3. Under assumptions BL1-BL9, the agreed price between C and
A is the solution to the following Nash (1950) bargaining problem, where (UCUA) is the
well-known “Nash product”:
p = arg max
p
(UCUA)
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Note that C’s net payoff equals the difference between acting flexibly and remaining as
a conventional, non-flexible electricity consumer (C’s “outside option”):
UC = U˜C − UC
= v − p− v + p
= −p+ p
Similarly, A’s net payoff is the difference between its two options, which are acquiring
control of the load and remaining out of business:
UA = U˜A − UA
= p− ED1(N)− 0
The first-order condition is:
U ′CUA + UCU
′
A = 0
−p+ ED1(N) + p− p = 0
Thus, the agreed price is
p =
p+ ED1(N)
2
Proof of Proposition 4.
If C and A enter a single-shot contract over the control of the flexible load, UC = U˜C =
v − p and UA = U˜A = p− ED1(N), because the load is delivered to C by A. Therefore,
TWflex = UC + UA
= U˜C + U˜A
= v − p+ p− ED1(N)
= v − ED1(N)
In contrast, if C and A and do not reach an agreement, then UC = UC = v − p but
UA = UA = 0 because it is the retailer who delivers the load, whose payoff is UR = p−ED1(1).
Hence,
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TW = UC + UR
= UC + UR
= v − p+ p− ED1(1)
= v − ED1(1)
Clearly, TWflex > TW . This is because, ED1(1) > ED1(N) whenever N > 1, which
follows from Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5.
1. If A has all the bargaining power, it will propose a price p such that the consumer’s
net payoff is:
UC = v − p− v + p = 
where  is an arbitrarily small, positive number. Therefore,
p = p− 
A’s payoff is then:
UA = p− ED1(N)
UA = (p− )− ED1(N)
2. Similarly, if C has all the bargaining power, he will set a price p such that A’s net
payoff is:
UA = p− ED1(N) = 
Therefore,
p = ED1(N) + 
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C’s payoff is then:
UC = v − p− v + p
UC = p− ED1(N)− 
Proof of Proposition 6.
Relaxing assumption BL7, i.e. assuming that R takes the role of A, but with equal
bargaining power between the two parties, the price p is the solution to the following Nash
bargaining problem:
p = arg max
p
(UCUA)
where
UC = U˜C − UC
= v − p− v + p
= −p+ p
and
UA = U˜A − UA
= p− ED1(N)− p+ ED1(1)
The first order condition to the Nash bargaining problem is:
U ′CUA + UCU
′
A = 0
−p+ ED1(N) + p− ED1(1) + p− p = 0
from which the following price is derived:
p = p+
ED1(N)− ED1(1)
2
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Calculations associated with subsection 3.3
Derivation of equation (14) on the main text:
With C’s downward-sloping demand curve q = max[0, 1−p], the Nash bargaining problem
is:
p = arg max
p
(UCUA)
where C’s net payoff is UC =
(1−p)2
2
− (1−p)2
2
and A’s is UA = (p − ED1(N))(1 − p).
Therefore:
p = arg max
p
[
(1− p)2
2
− (1− p)
2
2
]
[(p− ED1(N))(1− p)]
which is equivalent to
p = arg max
p
(1− p)3(p− ED1(N))− (1− p)2(1− p)(p− ED1(N))
This has the first order condition:
−3(1− p)2(p− ED1(N)) + (1− p)3 + (1− p)2(p− ED1(N))− (1− p)2(1− p) = 0
or
(1− p)2(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)) = (1− p)2(1− 2p+ ED1(N)) (22)
which is the equation used to estimate numerical values of p in table 1 on the main text.
Re-arranging this expression gives equation (14) in the main text:
(1− p)2 = (1− p)2
[
1− 2p+ ED1(N)
1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)
]
On the condition that p < 1+ED1(N)
2
:
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If A were a pure monopolist, then it would solve:
max
pm
(pm − ED1(N))(1− pm)
which leads to the first order condition 1− pm − pm + ED1(N) = 0 or
1− 2pm + ED1(N) = 0
Thus,
pm =
1 + ED1(N)
2
Of course, if N = 1, then ED1(N) = ED1(1) and R were a pure monopolist, then p = pm.
For N > 1, ED1(1) > ED1(N) as shown in Proposition 2. It follows that p ≥ pm > p.
Proof of Proposition 7.
1. To see the first part of the claim, divide both sides of equation (22) (in the Appendix)
by 2 and re-arrange terms to obtain:
(1− p)2
2
(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)) = (1− p)
2
2
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
CS(p)
[
1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)
1− 2p+ ED1(N)
]
= CS(p)
Note that:
1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)
1− 2p+ ED1(N) =
1− 2p+ ED1(N)− 2p+ 2ED1(N)
1− 2p+ ED1(N) = 1−2
p− ED1(N)
1− 2p+ ED1(N) < 1
for p < 1+ED1(N)
2
= pm
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2. The second part of the claim follows from:
d
dED1(N)
(
1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)
1− 2p+ ED1(N)
)
=
d
dED1(N)
(
1− 2 p− ED1(N)
1− 2p+ ED1(N)
)
=
− d
dED1(N)
(
2(p− ED1(N))(1− 2p+ ED1(N))−1
)
=
= 2 (1− 2p+ ED1(N))−1 + 2 (p− ED1(N)) (1− 2p+ ED1(N))−2
=
2− 2p
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))−2
= 2
1− p
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))2
Note that this expression is strictly positive for p. Hence, as ED1(N) increases CS(p)
and CS(p) tend to be equal. Put differently: the lower ED1(N), the bigger the increase
in CS(p) relative to CS(p).
Proof of Proposition 8.
If C has a downward-sloping demand curve given by q = max [0, 1− p] and enters a
contract for delivery of the flexible load q with A, then UC =
(1−p)2
2
= U˜C and UA =
(p− ED1(N))(1− p) = U˜A, because the load is delivered to C by A. Therefore,
TWflex = UC + UA
= U˜C + U˜A
=
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
In contrast, if C and A do not agree on a contract to deliver the flexible load, then
UC =
(1−p)2
2
= UC but UA = UA = 0 because it is R who delivers the load and, consequently,
its profit is UR = (p− ED1(1))(1− p). Hence,
TW = UC + UR
= UC + UR
=
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
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Now, we show that TWflex > TW . Term-to-term comparison of the two expressions
shows that:
1. Consumer surplus is greater when flexibility is traded:
(1− p)2
2
>
(1− p)2
2
This is because CS(·) is decreasing in p and we have proved that p < p.
2. A’s profit is greater than R’s profit:
(p− ED1(N))(1− p) > (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
Subtracting (1− p) from (1− p) and (p−ED1(N)) from (p−ED1(1)), we obtain the
following expression:
0 > [(p− ED1(1))− (p− ED1(N))] [(1− p)− (1− p)]
> [(p− p)− (ED1(1)− ED1(N))] [(p− p)]
From Proposition 7 and 2, (p− p) < 0, (p− p) > 0 and (ED1(1)−ED1(N)) > 0 must
hold. Furthermore, if flexibility is traded, then (p − p) > (ED1(N) − ED1(N)) must
hold as well. This proves that the inequality above holds.
Calculations associated with Section 3.4
Derivation of equation (16):
If the role of aggregator is assumed by a retailer and the consumer has downward-sloping
demand curve q = max [0, 1− p], the Nash bargaining problem is:
p = arg max
p
(UCUA)
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where C’s net payoff is UC =
(1−p)2
2
− (1−p)2
2
and A’s is UA = (p− ED1(N)) (1− p) −
(p− ED1(1)) (1− p). Therefore:
p = arg max
p
[
(1− p)2
2
− (1− p)
2
2
]
[(p− ED1(N)) (1− p)− (p− ED1(1)) (1− p)]
After some algebraic manipulation:
p = arg max
p
(p− ED1(N))(1− p)3 − (p− ED1(1))(1− p)(1− p)2 − (p− ED1(N))(1− p)(1− p)2
+ (p− ED1(1))(1− p)3
The first order condition of this problem is:
−3(p−ED1(N))(1−p)2+(1−p)3+2(1−p)(p−ED1(1))(1−p)−(1−p)(1−p)2+(p−ED1(N))(1−p)2 = 0
or
(1−p)2
[
−3(p− ED1(N)) + (1− p) + 2(p− ED1(1)) (1− p)
(1− p)
]
= (1−p)2 [1− 2p+ ED1(N)]
We obtain:
(1−p)2
[
(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N))(1− p) + 2(p− ED1(1))(1− p)
(1− p)
]
= (1−p)2 [1− 2p+ ED1(N)]
(23)
Re-arranging terms leads to equation (16) in the main text:
(1− p)2 = (1− p)2
[
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))(1− p)
(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N))(1− p) + 2(p− ED1(1))(1− p)
]
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Corollary 2:
1. Dividing both sides of equation 23 by 2 and manipulating the expression further, we
get:
(1− p)2
2
[
(1− 2p+ ED1(N)− 2p+ 2ED1(N))(1− p)
(1− 2p+ EDN(N))(1− p) + 2
(p− ED1(1))(1− p)
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))(1− p)
]
=
(1− p)2
2
or
(1− p)2
2
[
1− 2 (p− ED1(N))
(1− 2p+ ED1(N)) + 2
(p− ED1(1))(1− p)
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))(1− p)
]
=
(1− p)2
2
which is equivalent to
CS(p)
[
1− 2
1− 2p+ ED1(N)
(p− ED1(N))(1− p) + (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
1− p
]
= CS(p)
Clearly,
[
1− 2
1− 2p+ ED1(N)
(p− ED1(N))(1− p) + (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
1− p
]
< 1
for p < 1+ED1(N)
2
, which proves that CS(p) < CS(p) and, therefore, p < p. Note that
this is equivalent to the first claim in Proposition 7.
In addition, note that
d
dED1(N)
(
1− 2
1− 2p+ ED1(N)
(p− ED1(N))(1− p) + (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
1− p
)
= 2
(p− ED1(N))(1− p) + (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
(1− p)(1− 2p+ ED1(N))2
− 2
(
(p− 1)
(1− p)(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
)
=
(
2
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
)(
(p− ED1(N))(1− p) + (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
(1− p)(1− 2p+ ED1(N)) + 1
)
> 0
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which is equivalent to the second claim in Proposition 7.
2. If A and C enter a contract for delivery of the flexible load q and C has a downward-
sloping demand curve given by q = max [0, 1− p], then UC = CS(p) = (1−p)22 = U˜C
and UA = (p−DN)(1− p) = U˜A. Thus,
TWflex = UC + UA
= U˜C + U˜A
=
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
In contrast, if C and A do not agree on a contract to deliver the flexible load, then
UC = CS(p) =
(1−p)2
2
= UC and UA = (p−ED1(1))(1− p) because A delivers the load
in its role of retailer. Hence,
TW = UC + UA
= UC + UA
=
(1− p)2
2
+ (p−D1)(1− p)
Furthermore, TWflex > TW as shown in Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 9
Relaxing Proposition BL9 and considering a period T , the agreed price between C and
A is the solution to the following Nash bargaining problem:
p = arg max
p
(UCUA)
where
UC = U˜C −UC
= T (v − p)− IP − T (v − p)
= T (p− p)− IC
and
UA = U˜A −UA
= T (p− ED1(N))− IA
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The first order condition to the Nash bargaining problem is:
U′CUA + U
′
AUC = 0
−T (T (p− ED1(N))− IA) + T (T (p− p)− IC) = 0
from which the following price is derived:
p =
ED1(N) + p
2
+
IA − IC
2T
Proof of Proposition 10.
If C and A enter a long-term contract of duration T over the control of the flexible load,
UC = U˜C = T (v−p)−IC and UA = U˜A = T (p−ED1(N))−IA, because the load is delivered
to C by A. Therefore,
TWflex = UC + UA
= U˜C + U˜A
= T (v − p)− IC + T (p− ED1(N))− IA
= T (v − ED1(N))− I
where I = IC + IA.
In contrast, if C and A and do not reach an agreement, then UC = UC = T (v − p)
but UA = UA = 0 because it is the retailer who delivers the load, whose payoff is UR =
T (p− ED1(1)). Hence,
TW = UC + UR
= UC + UR
= T (v − p) + T (p− ED1(1))
= T (v − ED1(1))
Clearly, T (v − ED1(N)) > T (v − ED1(1)), which follows from Proposition 2. But
TWflex > TW only if I < T (v − ED1(N))− T (v − ED1(1))
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Calculations associated with Section 4.2
Derivation of equation (21):
With duration of a long-term contract T , and assuming that C has downward-sloping
demand curve q = max [0, 1− p], the Nash bargaining problem between A and C is:
p = arg max
p
(UCUA)
where C’s net payoff is UC = T
[
(1−p)2
2
− (1−p)2
2
]
− IC and A’s is UA =
T [(p− ED1(N)) (1− p)]− IA.
Thus:
p = arg max
p
{
T
[
(1− p)2
2
− (1− p)
2
2
]
− IC
}
{T [(p− ED1(N)) (1− p)]− IA}
Expanding the expression above:
p = arg max
p
T 2
[
(p− ED1(N))(1− p)3
2
− (p− ED1(N))(1− p)(1− p)
2
2
]
− TIA
[
(1− p)2
2
− (1− p)
2
2
]
− TIC [(p− ED1(N))(1− p)] + ICIA
This has the first order condition:
T 2
2
[−3(1− p)2(p− ED1(N)) + (1− p)3 + (1− p)2(p− ED1(N))− (1− p)2(1− p)]
+ TIA(1− p)− TIC(1− 2p+ ED1(N)) = 0
Simplifying and re-organizing the equality:
T 2
2
[
(1− p)2(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N))
]
+ T [IA(1− p)− IC(1− 2p+ ED1(N))]
=
T 2
2
[
(1− p)2(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
]
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Multiplying the whole expression by 1
T 2
:
[
(1− p)2
2
(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N))
]
+
1
T
[IA(1− p)− IC(1− 2p+ ED1(N))]
=
[
(1− p)2
2
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
]
(24)
to obtain equation 21 on the main text.
Corollary 4:
1. There is a price p < p such that CS(p) > CS(p):
Equation 21 is equivalent to:
CS(p)(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)) + 1
T
[IA(1− p)− IC(1− 2p+ ED1(N))]
= CS(p)(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
Dividing the whole expression by (1− 2p+ ED1(N)):
CS(p)
[
(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N))
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
]
+
1
T
[
IA
(1− p)
(1− 2p+ ED1(N)) − IC
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
]
= CS(p)
[
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
]
which is equivalent to:
CS(p)
[
(1− 4p+ 3ED1(N))
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
]
+
1
T
[
IA
(1− p)
(1− 2p+ ED1(N)) − IC
]
= CS(p)
From the proof of Proposition 7, we know that:
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1− 4p+ 3ED1(N)
1− 2p+ ED1(N) = 1− 2
p− ED1(N)
1− 2p+ ED1(N) < 1
for p < 1+ED1(N)
2
= pm
Furthermore,
(1− p)
1− 2p+ ED1(N) < 1
for p < ED1(N)
2
2. The price p is a decreasing function of ED1(N)
It follows from the proof of proposition 7 and the fact that
d
dED1(N)
(
(1− p)
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
)
= − (1− p)
(1− 2p+ ED1(N))
Proof of Proposition 11.
If C and A enter a long-term contract of duration T over the control of the flexible load,
UC = U˜C = T
[
(1−p)2
2
]
− IC and UA = U˜A = T [(p− ED1(N))(1− p)]− IA, because the load
is delivered to C by A. Therefore,
TWflex = UC + UA
= U˜C + U˜A
= T
[
(1− p)2
2
]
− IC + T [(p− ED1(N))(1− p)]− IA
= T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
]
− I
where I = IC + IA.
In contrast, if C and A and do not reach an agreement, then UC = UC = T
[
(1−p)2
2
]
but UA = UA = 0 because it is the retailer who delivers the load, whose payoff is UR =
T [(p− ED1(1))(1− p)]. Hence,
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TW = UC + UR
= UC + UR
= T
[
(1− p)2
2
]
+ T [(p− ED1(1))(1− p)]
= T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
]
From Proposition 8,
T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
]
> T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
]
but TWflex > TW holds only if
I < T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(N))(1− p)
]
− T
[
(1− p)2
2
+ (p− ED1(1))(1− p)
]
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Chapter 4
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Abstract 
As the share of intermittent renewable energy increases in the generation mix, power systems are exposed to 
greater levels of uncertainty and risk, which requires planners, policy and business decision makers to incentivise 
flexibility, that is: their adaptability to unforeseen variations in generation and demand. As a commodity, 
flexibility has multiple attributes such as capacity, ramp rate, duration and lead time, among which there are 
complementarities. This paper asks the fundamental question of how should the provision of flexibility, as a 
multi-dimensional commodity, be incentivised? To answer it, this paper proposes a model of bilateral trade in an 
environment characterized by multidimensional adverse selection. Through a simulation analysis, the paper also 
elucidates the applicability of the proposed model and demonstrates the way in which it can be utilised in, for 
example, a thermostat-based demand response programme. 
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1. Introduction 
Integrating renewables into electricity systems poses a number of operational challenges (on this topic see, 
e.g. Morales et al. (2014)). Transmission system operators, which ensure system balancing at all times, 
must face higher short-term uncertainty as renewable production is stochastic. In the absence of widely 
available electricity storage, there is a growing need for power systems to adapt to the fluctuation imposed 
by renewables, that is: to increase their flexibility. While a universal definition for flexibility doesn’t exist 
in the technical literature on power systems, it is the encompassing word used to describe the ability of 
power systems to respond to demand and supply variations over various time horizons.1 Moreover, while 
the term is relatively new, the concept is not, as the challenges related to variable demand and generation 
outage have existed since the dawn of the power industry.  
Given the increased deployment of renewables, the technical and policy literatures on power systems have 
shown greater interest in the topic of flexibility. For example, Lannoye et al. (2012) and Ulbig and Adersson 
(2015) have focused on the important question of measuring power system flexibility, while associations 
like EURELECTRIC (2015) have focused on regulatory recommendations to increase the role of demand 
side flexibility in European electricity markets. 
However, very few studies have recognised the need to incentivise the provision of power system flexibility 
or that it has multiple attributes or dimensions. One notable exception is the report by Ela et al. (2014) who 
focus on the incentives to enable flexibility in short-term power system operation and claim that “different 
types of resources excel at different forms of flexibility, and they also have different cost impacts when 
providing flexibility”.  
In line with Ela et al. (2014), a key claim of this paper is that - unlike commodities traded in existing 
electricity markets, such as energy or capacity - power system flexibility is a commodity with multiple 
attributes. These include, for example, capacity, ramp rate, duration and lead time for demand-side 
resources. Therefore, buyers have different preferences over the elements that compose flexibility, but 
sellers are also constrained by the technology they possess, creating thus heterogeneity in the commodity 
space of flexibility. From the buyer perspective, the value of different attributes of flexibility depends on 
the specific purpose and conditions (e.g., sometimes for the user, ramp rate is more important than other 
features of flexibility and some other times duration of response). On the supply side of the market, sellers 
of flexibility also have different degrees of efficiency across flexibility components. 
The inherent multi-attribute nature of flexibility, its heterogeneity and the imperfect complementarity 
among the consumption and production of its composing elements create a set of unique characteristics that 
have not been analysed thus far. Its economic implications are much more than a theoretical curiosity and 
have implications of practical relevance for energy policy makers in general and system operators in 
particular, because they must incentivise the efficient provision of flexibility if an increasing reliance on 
renewables is to be achieved. 
Furthermore, flexibility is topically relevant as recent technological innovations have sparked new business 
models that are attracting new actors to trade with different forms of flexibility. Among the new players are 
distribution system operators, who are expected to have an increasing role as buyers of flexibility to manage 
congestion. Other market players include retailers, aggregators and balancing-responsible parties who trade 
for portfolio optimisation purposes (Boscán and Poudineh, 2016).  
1 The reader is referred to Boscán (2016b) for a literature review on power system flexibility and its product design perspective.  
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The emergence of new technologies along with the greater use of ICT in the power infrastructure have 
enabled the provision of flexibility from many small resource providers (such as households). This is, in 
fact, a feature of the future decentralised power systems in which the role of small players will become 
more valuable to the system especially at an aggregated level. Against this background, the central question 
of this paper is of an economic nature and can be summarised in a sentence, namely: how should the 
provision of flexibility be incentivised from these small resources? Specifically, how does a utility company, 
system operator or an aggregator compensate owners of flexibility-enabling assets in a power system to 
supply flexibility? The incentive can be provided through bilateral contracts or auctions (see Boscán, 2016a) 
specifically designed to account for the economic properties of flexibility. However, due to presence of 
high transaction cost relative to the size of resource, the small resources providers cannot participate directly 
in an organised market and compete against each other. Therefore, this situation creates a trading 
environment in which “efficient” bilateral contracts are the natural method of procurement.  
This paper fills an existing gap and contributes to the literature in three different ways. In section two, we 
discuss the concept of power system flexibility by explaining its relevance, the different sources from which 
it can be obtained, how it is traded in existing markets, and its main economic properties. 
The second and the main contribution of this paper is in power system economics, as section three proposes 
and solves a static bilateral contracting model with bi-dimensional adverse selection, which appeals to the 
topic of flexibility but, more generally, to the procurement problem. 2 A buyer of flexibility - the principal 
- procures the two composing elements of flexibility from a seller - the agent - who has private information 
about the unit cost of supplying each component. While the model is presented in a bilateral setting, it can 
be extended to instances where competition among suppliers is feasible, but this paper focuses on trading 
environments where competition is not realistically viable. For example, contracts between an aggregator 
and a household or contracts between a DSO and a household for obtaining flexibility through the 
installation of smart energy management systems.3 In such cases, transaction costs associated to market 
access or scale of the offer from a specific agent prevent competition to exist.  
The model is presented in a sufficiently general form, which accounts for a wide range of specific functional 
forms, and the solution assumes non-separability4 in both the principal’s gross utility and the agent’s cost 
function.5 In this way, instances where separability holds are special cases. To gain tractability, we solve a 
relaxed version of the fully constrained optimisation program which gives rise to the most economically 
relevant situations. Within this program, we analyse five different cases, which stem from the covariance 
of types – which determines if an agent’s efficiency in one dimension of flexibility can be used to predict 
or not its efficiency in the second dimension of flexibility – namely: perfect correlation, positive correlation, 
2 Although flexibility is multi-dimensional in nature, our model is bi-dimensional. Such a simplification was introduced for the 
sake of tractability. 
3 In separate work, Boscán and Poudineh (in preparation) analyse bilateral contracts in a decentralised competitive market and 
multi-attribute auction models for procuring flexibility services. 
4 Non-separability means two (or more) elements of commodity (here flexibility) must be produced or consumed together. In 
other words, a provider of flexibility either produces all attributes (e.g., capacity, ramp rate, duration) at each time or none of 
them. Similarly, a user of flexibility either consumes all of the elements together or none of them as they cannot be separated. 
Later in the paper we show that this non-separability feature has a great impact on the specifications of efficient contracts for 
flexibility services.   
5 Throughout the paper we refer to the principal’s “gross utility” but a mathematically equivalent interpretation is that of a non-
separable, multiple input production function where the inputs are the attributes that compose flexibility and the output is used in 
an internal production process. For example, a DSO that procures “capacity” and “duration” utilises both elements to produce 
flexibility that alleviates congestion in the network, although this output does not necessarily have a market value but a value that 
is relevant for the DSO’s overall profitability. In the DSO’s case, an alternative to procuring the composing elements of flexibility 
and using it in the internal production process would be expanding the network, which may not be the most efficient alternative.  
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weak correlation and negative correlation with asymmetry towards each one of the two existing middle 
types.  
The third contribution appears in section four of the paper, where specific functional forms to characterize 
the optimal contracts in simulated bilateral environments are presented. Specifically, we analyse existing 
thermostat-based response programs. The last part of the paper concludes. 
Related economic literature 
On the theoretical side, there is a considerable body of economic related research. First, it has been 
acknowledged by Che (1993), Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005), and Asker and Cantillon (2010) that 
procurement is rarely concerned exclusively with one attribute and its price. Buyers of products and services 
in different industries usually take quality, materials, managerial performance among other considerations 
into account when offering a contract.  
Unlike Che (1993), Asker and Cantillon (2010) and, more recently, Li et al. (2015) depart from the uni-
dimensional mechanism design paradigm and analyse procurement in environments with multi-dimensional 
private information. While our work coincides with theirs in the multi-dimensional procurement approach, 
it differs with Asker and Cantillon's (2010) in the competitiveness of the environment and with Li et al.’s 
(2015) in the number of agent types considered.  
The second area of related literature is concerned with the multi-dimensional screening approach surveyed 
by Rochet and Stole (2003). Within this area of research, the paper by Armstrong and Rochet (1999) has 
been highly influential in our work as it presents a complete and tractable analysis of optimal contracts with 
four types of agents. Our model, however, generalizes their approach in a significant way as we assume 
non-separability, whereas they assume additively separable utility and cost functions. This is an important 
distinction as it introduces a relevant economic insight into the analysis, which we have termed as the “non-
separability effect”, closely related to the topic of non-separable externalities discussed by Davis and 
Whinston (1962) and Marchand and Russell (1973). The model by Dana (1993) is also related, as it 
coincides with ours in the number of agents considered.  
From the principal’s perspective, the composing elements of flexibility are never perfectly substitutable 
and create an externality in the sense that the marginal utility of one of the components always depends on 
the other component (in a bi-dimensional setting). Symmetrically, from the agent’s perspective, the 
marginal cost to produce one of the composing elements of flexibility depends on the output level selected 
for the second component. Therefore, whenever the principal is more interested in a specific element (for 
example, duration of response), he will have to compensate the agent with a price that not only depends on 
the marginal cost of that element but also on the level of output of the second element (for example, ramp 
rate or capacity), regardless of his valuation for it. Most other models of procurement under multi-
dimensional screening, e.g., Asker and Cantillon (2010), Li et al. (2015), Laffont and Martimort (2002), 
have avoided such complications.  
 
2. Power system flexibility  
 
A distinctive feature of power systems is that they require instantaneous equilibrium between supply and 
demand. Traditionally, utilities have operated with fairly predictable and mature technologies. To deal with 
the challenges of uncertainty and variability, which aren’t new, a stock of balancing services and reserves 
have been available to system operators to ensure that the system remains in balance second by second.  
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However, as decarbonisation climbs up in the policy agenda and renewable generation becomes more 
relevant in power systems throughout the world, increased uncertainty and variability represent greater 
challenges for system operation. With substantial shares of renewables, the system operator’s problem is to 
predict fluctuations in the net load, which is the difference between total demand (load) and variable 
generation, that is: demand that must be met by other sources if all renewable generation is utilised.6 This 
magnitude is harder to predict accurately – i.e. contains greater uncertainty– as it depends on two random 
variables, namely demand and renewable generation.  
 
Variability of the net load has technical and economic impact on the overall generation base of power 
systems. In ideal circumstances, demand and renewable generation would be positively correlated: demand 
is high when renewables are available or, conversely, demand is low when renewables become scarce. If 
this is the case, generators face shorter peaks, implying fewer operating hours and lower economic 
compensation for existing power plants. Which, of course, raises the related question of resource adequacy: 
How can system reliability be ensured? How can investments in baseload power plants be incentivised if, 
as a consequence of the greater reliance on renewables, these receive lower compensation? This is, however, 
a fundamentally distinct question from that of renewable integration: How to tackle the operational 
challenges implied by the greater variability imposed by renewables? The short answer to this question is 
“flexibility”.  
 
When demand and renewable supply are negatively – and therefore unfavourably – correlated, the 
remaining generation base experiences steeper ramp ups and deeper turn downs (Katz and Cochran, 2015).7 
If renewable supply decreases together with increases in demand, system operators must dispatch 
generation that is able to ramp up quickly. On the contrary, if renewable supply is high when demand is 
low, the generation base faces deeper turn downs as they must give way for renewables to satisfy demand. 
In other words, operators require resources – flexibility-enabling assets – that modify demand or output in 
order to follow net load fluctuations. But the question remains: what should the owners of these assets 
modify in order to help the operator meet net load variations? Supply and demand must indeed be modified, 
but for how long, for how much and at what cost? More precisely, what are the exact requirements of the 
operator? Is it capacity? Is it duration? Is it the ramp rate? Is it the lead time? Or is it a combination of these 
elements?  
 
From a technical perspective, Ulbig and Andersson (2012), extending the work of Marakov et al. (2009), 
elucidate these questions. Focusing on “individual power system units” (a synonym of flexibility-enabling 
assets), they propose the following flexibility trinity to measure flexibility: 
 
 a) Power capability 𝑃𝑃  for up/down regulation (measured in MW), 
 b) Energy storage capability 𝐸𝐸 (measured in MWh), and 
 c) Power ramping capability 𝑅𝑅 (measured in MW/min),  
 
6 The term “sources” is employed here in its widest possible sense: it could refer to generation, conventional or not, but it could 
also involve any change in demand that helps to keep the system in balance. 
7 Morales et al. (2013) note that this is typically the case in places like Northern Europe and Texas: renewable supply and 
demand are negatively correlated.  
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The three magnitudes are related via integration and differentiation over the time domain, as figure 1 shows. 
A fourth, related metric is ramping duration 𝐷𝐷, which is defined as the ratio of power to the ramp rate, 𝐷𝐷 =
𝑃𝑃
𝑅𝑅
.  
 
While Ulbig and Andersson (2012)’s trinity could be considered incomplete by some to measure 
flexibility,8 their approach highlights its fundamental economic characteristics: 
 
1. Flexibility has multiple attributes: unlike other commodities traded in existing electricity markets, 
such as energy or capacity, it is not possible to measure flexibility with a single metric. This feature 
is economically relevant because ranking the flexibility coming from enabling assets or the agents’ 
cost of supplying flexibility is not straightforward unless precisions regarding the multiple 
attributes that compose flexibility are made. Statements such as “Flexibility-enabling asset A is 
more flexible than flexibility-enabling asset B” are not valid, unless a clarification of what 
dimension of flexibility the statement refers to. Instead of a single good, it is convenient to think of 
flexibility as a bundle of goods.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  
Flexibility in Power Systems Operation: Ramp rate (𝑅𝑅), Power (𝑃𝑃), Energy (𝐸𝐸) 
Source: Ulbig and Andersson (2012)  
 
8 For example, EURELECTRIC (2014) considers location, while Zhao et al. (2015) include uncertainty and cost as composing 
elements of flexibility. 
9 It could be argued that any commodity has multiple attributes as well. All pencils, for example, have height and colour. But in 
existing markets (e.g. the day-ahead market), electricity is measured in MWh, whereas flexibility has several dimensions.  
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2. Flexibility is a heterogeneous commodity: in contrast to homogenous commodities, which have the 
same characteristics across its attributes, flexibility naturally has different characteristics across 
them. A flexibility-enabling asset or agent can be efficient in one dimension but inefficient in 
another, creating heterogeneity. Consider, for example, a comparison between pumped-storage and 
nuclear power: the first has a very short lead time (can be started up from “cold” quickly) and has 
a steep ramp rate, whereas the second has a long lead time (cannot be started from “cold”) and a 
much flatter ramp rate (EURELECTRIC, 2011).  
 
3. The elements that compose flexibility are imperfect complements: in addition to being technically 
interrelated as explained before, the components of flexibility are imperfect complements because 
it is not possible to create any value (e.g. to the system operator) without having positive quantities 
of at least two flexibility components. Therefore, it is convenient to assume that the final user of 
flexibility has convex indifference curves (or isoquants) over the bundle of flexibility 
components.10 Interestingly, the imperfect complementarity nature of flexibility can be traced back 
to the work of Marakov et al. (2009) who propose a “concurrent consideration of … capacity, 
ramping and … duration”.  
 
The techno-economic vision of flexibility taken in this paper is summarised in figure 2: a multi-dimensional 
(not necessarily three-dimensional as in figure 2), heterogeneous commodity whose components are 
imperfect complements. Supply-side resources (e.g. generation) are assumed to be composed – at least – 
by capacity, duration and ramp rate. Likewise, demand-side resources are assumed to be composed by – at 
least – capacity, duration and lead time (the time elapsed between agreement and delivery). From a different 
perspective, if each axis in the figure 2 represents the cost or disutility (when the flexibility provider is for 
example a household) of providing that dimension of flexibility, then an efficient flexibility contract can be 
interpreted as a mechanism that minimises the size of the cube shown in the figure.  
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the economic properties of flexibility refer both to the flexibility-enabling 
assets and to the agents who own the assets. However, when it comes to incentivising the provision of 
flexibility, there are significant distinctions between both. When considering supply-side resources like 
generation, owners of power plants have technical constraints to supply flexibility but will typically behave 
in an economically rational way, i.e. as profit maximisers. Owners of flexibility-enabling assets 
participating in, say, a demand response program, can be assumed to be relatively uniform regarding the 
assets they possess (e.g air conditioners), but their cost of provision (disutilities) should not be 
straightforwardly assumed to be uniform. The latter are consumers and may react to behavioural elements 
beyond utility maximisation.   
 
10 Read footnote 5.  
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Figure 2: 
Dimensions of flexibility for a) a supply side resource (left) b) a demand side resource (right) 
Source: Authors 
 
There are a number of resources that enable operational flexibility in power systems, including both 
physical (i.e. flexibility-enabling assets) and other elements, including institutional design. The former 
includes generation facilities – which depending on its attributes – are positioned to supply flexibility,11 
storage (pumped hydro, thermal storage and batteries), interconnections with neighbouring networks and 
demand-side management. The latter comprehends elements like the power grid, which does not actually 
provide additional flexibility but severely limits the provision of flexibility if sufficient transmission 
capacity is unavailable. Market and contract design are another relevant element that can enable flexibility: 
in the absence of adequate trading mechanisms, market participants are unable to trade flexibility even if 
sufficient physical resources exist.  Figure 3 summarises these elements. 
 
 
Figure 3: Factors affecting flexibility 
Source: Authors 
 
It is worth noting that despite the fact that flexibility has always been needed and indeed used in the 
operation of power systems, it has never been traded as a distinct commodity. Usually, conventional 
generators have been able to provide the flexibility that the system requires and have been compensated on 
the basis of its energy and/or capacity component. However, as the requirement for flexibility increases in 
11 In a comparative study of the European generation fleet in terms of its technical flexibility, EURELECTRIC (2011) considered 
that warm and cold start-up times, the rapidity of load change (i.e. the ramp rate), the minimum load level and the shutdown time 
were the relevant attributes to describe the technical flexibility of power plants, also referred to in this paper, as resource flexibility.  
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power systems, there is a need for designing a product that can be bought and sold, along with other 
components of electricity services such energy and capacity (on this topic, see Boscán (2016b)).  
Mainly, final users of flexibility are transmission system operators (TSOs), Independent System Operators 
(ISOs) – who are responsible for balancing the high-voltage grid – distribution system operators (DSOs) – 
who are responsible for the reliable operation of distribution networks and quality of service – together with 
other market players who may use flexibility to meet their energy and balancing obligations. Access to 
flexible resources to manage network constraints leads to an effective integration of distributed energy 
resources, allows network companies to optimise on their network reinforcement capital investments, and 
improve the reliability and quality of service. It also enables other market players to optimise their energy 
portfolio in order to meet their energy market and balancing obligations at minimum cost by, for example, 
arbitrating between generation and demand response (Boscán and Poudineh, 2016).   
Overall, electricity markets can be centralised or decentralised: they can be based on a tightly controlled 
pool, centralised exchange or bilateral contracts. Trade can include physical and/or financial obligations 
through forward and spot contracts and the market may allow for financial hedging. The main official 
market can be mandatory or optional and allow or disallow secondary markets.  
Depending on the specific situation, flexibility can be procured in a competitive setting, where a single 
buyer incentivises suppliers to compete. Alternatively, when competition isn’t feasible – as assumed in this 
paper – a buyer of flexibility can offer contracts to sellers who do not compete against each other. For 
example, a contract in which a DSO or an aggregator offers a household to provide demand side flexibility 
services.  
Bilateral procurement contracts without competition among sellers exist across the supply chain of 
flexibility services for various reasons. For example, direct participation of the flexibility resource provider 
in an organised market may not be feasible always because of insufficient capacity size. This is important 
as there are diverse classes of consumers, ranging from households to large industrial units who can provide 
flexibility. Due to high transaction costs, small resources may face barriers to directly access the market as 
opposed to large industrial or commercial consumers. Aggregation provides an opportunity for small 
generation and demand resources to offer their flexibility in the market (Eurelectric, 2014). In this case, the 
aggregator can be a retailer or a third party who acts as intermediary between providers and buyers of 
flexibility. Additionally, in many European countries intermittent renewables are being treated as 
conventional generation in the sense they have the same obligations for their imbalance position and 
entitlement to participate in balancing market (for example, in Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden renewable resources have full balancing responsibility). This encourages not only 
improved forecasting but also entry of competitive aggregators whose role is to minimise balancing risks 
and offer ancillary services from renewable resources. Furthermore, this provides incentives for renewables 
to be firmed up by, for example, entering into separate contracts with owners of flexible resources such as 
residential demand response and storage facilities.  
The Nest Learning Thermostat is a good real-world example of how bilateral contracts for flexibility 
services can be utilised in the integration of renewable resources. Nest, as the manufacturer of smart 
thermostat technology, partners with utility companies to provide a residential demand response program. 
Under the so-called “Rush hour scheme”, the contracted consumer’s consumption (air conditioner 
temperature for instance) is adjusted automatically by a utility company to manage fluctuation of demand 
and supply. The consumers are offered a menu of contracts with different lead times (from on-demand to 
24-hour notice in advance, for example), duration of adjustments in consumption (30 minutes to 4 hours 
for instance) and payments. The contract design problem arises because different consumers experience 
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different disutilities for the various dimensions of flexibility they provide, and such disutilities are a 
privately held piece of information held by the resource provider. For example, one household may incur a 
high disutility for the short lead time and another household for long duration of load control. Logically, 
the former household prefers a contract with higher lead time but can sacrifice on load control duration, 
whereas the latter values more a contract with shorter load control duration. Therefore, the contracts should 
be (and currently are not necessarily being) designed in a way that each participating agent truthfully self-
selects its own contract, given the presence of multidimensional information asymmetry between the buyer 
and sellers. The bilateral contract model of this paper focuses on this category of contractual settings in 
electricity markets. 
 
3. The model 
Let 𝑞𝑞  and 𝑑𝑑  be any two composing elements of flexibility that a buyer – the principal – procures, in 
exchange for a transfer 𝑇𝑇, from a seller – the agent – who has asymmetric information parameters 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡. 
Note that in contrast to the claim that flexibility is a multi-attribute commodity stated in section 2, and for 
the sake of tractability, the model reduces the multi-dimensionality of flexibility to a bi-dimensional setting. 
In the context of flexibility, 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑑𝑑  can be the lead time, duration, capacity or the ramp rate of a generator, 
for example. More generally, beyond the context of flexibility,  𝑞𝑞  and 𝑑𝑑  can be any two activities or 
characteristics of a product delegated on an agent by a principal, who is uncertain about the unit cost of 
production 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡. These can also be thought of as relevant parameters of any production process with 
multiple attributes. For example, materials, design, quality, product features (Li et al., 2015; Asker and 
Cantillon, 2010).  
Net payoffs to the principal and agent are, respectively: 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) − 𝑇𝑇 
and  
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑇𝑇 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡) 
where 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑)  and 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡) are the utility and cost function of the principal (buyer) and the agent 
(seller) respectively, which results from consuming and producing flexibility.12 Besides linearity of  𝑇𝑇 in 
𝑊𝑊 and 𝑈𝑈, which ensures the risk neutrality of the principal and the agent, few additional assumptions are 
made: 
Assumption 1: the gross utility 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑)  of the buyer and the seller’s cost  𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡�  are twice 
differentiable functions.  
Assumption 2 :𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) satisfies: 
2a:  Monotonicity, i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
,  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
> 0 and  
12 A mathematically equivalent interpretation of 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) is that of a production function with inputs 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑑𝑑 which 
combined produce an output (flexibility) employed in an internal production process.  
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2b: Concavity, i.e. 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2
, 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡2
< 0  
Assumption 3: 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡� satisfies: 
3a: Monotonicity in all its parameters, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞
, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡
> 0,  
3b: Concavity in 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡, i.e. 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞2 , 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡2 < 0,  
However, no specific curvature assumption of 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡�with respect to 𝑞𝑞  and 𝑑𝑑   is made. That is, 
𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡) can be convex (if  𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2 , 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡2 > 0 ), concave (if  𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2 , 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡2 < 0 ) or both (i.e., linear). 
Assumption 4: the Spence-Mirrlees (constant sign) conditions hold for 𝑈𝑈 with respect to 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑑𝑑: 
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞
�
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞⁄
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇⁄
� , 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡
�
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑⁄
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇⁄
� < 0 
These assumptions are sufficiently general to account for a wide range of specific functional forms. For 
example, 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) and 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡� can be non-separable, weakly separable or additively separable. The 
solution to the model, though, assumes non-separability such that instances where separability holds are 
special cases.  
As is standard in static bilateral contracting, nature determines the agent type which, in this case, is a pair 
of parameters�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡� in the agent’s cost function with two possible realizations. Each parameter can be 
either “High” (𝐻𝐻) or “Low”(𝐿𝐿), i.e., 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞  ∈  �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿� and 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡  ∈  {𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿}. Nature reveals the type to the 
agent but not to the principal, resulting thus in an adverse selection problem.  
However, the distribution of types is common knowledge to both players. Namely, there are four types of 
agent: 
1. Agent type 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 characterised by �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� with probability 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
2. Agent type 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 characterised by �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� with probability 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
3. Agent type 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 characterised by �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� with probability 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  
4. Agent type HH characterised by �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� with probability 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻. 
We refer to the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type as the “efficient” because it is capable of offering the lowest cost product in both 
dimensions of flexibility. The 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type is called the “inefficient” because it has the highest cost in both 
activities. Likewise, 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 types are the “middle types”, because they are efficient in one of the 
activities but inefficient in the other one. We refer to the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 together as the “less efficient” 
types. 
 
3.1. Dependence of events and covariance of types 
The following table summarizes the joint probability distribution of parameters 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 and 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡: 
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  𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞  
  𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻  
𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 
𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 
 
𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 
  𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
Table 1: Joint and marginal probability distribution of types 
 
Here, 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿, 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻  and 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 are the marginal (unconditional) probabilities that events 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞and 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 happen to be, 
respectively, “High” or “Low”. Clearly, it must always be the case that 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 =  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 = 1.  
A crucial question is how to formalise a general relationship among the probability distribution parameters 
to reflect the possibility of dependence or independence of events. For example, if the result of a random 
experiment in which the two asymmetric information parameters are drawn is the event 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻, what 
should the principal expect to happen: the event 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 or 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿? Or are these two events independent 
of one another? 
To analyze this, we use the fact that the probabilistic covariance of two events13  𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 , 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖 =
𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻;  𝑗𝑗 = 𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻 is defined as: 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� =  𝑝𝑝�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 =  𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� − 𝑝𝑝�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝�𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� 
which leads to the following concise expression for the covariance of types:14 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  
 It is without loss of generality to define the following three possible cases: 
i. Positive correlation  if and only if   𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 > 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
ii. Negative correlation if and only if  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 < 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
iii. Absence of correlation if and only if  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
 
 
13 The formula for covariance presented in the text is based on a probabilistic view of 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 and 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 as events, not as random variables. 
There is a probability associated to the occurrence of each event. Formally: if 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 are events then 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝐵) −
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵).  
14 The discrete set of agents considered and the expression for covariance of types coincides with the setup of Armstrong and 
Rochet (1999) and Dana (1993). 
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3.2. Relaxing the fully constrained program 
In this bi-dimensional setting, 𝑆𝑆�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is the total surplus derived from trading goods 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 stand for, respectively, the net payoffs to the principal and agent associated to the 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗-
type.  
Without informational asymmetry, the principal is able to observe cost and obtains first-best levels 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 
and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  = arg max𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� , such that: 
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗)
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
= 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
 for all  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓)
𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
= 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗)
𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
 for all  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
for all 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻 ; 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻 
With adverse selection, the principal’s problem is to offer a menu of contracts �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� that maximizes 
expected surplus, 
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� − ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗    (1) 
subject to individual rationality (IR): 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� = 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0 for all 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻 ; 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻  
and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints: 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  ≥  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ + 𝑐𝑐 �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′ ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗′� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� for all pairs 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and 𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′   
At this point, it is convenient to introduce the following notational convention: 
∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′� = 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗′� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� 
where ∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′� stands for the total cost difference between the 𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ and the 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 type, evaluated at 
output levels �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′�. Note that ∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′� can be positive, negative or zero. 
Using this convention, it is also possible to write: 
𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′ ,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′
= 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′ ,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′ ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖′�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′
−
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′ ,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′ ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖′
 for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑}   
to denote the difference in marginal cost between the 𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ and the 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 type when producing either 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ or 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ .  
With this notation, IC constraints can be simplified to: 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  ≥  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ + ∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′ , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′� for all pairs 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and 𝑖𝑖′𝑗𝑗′   
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The fully constrained program consists of four IR constraints and twelve IC constraints from which the 
following monotonicity conditions for production levels follow (for details, see sections A.1 and A2.1 in 
the appendix): 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,  𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻   (2) 
Adding local incentive constraints two by two reveals that it is optimal for the principal to incentivize the 
efficient types to produce more than the inefficient ones in both dimensions. However, this procedure does 
not clarify how the outputs of the middle types are ordered relative to each other. It can be shown that 
assuming a given order in the output levels of one of the middle types in one dimension, does not lead to a 
definite conclusion about the order in the corresponding output levels of the other dimension. For example, 
assuming that 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  holds, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  can be equal, greater or lower than 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  and still satisfy the 
corresponding cost inequality that results from adding IC constraints. Conversely, assuming a given order 
for 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 does not lead to a clear-cut conclusion about the order of 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿.  
To gain tractability, it is convenient to relax the fully constrained program. To this end, economic reasoning 
helps identifying a number of constraints that can be ignored to construct a relaxed program, which is 
relevant to the extent that its solution satisfies the general, fully constrained program. First note that it is in 
the interest of the more efficient types to mimic the relatively less efficient agents because by doing so, the 
former choose to produce sub-optimal output levels while obtaining positive informational rents. In 
contrast, the less efficient types lack the incentives to mimic the relatively more efficient ones because this 
would imply incurring in an unnecessarily high cost. Therefore, it is reasonable to focus on the upward IC 
constraints only. But in the presence of a set of incompletely ordered agents, who mimics whom? 
The efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) can mimic any of the three remaining agents but it is not immediately obvious which 
would give the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿-type the highest possible informational rent. Consequently, the efficient’s optimal choice 
could involve the possibility of mimicking one, two or three of the less efficient types. Likewise, the middle 
types can choose to mimic the inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) but they could also have incentives to mimic each other 
(see sections A2.2 and A2.3 in the appendix, for more details).  
In consequence, there are seven relevant IC constraints that must be considered in any relaxed program that 
attempts to solve the fully constrained program: 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  
Relevant IC constraints in any relaxed program 
 
 
 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥ max {𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)} 
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𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  ≥ max {𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)} 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  ≥ max {𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)} 
This situation is reflected in figure 4, where the dashed arrows represent the potentially binding IC 
constraints of a general program relaxation. However, analysing them simultaneously introduces 
considerable complexity. Instead, this paper focuses on a baseline relaxed program (one of the two possible 
relaxed programs) which accounts for the most economically relevant cases.15 
3.3. A baseline relaxed program 
The widest range of practically relevant cases can be covered if the IC constraints of the middle type agents 
to mimic each other are ignored. Specifically, by assuming that: 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)< 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)   
and 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)<𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)   
hold, it is always optimal for the middle types to mimic the inefficient type (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) while ignoring  their 
counterpart’s contract. That is, the baseline relaxed program assumes that the “horizontal” constraints will 
never bind at the optimum. 
The baseline relaxed program thus reduces to maximizing the principal’s expected profit (equation (1)) 
subject to the following five IC constraints: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥ max {𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)} 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)   
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)  
 and the IR constraint for the inefficient: 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ≥ 0 
Figure 5 depicts the IC constraints of the baseline relaxed program. Note that the solid lines indicate 
optimally binding constraints, whereas the dashed lines indicate potentially binding constraints where at 
least one of them binds at the optimum. That is, the middle types’ IC constraints with respect to the 
inefficient always bind while at least one of the inefficient’s IC constraints with respect to the less efficient 
bind. 
15 The other relaxed program is the “alternative” relaxed program which accounts for situations in which it may be profitable for 
the middle types to mimic each other.  
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Figure 5:  
Relevant IC constraints in the baseline relaxed program 
 
At the optimum, the IR constraint for the inefficient binds (𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0), but the efficient’s and middle types’ 
IC constraints also bind. Then, substituting for the latter into the efficient’s IC constraints simplifies the set 
of constraints to:  
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = max {∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻),∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿),∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)} (3) 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)   
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 =  ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 
The setup of the baseline relaxed program gives rise to four mutually exclusive cases, which depend on the 
optimally binding constraints for the efficient type. As will become clear, the emergence of these cases is 
closely related to the covariance of types and the difference in marginal cost between the least efficient type 
(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) and the three other agent types: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻. 
 
3.3.1. Solution to the baseline relaxed program16 
The output levels produced under adverse selection are always second-best and are written as: 
                                                        𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞(∙), 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑(∙)          (4) 
Here, 𝑞𝑞(∙), 𝑑𝑑(∙) denote that the second-best output levels are, respectively, outputs 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑑𝑑 that deviate from 
the first-best solution by the expression in the argument. So, the greater the argument, the greater the 
deviation from the first best solution is. In contrast, if the argument is zero, then first-best and second-best 
output levels coincide17. That is, if 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞(0) ⇒ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓; 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑(0) ⇒ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓. 
In the baseline relaxed program, the efficient’s output levels always coincide with the first-best:  
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 =  𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 =  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓     (5) 
but the outputs of the remaining types (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) are distorted. The size of the distortion, however, 
will depend on each case.  
16 Technical details are outlined in Appendix, subsection A.3 
17 This happens when marginal cost equals marginal benefit and thus at the optimum point their difference is zero such that the 
agent produces with no distortion.  
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Case 1: Positive correlation  
In the first case, equation (3) has no single maximum, implying that the efficient type does not have an 
incentive to mimic one specific agent but all the three less efficient agents. Note that perfect correlation is 
a subcase of case 1. The 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type does not ignore the global IC constraint with the inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), as it 
would give him an equally rewarding informational rent as mimicking any of the two adjacent types, 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
or 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿.  
Graphically, this situation is represented in figure 6, which indicates that all the IC constraints of the 
baseline relaxed program bind at the optimum. In particular, the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type’s IC constraints bind with respect 
to the three less efficient types. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  
Binding IC constraints under case 1 (Positive correlation) 
 
Intuitively, this situation arises whenever the types are positively correlated such that the efficient and 
inefficient types are more likely than the middle types in a given distribution. This case holds whenever the 
covariance of types is: 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� > (1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 � −   𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
In this case, the principal finds it optimal to incentivize the efficient to produce at first-best levels, giving 
this agent type a rent that equals a convex combination of the informational rents that he would obtain by 
mimicking the less efficient agents simultaneously. 
Essentially, the principal distinguishes between the efficient, which is able to offer 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑑𝑑 at the lowest 
cost, and the less efficient types, who compose a rather indistinguishable group. There is a resemblance of 
this case with that of the unidimensional adverse selection problem, in which a single parameter determines 
the difference between the efficient and the inefficient. By implication, the outputs of the inefficient are 
distorted in a way that leads to a bunching solution, i.e., 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  ;  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 . 
Specifically, the deviations of output relative to the first-best levels are given by: 
• For the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 in the 𝑞𝑞 attribute: 
154
 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � (6a) 
 
• For the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 in the 𝑑𝑑 attribute: 
 
 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �   (6b) 
 
 
Case 2: Weak correlation  
In the second case, the global IC constraint between the efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) and inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) becomes 
irrelevant. This is because the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type can realize a higher rent by mimicking any of the middle, adjacent 
types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 or 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) than by mimicking the inefficient type. In contrast to case two, this case emerges 
whenever the middle types become more likely in the distribution, such that the covariance of types is still 
positive or negative but closer to zero. The situation is depicted in figure 7, where the binding IC constraints 
are shown. 
 
 
Figure 7: 
Binding IC constraints under case 2 (Weak correlation) 
 
 
 
It is rational for the efficient to always mimic the least efficient type because by doing so he obtains a higher 
informational rent. To avoid the rent becoming too costly, it is in the principal’s interest to make the efficient 
type indifferent between any of the two middle types. This means that the following equality should hold: 
                        ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �       (7) 
Equation (7) depends on a real number 𝜆𝜆, and the principal’s problem reduces to finding a 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1 for 
which the informational rent that the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type would realize from mimicking any of the two middle types is 
equal, as in (7).  
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To this end, the principal distorts output levels which, in turn, depend on the degree of marginal cost 
symmetry between them. Depending on the assumption about the marginal cost symmetry of the middle 
types three possibilities emerge.    
Output levels, which depend on 𝜆𝜆, are: 
• For the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �λ  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �λ  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�                   (8a) 
• For the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �(1 − λ)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �(1 − λ)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�    (8b) 
• For the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(λ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + �(1 − λ) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ��       
(8c) 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �(λ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + �(1 − λ) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �� 
 
The first case is that middle types are equally marginally efficient, i.e., assume that:   
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
= 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
 for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
holds, meaning that both middle types would realize the same informational rent by mimicking the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 
type because they are equally efficient at the margin.  
It is, however, too restrictive to assume cost symmetry between the middle types and even in the cases in 
which there is marginal cost asymmetry we show  that there is 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1 that satisfies equation (7). One 
possibility is that  𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type is more inefficient than the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
> 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
 for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
The other possibility is that HL type is more inefficient than the LH type: 
∂∆LH
HH(qHH, tHH)
∂zHH < ∂∆HLHH(qHH, tHH)∂zHH  for z ∈ {q, t} 
The appendix (section A.3) contains a proof for the existence of a 𝜆𝜆 that satisfies the indifference condition 
in (7) in all previous three possibilities. 
The sufficient condition for the existence of 𝜆𝜆 and thus a solution for case three is that the following 
inequality holds.  
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∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝑞𝑞 �
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�� − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)� < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 � − ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �< ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�� 
 
This implies that weak correlation of types case happens when there is no large asymmetry between the 
middle types.  
Case 3: Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 type 
This case arises whenever the distribution of types is negatively correlated because the middle types are 
more likely than the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type together, and contains a higher probability of observing an 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type 
than any other type. In this situation, the efficient will have an incentive to mimic the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type but will, 
essentially, ignore the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type. The situation is graphically illustrated in figure 8. 
It is optimal for the principal to distort the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type but not the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type, whose output will coincide with 
the first-best. The middle types will continue to mimic the inefficient but because of the asymmetry, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻’s 
output will have a higher distortion relative to the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 than to the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: 
Binding IC constraints under case 3 (Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type)  
 
 
The output levels in this case are: 
• For the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�   (9a) 
• For the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞(0) = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ,  𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑(0) = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  (9b) 
• For the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
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𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ��   
 (9c) 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �� (9d) 
 
Case 4: Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 type 
This case is symmetric to case 3 and happens when the probability of observing the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type is higher than 
any other type in the distribution. Consequently, the efficient will have an incentive to mimic the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 while 
ignoring the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type. In this situation, shown in figure 9, the principal distorts 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type’s output but not 
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻’s, who produces first-best levels. 
The middle types will continue to mimic the inefficient but because of the asymmetry, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻’s output will 
have a higher distortion relative to the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 than to the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻. 
 
 
Figure 9:  
Binding constraints under case 5 (Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type)  
 
The output levels in this case are: 
• For the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞(0) = 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑(0) = 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   (10a) 
• For the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�  (10b) 
• For the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ��  
(10c) 
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𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �� 
 
4. Simulating bilateral flexibility-enabling contracts 
In this section, we emphasise on the applications of the model and delve into its concrete implications for 
policy and business decision makers. We find inspiration in existing thermostat-based demand response 
programs in which utilities incentivise their customers to modify their consumption during peak hours or 
when the system reliability is at stake. Relying on automation, customers allow utilities to automatically 
reduce their air conditioning (during summer) or electric heating (during winter) consumption in exchange 
for payments. Some companies pay customers for each season in which the customer enrols or give a rebate 
on the device. Others give a flat credit on the customer’s electricity bill, while others pay per peak hour. If 
smart metering technology is available, companies will compare actual vs. typical consumption and reward 
them accordingly.   
While an important feature of this approach is that it reduces the customers’ transaction cost to act flexibly 
– a relevant barrier to successfully achieving price responsiveness – a demand response programs cannot 
be based on a “representative agent” approach in which customers do not differ from one another. We claim 
that designing “efficient” contracts based on this kind of approach is not possible given that suppliers 
naturally differ in their cost (or disutility) of provision across the different dimensions of flexibility. This is 
true even when, for example, consumers have identical flexibility enabling assets (e.g., similar air 
conditioners). 
In contrast, we take a normative approach to illustrate how the multi-dimensional adverse selection model 
discussed in this paper can be employed to design bilateral flexibility-enabling contracts that ensure 
economic efficiency. The main ingredient required to apply the proposed contract design approach is 
information regarding the distribution of types and the hidden unit cost parameters in the suppliers’ cost 
functions. A key question that follows is thus how to elicit the relevant information from flexibility 
suppliers.  
For illustration purposes, consider the case of a utility company – the principal – that seeks to procure 
flexibility through a demand response program from its customer base – the agents – in an area where 
electric heating or air conditioning is widely used (in practice the programme can include all types of 
flexible loads such as washing machine, electricity vehicles, among others). The company aims at entering 
into bilateral contracts with customers who aren’t competing against each other and thus designs a menu of 
contracts �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�into which suppliers self-select..  In the menu of contract 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is the capacity of 
response (e.g., measured in kW but it is closely correlated with the temperature of air conditioner or electric 
heater), 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is duration that the control of the flexibility-enabling asset is surrounded to the utility company 
(e.g., measured in hours) and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is the payment to the consumer in exchange for proving flexibility (e.g., 
measured in dollar or any other unit of money). Subscript 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 refer to the type of  resource provider in 
terms of its cost efficiency at each dimensions (capacity and duration) which can be either low cost (𝐿𝐿) or 
high cost (𝐻𝐻). This creates four types of consumers 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 which their descriptions are presented 
in Table 2.  
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 Type of consumer Description 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Experiences a low disutility with regard to change in both the air conditioner 
temperature and duration of surrounding the control of air conditioner to the utility 
company.  
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 Experiences a high disutility with respect to change in temperature but a low 
disutility with respect to duration of control.  
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 Experiences a low disutility with respect to change in temperature but a high 
disutility with respect to duration of control.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 Experiences a high disutility with respect to both change in temperature and 
duration of control.  
Table 2: type of customers and their descriptions 
 
In the absence of a Smart Grid infrastructure, which would allow the customer base anonymously revealing 
their type, an alternative approach would involve conducting experiments among the utility’s customer base 
in which the emphasis is placed on eliciting consumer’s preferences (not the technical flexibility of the 
asset).  
Regarding the values of hidden cost parameters (i.e., marginal disutility that customer experience with 
respect to change in temperature and duration of surrounding the control to the utility company) in the 
agents’ cost functions, these could be estimated through dedicated empirical studies, laboratory experiments 
or a combination of both. A relatively simple, yet suitable approach would involve conducting an 
experiment with randomly chosen subjects from the customer base who have identified themselves as 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 in the survey. 
In what follows, however, we limit ourselves to presenting results that reflect the simulated application of 
the previously described approach. To this end, we take the following steps: 
1. Generate simulation data for survey results to determine the distribution of types in the customer 
base: Assuming a sufficiently large sample and an equally likely outcome coming from a uniform 
distribution for the binary outcome (i.e., High or Low) that represents the disutility which 
consumers experience with respect to temperature variation and duration of change, we follow a 
Monte Carlo approach to generate a discrete, joint probability distribution of types (𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 
and 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 which shows probability of observing each type of agent). Using the Microsoft Excel add-
ins developed by Myerson (2005), it is a straightforward process to generate this data in a 
spreadsheet.  In our model, the information about distribution of types is concentrated in one 
parameter named covariance of types. Covariance of type (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣) show how different dimensions of 
flexibility are correlated across customer base. 
 
2. Determine the optimal contracts under the four different cases that emerge from the baseline 
relaxed program (section 3.3) assuming, respectively 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) = 𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗1−𝛼𝛼 and 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡� =
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1−𝛽𝛽(𝑞𝑞𝑑𝑑)𝛾𝛾  as the principal’s gross utility and the agent’s cost function. With this 
specification, net payoffs to the principal and agent are 𝑊𝑊 = 𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝑇𝑇 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑇𝑇 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽�𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�1−𝛽𝛽�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝛾𝛾 . Note that 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑)  and 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡�  comply with the 
assumptions of the model introduced in section 3. First, both are twice differentiable functions. 
Second, 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) is always monotone and concave, given that 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1. Third, 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡� is 
monotone in all its parameters and concave in 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 and 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡, which is guaranteed because 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1. 
Furthermore, the value assigned to 𝛾𝛾  determines the convexity, concavity or linearity 
of  𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡�  with respect to 𝑞𝑞  and 𝑑𝑑 . If 𝛾𝛾 < 1 , the cost function is concave and exhibits 
economies of scale. In contrast, if 𝛾𝛾 > 1, the cost function is convex and has diseconomies of scale. 
But if 𝛾𝛾 = 1, the cost function is linear.  Section A4 in the appendix contains complete technical 
details of the equations and numerical procedures to compute the simulation results. Section A6 in 
the appendix contains MATLAB script files used in the computation.  
 
 
 
4.1 Results 
Before proceeding into setting the value of cost and utility function parameters a caveat worth noting is that 
in the absence of actual data to feed into the model, the parameters chosen for simulation are arbitrary. 
Since the simulation is just for illustration of the way our model works therefore, we do not try to give a 
technical interpretation to the numerical results. However, the results are of sufficient information to 
establish the point we are trying to make about designing efficient contracts for flexibility services. If actual 
data becomes available, a more realistic set of results can be produced. 
In all simulations, we set the following parameter values: 𝐴𝐴 = 5, 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5  in 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) and 𝛽𝛽 = 0.5, 𝛾𝛾 = 0.6  
in 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡� . Further, we assume that 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ∈ �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 = 2,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 = 4�  and that 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ∈ �𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 = 4,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 = 8� , 
giving rise to four agent types, as summarised in the following table: 
 
 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 2 4 
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 2 8 
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 4 4 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 4 8 
Table 3: Cost parameters for the four agent types 
That is: the efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) type experiences the lowest discomfort in both the 𝑞𝑞 and the 𝑑𝑑 dimensions, the 
inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) experiences the highest discomfort in both dimensions, while the middle types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) are efficient in only one of the dimensions.  
The principal procures one dimension of flexibility, 𝑞𝑞, which in our case stands for capacity (correlated 
with change in temperature), for a fixed quantity of second dimension (𝑑𝑑) , which stands for duration. The 
desired capacity is obtained through the change in temperature of air conditioner or electric heating at 
consumers’ premises. In all cases that follow, and for simplicity alone, we assume three different possible 
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values for duration of control, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 2, 4, 6 hours. That is: the principal designs an optimal menu of contracts  
to procure capacity 𝑞𝑞, given three different options for duration.  
The company announces that it will reward provision of capacity, i.e. modifying of household temperature, 
during 2, 4 or 6 hours, in exchange for a payment 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  and the customer who enters into contact with 
company must provide the specified amount. Each agent type is expected to (truthfully) self-select into one 
of the contracts. Under the baseline relaxed program, the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints between 
the middle types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) and the inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) always bind at the optimum (see Figure 5), but the 
correlation of types determines which of the efficient’s IC constraints bind at the optimum, as depicted in 
figures 6 to 9. 
The details of the results are presented in cases 1 to 4 below but they can be broadly summarized as follows.  
The optimal menu of contract for flexibility services have the following properties: (i) the most efficient 
type (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)  always receives the first best contract (i.e., undistorted) and the least efficient type’ contract (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 
is always the second best (i.e., distorted) (ii) the middle type contracts are the second best except when 
there is negative correlation with asymmetry in which case one of the middle type receives the first best 
contract (iii) under most distributions assumed (except when there is strong positive correlation) the least 
efficient type is shut down in the sense that in practice it provides no flexibility and receives no 
compensation (in theory the production and compensation for this type are not zero but extremely low). 
This is likely due to cost parameters assumed in Table 3 in which the marginal cost (disutility) of production 
(𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡), for the least efficient type is assumed to be twice of the most efficient one. This makes provision 
of flexibility by the least efficient type very costly to principal. 
 
Case 1: Positive correlation 
 
In a simple language positive correlation means that having information about one dimension of flexibility 
of a customer we can deduce about its efficiency in other dimension. That is if we randomly select a 
customer and observe that it is efficient in 𝑞𝑞 dimension it is highly probable that it is also efficient in 𝑑𝑑 
dimension (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿). Similarly, if it is inefficient in 𝑞𝑞 dimension it is highly probable that is also inefficient in 𝑑𝑑 
dimension (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻). Mathematically, positive correlation happens when the customers are distributed in a way 
that the product of  probabilities of being efficient in both dimensions (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) and inefficient in both 
dimensions (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) is strictly higher than the product of probabilities of being efficient in one dimension and 
inefficient in the other dimension (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 or 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻). This means 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 > 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and therefore covariance of 
types is positive ( 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 > 0 ).  To illustrate this case, consider the following 
distributions, with high probability for 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  types: 
 
Distribution 1A:  where    𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.5, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.5, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.25  
  
Table 5 contains the menu of contracts for this distribution of types. In table 5, each row contains the menu 
of contracts for duration of 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 2,4,6 hours respectively, and each column contains the optimal menu of 
contracts for each of the four agent types. The fifth column contains the sum of capacity procured, given 
each duration. For example, when the duration is 2, it is optimal for the principal to procure 24.07 units of 
𝑞𝑞 from the efficient type in exchange for a transfer 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 28.95. The inefficient type (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), in contrast, 
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produces an output of 4.8E-04 units, which is virtually zero, in exchange for a transfer  𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.08.18 The 
rows given a duration of 4 and 6 hours can be equivalently interpreted: note that as duration increases, the 
capacity procured decreases. This is the consequence of the specified 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) in which both inputs are 
imperfect complements.  
In the next two examples for this case the probability of observing middle types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) increases as 
that of the inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) and efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) decrease. The results of for these distributions have been 
presented in Tables 6 and 7.  
 
In all aforementioned distributions, the three incentive compatibility constraints of the efficient type bind 
at the optimum, as in figure 6 in Section 3-i.e., for the three different duration considered, the efficient is 
simultaneously indifferent between his contract, the inefficient’s (HH), and the two middle types (HL and 
LH). The details of calculations of incentive compatibility constraints are presented in appendix A5.  
 
Two points needs to be noted in the case of positive correlation. First, as seen in the theoretical model in 
Section 3, under positive correlation there is a bunching for the second best contacts offered to the less 
efficient types, while the efficient type produces at first best levels. This means that although there are four 
possible types of agents the principal bunch middle type contract with that of inefficient type and thus offer 
them the same contract.  This can be readily confirmed from the simulation results presented in Tables 5,6 
and 7. Such a result is true under any alternative distributions that exhibit positive correlation.  
Note, in the results for distributions 1B and 1C, that as the middle types become more likely in the 
distribution of types, the rent that the principal gives to the efficient becomes costlier. In consequence, the 
expected profit decreases.  Furthermore, there is a relevant qualitative characteristic of the positive 
correlation case that sets it apart from the remaining cases: first, the principal determines the output level 
of the inefficient (HH) type and, accordingly, determines the middle types’ (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) output levels, such 
that the efficient stays indifferent among the three less efficient types’ contracts. This explains that even 
within the same type distribution, the optimal contract differs from one another: given a fixed 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, the 
principal determines 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 which, in turn, determines the (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) and (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) output pairs. 
Additionally, when there is strong positive correlation, the optimal menu of contract, in practice, leads to 
shutdown of less efficient types. This can be seen from Table 5 where  𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,  𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 virtually produce 
nothing and receive no compensation. The sum of 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 for each duration is almost equal to production level 
of the most efficient type. However, as seen from Tables 6 and 7 when probability of middle type increases 
the optimal contract involves a non-zero level of production for less efficient types.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 The inefficient produces an arbitrarily low amount, which is very close to zero. Actually, it is correct to assume that the 
inefficient does not produce any amount.  
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{𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07, 2 ,28.95} {0.00, 2 ,0.08} {0.00, 2 ,0.08} {4.8E-04, 2 ,0.08} 24.07 
{12.03, 4 , 28.95 } {0.00, 4 ,0.08} {0.00, 4 ,0.08} {2.4E-04, 4 ,0.08} 12.04 
{8.02, 6 , 28.95 } {0.00, 6 ,0.08} {0.00, 6 ,0.08} {1.35E-04, 6 ,0.08} 8.03 
Table 5: Menu of contracts under case 1 and type distribution 1A  
 
 
Distribution 1B: where   𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.49, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.01, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.01, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.49, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.24 
 {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07,  2, 28.99} {0.0014, 2 ,0.16} {0.0014, 2 ,0.16} {0.0014, 2 ,0.16} 24.07 
{12.03, 4 , 29.04 } {0.0015, 4 ,0.26} {0.0015, 4 ,0.26} {0.0015, 4 ,0.26} 12.04 
{8.02, 6 , 29.10 } {0.002, 6 ,0.38} {0.002, 6 ,0.38} {0.002, 6 ,0.38} 8.03 
Table 6: Menu of contracts under case 1 and type distribution 1B 
 
 
Distribution 1C: where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.45, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.05, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.05, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.45, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.20 
 {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07,  2, 29.30} {0.02, 2 ,0.79} {0.02, 2 ,0.79} {0.02, 2 ,0.79} 24.12 
{12.03, 4 , 29.83} {0.04,4,1.84} {0.04,4,1.84} {0.04,4,1.84} 12.15 
{8.02, 6 , 30.46 } {0.06, 6 , 3.10 } {0.06, 6 ,3.10 } {0.06, 6 , 3.10 } 8.21 
Table 7: Menu of contracts under case 1 and type distribution 1C 
 
Case 2: Weak correlation 
 
When there is weak correlation, the middle types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) become more likely in the distribution of 
types, while the efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) and inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) become less likely. Therefore, types are weakly 
correlated, i.e. the covariance of types is closer to zero but still positive, and the incentive compatibility 
(IC) constraint between the efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) and inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) does not bind. Instead, the efficient finds it 
more profitable to mimic any of the middle types. Therefore, it is in the principal’s best interest to make 
the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type indifferent between mimicking any of the two middle types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 or 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿). This is ensured by 
finding a real number 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1 that leads to output levels for which equation (7) in Section 3 holds, which 
we obtain numerically. Likewise, IC constraints behave as in figure 7 (see Section 3). 
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The following two type distributions illustrate the relevant features of weak correlation: 
Distribution 2A where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.3, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.25, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.19, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.26, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.03. For 𝜆𝜆 = 0.57, the 
the output levels that satisfy equation (7) have been presented in Table 8.  
Distribution 2B where where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.28, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.22, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.22, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.28, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.03. For 𝜆𝜆 =0.50, the output levels that satisfy equation (7) have presented in Table 9.  
As seen from Table 8 and 9, the middle types produce more flexibility compare to the previous case but the 
least efficient type (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) almost does not produce. The share of middle type output increases when its 
probability of being observed increases. Unlike the positive correlation case, in which the principal 
determines the middle types’ output levels in accordance with the inefficient type’s (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) output, under 
weak correlation it is optimal for the principal to determine output levels that will satisfy equality (7), which 
ignores the global IC constraint between the  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿. If a number 𝜆𝜆 satisfying this equality exists, then 
the same number will satisfy it for different levels of the fixed 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. This explains that the same contracts are 
optimal for different duration and that the efficient’s rent and expected profit remain unchanged.  
For both 2A and 2B distributions, the efficient type is indifferent between his contract and that of any of 
the two middle types. However, as predicted in theory presented in Section 3 the efficient’s incentive 
compatibility constraint with respect to the inefficient does not bind. The details of calculations for 
incentive compatibility check can be found in Appendix A5.  
 
{𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07,  2, 29.42} {0.12, 2 ,1.72} {0.12, 2 ,1.72} {5.47E-05, 2 ,0.02} 24.31 
{12.03, 4 , 29.42 } {0.06,4,1.72} {0.06,4,1.72} {2.74E-05,4,0.02} 12.15 
{8.02, 6 , 29.42} {0.05, 6 ,1.72 } {0.05, 6 ,1.72 } {1.82E-05, 6 ,0.02} 8.10 
Table 8: Menu of contracts under type distribution 2 A 
 
{𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07,  2, 29.45} {0.14, 2 ,1.84} {0.14, 2 ,1.84} {8.57E-05, 2, 0.03} 24.34 
{12.03, 4 , 29.45 } {0.07,4,1.84} {0.07,4,1.84} {4.28E-05,4, 0.03} 12.17 
{8.02, 6 , 29.45 } {0.05, 6 ,1.84 } {0.05, 6 ,1.84 } {2.86E-05, 6, 0.03} 8.11 
Table 9: Menu of contracts under type distribution 2B 
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Case 3: Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 type 
 
If there is negative correlation, because both of the middle types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) are more likely than the 
efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) and inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) taken together, and the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type has a greater probability of being 
observed in the distribution than any other type, then the general model is under case 3. In consequence, at 
the optimum, the efficient’s only binding constraint is the one with respect to the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type ( see figure 8 in 
Section 3). To avoid the efficient’s rent becoming too costly, the principal distorts the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type’s and the 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻’s output level, while letting the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type produce at first-best levels.  
 
The following two distributions illustrate the features of case 3: 
Distribution 3A where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.125, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.5, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.25, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.125, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = −0.11 
{𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07,  2, 29.45} {0.37, 2 ,1.84} {0.75, 2 ,1.84} {3.37E-07, 2, 0.00} 25.19 
{12.03, 4 , 29.30 } {0.19,4,3.34} {0.38,4,5.11} {1.68E-07,4, 0.00} 12.59 
{8.02, 6 , 29.89 } {0.12, 6 ,3.34 } {0.25, 6 ,5.11 } {1.12E-07, 6, 0.00} 8.40 
Table 10: Menu of contracts under type distribution 3A 
 
Distribution 3B where where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.08, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.74, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.08, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = −0.11 
{𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07,  2, 30.15} {0.55, 2, 4.24} {0.75, 2 , 5.11} {9.2E-09, 2 ,0.00} 25.37 
{12.03, 4 , 30.15 } {0.28,4, 4.24} {0.38,4,5.11} {4.6E-09,4,0.00} 12.68 
{8.02, 6 , 30.15} {0.18, 6 , 4.24 } {0.25, 6 ,5.11 } {3E-09, 6 ,0.00} 8.46 
Table 11: Menu of contracts under type distribution 3B 
 
Unlike all previous cases in which only the most efficient type receives the first best contract and the rest 
are offered the second best contract, in the case of negative correlation with asymmetry, one of the middle 
type receives the first best contract-i.e., the middle type that is least probable to be observed (here 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type). 
This situation creates a sharp distinction between bilateral contracts under unidimensional and 
multidimensional information asymmetry in the sense that when there is more than one dimension it is 
possible to have first best contract for a less efficient type even under information asymmetry. In fact the 
low probability of 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type averts the need to distort its contract.  
In both distribution 3A and 3B, the efficient type is indifferent between his contract and that of the LH type. 
With the closed form solutions of section A4 in the appendix, it is straightforward to compute output levels 
for case 3 by letting 𝜆𝜆1 = 1, 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝜆𝜆3 = 0.  
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Case 4: Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 type 
 
Symmetrically to case 3, if both middle types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) are more likely than the efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) and 
inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) together, and the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type has a greater probability of being observed in the distribution 
than any other type, then the general model is under case 4. At the optimum, the efficient’s only binding 
constraint is the one with respect to the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type (see figure 9 in Section 3), and the principal optimises by 
distorting both the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type’s and the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻’s output level, while letting the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type produce at first-best 
levels.  
Consider the following two type distributions, which satisfy case 4: 
 
Distribution 4A, where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.125, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.25, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.5, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.125, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = −0.11 
{𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07,  2, 29.89} {0.75, 2, 5.11} {0.37, 2 , 3.34} {3.3E-07, 2 ,0.00} 25.19 
{12.03, 4 , 29.89 } {0.38,4, 5.11} {0.19,4,3.34} {1.6E-07,4,0.00} 12.59 
{8.02, 6 , 29.89} {0.25, 6 , 5.11 } {0.12, 6 ,3.34 } {1.12E-07, 6 ,0.00} 8.40 
Table 12: Menu of contracts under type distribution 4A 
 
Distribution 4B, where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.04, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.05, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.87, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.04, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = −0.04 
{𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳} {𝒒𝒒𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳, 𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳}  Sum of 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 
{24.07,  2, 30.29} {0.75, 2, 5.11} {0.66, 2 , 4.72} {2.1E-11, 2 ,0.00} 25.48 
{12.03, 4 , 30.29 } {0.38,4, 5.11} {0.33,4, 4.72} {1.05E-11,4,0.00} 12.74 
{8.02, 6 , 30.29} {0.25, 6 , 5.11 } {0.22, 6 , 4.72} {7E-12, 6 ,0.00} 8.49 
Table 13: Menu of contracts under type distribution 4B 
 
The results in this case is symmetric of case 3. The most efficient type and one of the middle types (here 
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)  receives the first best contract and the rest receive the second best. As under most distributions 
assumed previously the least efficient type (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ) contract in practice leads to no production and 
compensation. 
In terms of incentive compatibility, the efficient type is indifferent between his contract and that of the HL 
type under both distributions 4A and 4B. The results for incentive compatibility check have been presented 
in Appendix A5. Using the formulas derived in section A4 in the appendix, it is straightforward to compute 
output levels for case 5 by letting 𝜆𝜆2 = 1, 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆3 = 0.  
 
167
5. Conclusions 
Given the increased reliance on renewables taking place in many power systems throughout the world, 
incentivising the provision of flexibility is becoming a priority for system operators, policy and business 
decision makers alike. The technological improvement in digital communication has resulted in emergence 
of new players in the electricity market with flexible loads (e.g., households with electric vehicles, electric 
heater, air conditioner, solar PV with storage) which are valuable sources of flexibility for the system at an 
aggregated level.  
On the other hand, flexibility is inherently multi-dimensional as both the cost of producing it and the utility 
(or output if one considers the equivalent mathematical interpretation of a production function) that is 
derived from utilizing it depends on more than one factor. Capacity, ramp rate, duration and/or lead time 
are among the many elements that describe flexibility. Because of this, different flexibility-enabling 
resources possess differing levels of efficiency, implying that flexibility is not a homogenous commodity. 
Additionally, an equally relevant economic property of power system flexibility is that its composing 
elements (i.e., capacity, ramp rate, duration) are best understood as imperfect complements: the cost of 
production and the utility derived from it are always non-separable. Not only do buyers and sellers of 
flexibility have utility and cost functions that depend on more than one factor but these factors enter into 
these functions multiplicatively.   
Therefore, as flexibility differs significantly from commodities traditionally traded in existing electricity 
markets, such as energy or capacity, correctly accounting for its economic properties is essential to create 
the incentives to enable it in electricity systems. More specifically, designing a market for flexibility 
services needs to be compatible with properties of the traded commodity, an important point that has so far 
remained unaddressed in the existing literature of power system economics. For example, where 
competition among flexibility providers are possible, a multi-attribute auction is needed to procure 
flexibility in an efficient manner. The multi-attribute auction is an allocation mechanism in which more 
than one feature of the commodity is valued (e.g., MW, MW/min and emission performance). Therefore, it 
allows the principal to incentivise, for example, capacity, flexibility and emission performance 
simultaneously in a single auction. In situations where competition is not feasible, multi-dimensional 
bilateral contracts are the alternative method of procurement.  
The bilateral contracts are specifically relevant in the case of emerging small resources as, due to high 
transaction cost relative to the size of resource, these resources cannot directly participate in an organised 
market and compete. Taking the aforementioned considerations as guiding principles rather than mere 
theoretical considerations, this paper has taken a contract design perspective to incentivise the bilateral 
exchange of flexibility from small resources, already happening in some electricity markets in the form of 
demand response programs and ancillary services.  More transactions of the kind are expected to play a 
greater role in the not so distant future as renewables grow further as an alternative to fossil fuels, and 
emerging business models that enable power system flexibility – led by technological innovation – 
consolidate (Boscán and Poudineh, 2016).  
The paper introduces an adverse selection model of procurement with multi-dimensional types. The model 
innovates by presenting solutions to the non-separable case in a baseline relaxed program that accounts for 
the vast majority of economically relevant cases. The results of this model provide important insights on 
designing efficient contract for flexibility services which can be utilised in a, for example, demand response 
programme.  
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First, the results show that optimal contract for flexibility crucially depends on the way that flexibility 
providers are distributed-e.g., if we assume flexibility with two dimensions (capacity and duration) which 
is procured from a group of flexibility providers then distribution of type is a set of probabilities that show 
what percentage of group is efficient (low cost) in both dimensions (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) or inefficient (high cost) in both 
dimensions (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) or efficient in one dimension and inefficient in the other dimension (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 or 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿). In the 
model presented in the paper, the information about distribution of types is concentrated in one parameter-
i.e., covariance of type.  The information about distribution of types can be obtained through well-designed 
surveys or through indirectly observing the consumers’ behavior in a smart grid environment.  
Depending on the covariance of types – whether efficiency in one dimension is independent or not of the 
other dimension – four mutually exclusive cases arises:  
If there is positive correlation, meaning most flexibility providers are either low cost (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) or high costs 
(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) in both dimension (middle types are a small percentage of group when there is positive correlation), 
the efficient type does have incentive to mimic the three less efficient types (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿). The optimal 
contract in this case has two properties: (a) it incentivises the efficient type (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)  to produce at first-best 
levels (no distortion as if there is no information asymmetry), giving this agent type a rent that equals a 
convex combination of the informational rents that he would obtain by mimicking the less efficient agents 
simultaneously (b) the other three types are offered the same contract and produce at the second best level 
(distorted because of information asymmetry). The bunching of the contracts for three less efficient types 
happens because probability of observing middle types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 or 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) is low in this case and thus there is no 
need to offer them a separate contract.  
If there is weak correlation, meaning that most flexibility providers are middle type agents (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 or 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿), the 
efficient type (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) can realize a higher rent by mimicking any of the middle, adjacent types (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 or 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 
than by mimicking the inefficient type (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻). In this case the optimal contact involves offering the efficient 
type the first best and the other three types each separately the second best contract. In contrast to the case 
of positive correlation, there is no bunching of contracts in this case and middle types produce at level 
which is higher than the least efficient type (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) although all three are distorted to maintain incentive 
compatibility.  
If there is negative correlation with asymmetry towards the LH type, meaning that middle type agents 
constitute a higher proportion in the group of flexibility providers and probability of observing an 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type 
is higher than the other middle type, the efficient type will have an incentive to mimic the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type but will, 
essentially, ignore the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type. The optimal contract in this case include the first best for the efficient type  
(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)  and (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) types but the rest will receive the second best contracts. An important difference of this case 
with previous cases is that in additional to efficient type, one of the middle types also receives the first best 
contract. This is one of the important differences between unidimensional and multi-dimensional adverse 
selection procurement in the sense that when the number of dimesons increases, sometimes a first best 
contract can be given to a not fully efficient agent (here 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) even when there is information asymmetry.  
Symmetrically, if there is negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type, the probability of 
observing the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  is higher than the other middle type in a distribution in which middle type agents 
dominate. Consequently, the efficient will have an incentive to mimic the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 while ignoring the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type. 
In this situation, the principal gives the first best contract to 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 types but distorts 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻’s 
types output.  
The second important results of the model in this paper is that designing the optimal contract for flexibility 
services is complicated not only because of multidimensional information asymmetry but also because of 
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the fact that the composing elements of flexibility are non-separable (capacity, ramp rate, duration, cannot 
be produced or consumed separately). This “non-separable externality” leads to further distortion of 
inefficient types beyond the fundamental rent efficiency trade off prevailing under information asymmetry. 
The non-separability distortion is unique to non-conventional commodities such as flexibility and it does 
not exist when cost and utility function of agent and principal is separable (a condition that has been 
assumed almost always in the contract theory literature).  
Besides the conceptual discussion about flexibility and the theoretical contribution and that constitutes the 
model itself, by way of a real-life example, the last section of the paper shows that the model is applicable 
by decision makers who wish to incentivise the provision of flexibility or, for that matter, any multi-
dimensional commodity with imperfectly substitutable components. Relying on surveys, empirical analyses 
and suitably designed experiments that elicit the cost of acting flexibly together with the distribution of 
types in a given area, it is feasible to actually design optimal contracts for flexibility services. Existing 
contracts fail to take any of this information into account and are, therefore, ill-positioned to deliver 
economic efficiency when for example applied to a demand response programme. 
The analysis of the paper has, of course, its limitations. First, we claim that flexibility is multi-dimensional 
but our model is bi-dimensional only: this is, of course, to gain tractability. The economic intuition, of 
course, carries over to a multi-dimensional framework. Second, unlike most treatments of the principal-
agent model in the literature, we deal with a discrete set of types. However, in line with Vohra (2011) “we 
know of no modeling reason to prefer a continuous type space to a discrete one”. Third, we are aware that 
the simulation results could cover a wider range of applications and considerations. For example, it would 
be interesting to obtain real empirical data to apply the contract modelling framework with real information. 
It would also be interesting to extend the model to consider the situation in which the principal is an 
intermediary (e.g. an aggregator) who faces downstream uncertainty in relation to the distribution of types 
and its hidden cost parameters but also faces upstream uncertainty coming from market fluctuations. 
Furthermore, analysing the impact of risk attitudes and competitive environments are relevant but beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
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 Appendix 
A1. Fully constrained program 
This section presents the fully constrained program.  
The principal maximises expected profit:  max{𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� −�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
    
subject to: 
Individual Rationality (IR) constraints: 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0           (A1) 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥ 0        (A2) 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0        (A3) 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ≥ 0         (A4) 
 
Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints: 
For the efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) type: 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� ≥  𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�  which is equivalent to 
 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥  𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)   (A5) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� ≥  𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� which is equivalent to 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥  𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)  (A6) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� ≥  𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�  which is equivalent to 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥  𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)   (A7) 
 
For the middle (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) type: 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  or 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)  (A8) 
173
 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� or 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)   (A9) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  or 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) (A10) 
 
For the middle (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) type: 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� or 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)  (A11) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� or 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)  (A12) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�  or 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)  (A13) 
 
For the inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) type: 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� which is equivalent to 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)  (A14) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� or 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)  (A15) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� or 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)  (A16) 
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 A2. Analysis of the incentive compatibility constraints  
A2.1 Monotonicity of output levels 
The monotonicity of output levels follows from the addition of local incentive constraints two by two.  
For 𝑞𝑞: 
• Adding (A6) and (A11) establishes 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� ≥ 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
• And adding (A10) with (A16) establishes 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� ≥ 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� 
Similarly, for 𝑑𝑑: 
• Adding (A5) and (A8) establishes 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 : 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�  ≥  𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
• Adding (A13) and (A15) establishes 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 :  
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� ≥ 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
 
However, adding (A9) with (A12) results in: 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� ≥ 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� 
which is satisfied if 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,  but also if 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 <  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻. 
Re-organizing the inequality, 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� ≥ 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
it is easy to verify that it holds if 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  and 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ≥  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  , but also if 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ≥  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  and 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 <  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 . 
Therefore, monotonicity of the middle types’ output levels cannot be established.  
A2.2 Binding constraints for the LL type 
Inequalities (A5), (A6) and (A7) are the three IC constraints for the efficient type, and all of them are 
upward.  
By mimicking the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type, the efficient obtains an informational rent of  
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥  𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 
If the efficient mimics the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type, he would obtain an informational rent of 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥  𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 
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And if the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 mimics the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, the informational rent is  
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥  𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 
Because there is no a priori ordering of the unit cost difference between the efficient and the inefficient in 
both dimensions, i.e. (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 − 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿) can be equal, greater or lower than (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 − 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿), and because monotonicity 
for the middle-types’ output levels cannot be established, it is not possible to determine which of the 
incentive constraints will bind at the optimum or if only one of them will bind. Therefore: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ≥ max {𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)} 
A.2.3 Binding constraints for the middle types 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 
The 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type agent can mimic the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type in which case he would realize a rent of: 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 
Agent 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 can also mimic the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, obtaining a rent of: 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 
Similarly, the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 can mimic the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 realizing: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 
Or it can mimic 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 obtaining: 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 
For the same reasons mentioned previously, that is: an absence of an a priori ordering of the unit cost 
difference between the efficient and the inefficient in both dimensions, i.e. (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 − 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿) and (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 − 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿), and 
an incomplete ordering of the middle types’ output levels, it is not possible to determine which of the 
incentive constraints will bind at the optimum or if only one of them will bind. Therefore, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  and 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 
are respectively, 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  ≥ max {𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)} 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  ≥ max {𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻),𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)} 
as in the program relaxation described in section 2.2. 
A3. Solution to the baseline relaxed program (technical details)  
To solve the problem, it is convenient to re-write equation (3) in the main text as a convex combination of 
the rents that result from mimicking the (adjacent) middle types and the (non-adjacent) inefficient type: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜆𝜆1 �∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)� + 𝜆𝜆2 �∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)� +
𝜆𝜆3(∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻))  
where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 , ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3 are real numbers. This approach, used by Armstrong and Rochet 
(1999), provides a simple way to characterize all the economically relevant cases emerging from the 
baseline relaxed program. 
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Substituting for the binding IC constraints into the principal’s expected payoff (equation (1) on the main 
text) leads to:  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) − 𝜆𝜆1 �∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)� − 𝜆𝜆2 �∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)�
− 𝜆𝜆3(∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻))� + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻[𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)]+ 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿[𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) − ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)] + 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻[𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)] 
The first-order conditions for the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type are: 
• With respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿: 
  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿[𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ] = 0     (A17) 
 
 
• With respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿: 
  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿[𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ] = 0     (A18)  
 
So, 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 and 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 solve the equations above, and it follows that 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 and 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓. This proves 
equations numbered with (4) in the main text.  
In contrast, the less efficient types are deviated from their first-best output levels.  
Consider the first-order conditions for the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type: 
• With respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
−𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0 
Expanding 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻⁄  and re-arranging: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ 𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   (A19) 
 
Further manipulation leads to: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
−
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿                                 (A20) 
 
• With respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
−𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0 
177
Expanding 𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻⁄  and re-arranging: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ 𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   (A21) 
Re-arranging to obtain: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
−
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   (A22) 
 
The second best levels of output 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  satisfy equations (A19) and (A21), respectively, and both 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  
and 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  deviate from first-best levels 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  by an amount equal to the second term of the corresponding 
equations. Equations (A20) and (A22) show that 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� . Note also that  
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
, 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
≠ 0 for non-separable cost functions.  
The first-order conditions for the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type are: 
• With respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
−𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0 
Expanding 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿⁄  and re-arranging: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ 𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   (A23) 
Re-arranging further to obtain: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
−
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿           (A24) 
 
• With respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
−𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0 
Expanding 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿⁄  and re-arranging: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ 𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿    (A25) 
 
Re-arranging again shows:  
 
178
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
−
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿      (A26) 
 
The second best levels of output 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  are, respectively, the solutions to (A23) and (A25). In both cases, 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  and 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  deviate from first-best levels 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  by an amount equal to the second term of equations the 
corresponding equations. Equations (A24) and (A26) show that 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�. Note 
that  𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
, 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
≠ 0 for non-separable cost functions.  
Consider the first-order conditions for the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
• With respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �𝜆𝜆1 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 � − 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
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• For the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
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𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� (A28) 
• For the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� (A29) 
 
• For the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ��   
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ��  
(A30) 
Case 1: Positive correlation  
The second case arises when 𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2,𝜆𝜆3 > 0 such that: 
180
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ��
�∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ��
�∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 )�   
That is, in this case it is optimal for the principal to give the efficient type a rent that will make him 
indifferent between his own contract and any of the three remaining agent’s. 
• Setting  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � =  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) and expanding: 
 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�= 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
 
Simplifying and re-arranging: 
 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � ⇔ 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ; 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  
 
• Likewise, ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) and expanding: 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� + 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�= 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
Simplifying and re-arranging: 
 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� = 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � ⇔ 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ; 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  
Thus, output levels are equal for the less efficient types: 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ; 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 .  
In consequence, from (A28), (A29) and (A30), the deviation from the first best for  𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓   and 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓  is, respectively: 
For element 𝑞𝑞: 
𝜆𝜆1
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �  
 
For element 𝑑𝑑: 
𝜆𝜆1
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �  
that is, two different systems of three equations in three unknowns. Because of symmetry between the 
systems, it is more compact to write and solve: 
181
𝜆𝜆1
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �  
where 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑}. 
Finding the second-best output levels for elements 𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑 thus amounts to solving the following: 
𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2 + 𝜆𝜆3 = 1 (A31) 
𝜆𝜆1
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � 
(A32) 
𝜆𝜆2
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � 
(A33) 
Substituting for 𝜆𝜆3 = 1 − 𝜆𝜆1 − 𝜆𝜆2 into (A32) and (A33) simplifies the system of equations to two 
equations in two unknowns:  
𝜆𝜆1
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆1 −
𝜆𝜆2) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � (A34) 
𝜆𝜆2
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆1 −
𝜆𝜆2) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �  (A35) 
Re-organizing  the equations: 
𝜆𝜆1 �
  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � + 𝜆𝜆2 �− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   
𝜆𝜆1 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � + 𝜆𝜆2 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � =
− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   
After simplification, the expressions for 𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2,𝜆𝜆3 are: 
𝜆𝜆1 = � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �� (A36) 
 
𝜆𝜆2 = � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �� (A37) 
 
182
𝜆𝜆3 = 1 − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �� ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 
(A38) 
Finally, it remains to establish that 𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2,𝜆𝜆3 > 0. To this end, we prove the following: 
Lemma 
1. 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
, 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
, 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
> 0 for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
2. 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
−
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
< 0 and  𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
−
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
< 0, for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
Proof: 
From the agent’s payoff function 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑇𝑇 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡), we know that 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑧𝑧 = − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑧𝑧, 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} the payoff 
is decreasing in the agent’s type. Alternatively, we write  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑧𝑧
> 0, so the cost increases with the agent’s 
type.  
 
Therefore, if the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type produces outputs (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), its cost is always strictly greater than if it were 
produced by any other type. So we can write: 
 
For 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿}: 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� > 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�  
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� > 0 
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
−
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
> 0 
𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
> 0 
which proves statement 1. 
Also note that, for 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿}: 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� > 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
−𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� < −𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
Adding 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� at both sides of the inequality: 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� < 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 
Deriving with respect to 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑}: 
183
𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
< 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
 
𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
−
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
< 0 
which proves statement 2. 
It follows that 𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2 are strictly positive. It remains to prove that 𝜆𝜆3 > 0: 
𝜆𝜆3 = 1 − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �� ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) > 0  
� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �� ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) < 1  
� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) <   𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
� −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ��  
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻2 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿2 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻<   𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 −   𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 −   𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
which simplifies to the following condition: 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� > (1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � −   𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} (A39) 
Substituting for 𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2, 𝜆𝜆3 in (A28), (A29), (A30) shows: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
= 𝑞𝑞�  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 � 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
= 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 � 
which are equations (6a-6c) in the main text. 
Case 2: Weak correlation  
184
The third case arises when 𝜆𝜆3 = 0 and  𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2 = 1.  For simplicity, let 𝜆𝜆1 = λ so 𝜆𝜆2 = 1 − λ 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = ��∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ��
�∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �� 
That is, in this case it is optimal for the principal to give the efficient type a rent that will make him 
indifferent between his own contract and any of the two adjacent, middle types: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �  (A40) 
which is the same as equation (7) in the main text. 
The “deltas” in (A40) are increasing in their arguments. From the lemma proved above (see the subsection 
on Case 2), we know that ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �, ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) are increasing in (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ).  
By a similar argument, we show that ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �  is increasing in �𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � and that ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � is 
increasing in �𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �: 
For 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿}: 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� > 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿� > 0 
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
−
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
> 0 
𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
> 0 for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
However, substituting for 𝜆𝜆1 = λ,  𝜆𝜆2 = 1 − λ , 𝜆𝜆3 = 0 in (A28), (A29), (A30): 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �λ  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �λ  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�                   (A41) 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �(1 − λ)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �(1 − λ)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�    (A42) 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(λ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + �(1 − λ) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ��      (A43) 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 � 1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(λ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + �(1 − λ) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ��       (A44) 
Which are equations (8a-8c) in the main text. 
reveals that the deviation of �𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � relative to the first best �𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� is increasing in λ, whereas the 
deviation of �𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � relative to �𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� is decreasing in this parameter. 
185
In contrast, the effect of λ on (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ) is ambiguous and depends on the marginal cost difference between 
the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  and the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  types and the marginal cost difference between the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  and the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  types, 
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
, 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
 for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑}. 
So, under weak correlation, the principal’s problem of defining the optimal output reduces to proving the 
existence of a λ for which (A40) holds. There are three cases to consider: 
i. Marginal cost symmetry between the middle types: suppose that 
 
                                      𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
= 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
 for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑}               (A45) 
holds. 
Substituting (A45) into equations (A43) and (A44) leads to the following expressions for 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 
which are independent of  λ:  
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞 �1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �� 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 = 𝑑𝑑 �1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �� 
Therefore, to prove the existence of a λ that satisfies (A40), the arguments of ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � and 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �  are the only relevant terms. The former is decreasing whereas the latter is increasing 
in λ.  
Re-arranging (A40), we obtain: 
                               ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �       
From (A45) we know that the difference ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � is a constant 𝑘𝑘∗, that is:  
∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = 𝑘𝑘∗ (A46) 
Substituting  𝑘𝑘∗ into (A46) and rearranging yields a function 𝑓𝑓(𝜆𝜆), 0 ≤ 𝜆𝜆 ≤ 1 :  
                                       𝑓𝑓(𝜆𝜆) = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − 𝑘𝑘∗ = 0         (A47) 
 
The problem now reduces to showing that (A47) has a root and to show this we use a classical result, 
namely the: 
 
Lemma (Intermediate Value Theorem, as stated in de La Fuente, 2000)): Let 𝑓𝑓 be a continuous real-
valued function on the closed bounded interval [𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠]. Then for each number 𝛾𝛾 (strictly) between 𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎) 
and 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠), there exists a point 𝑐𝑐 ∈ (𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠) such that 𝑓𝑓(𝑐𝑐) = 𝛾𝛾. 
 
To be able to apply the result, 𝑓𝑓(𝜆𝜆) must be continuous over 𝜆𝜆, which can be easily verified by simple 
inspection of (A41) and (A42), which are well-defined over the admissible range of 𝜆𝜆. Therefore, the 
sufficient condition for the existence of a root for (A47) over the domain of  𝑓𝑓(𝜆𝜆) is that 𝑓𝑓(0)𝑓𝑓(1) <0. 
186
 
If 𝜆𝜆 = 0: 
𝑓𝑓(0) = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�� − 𝑘𝑘∗ 
 
If 𝜆𝜆 = 1:                                
𝑓𝑓(1) = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�� − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)� − 𝑘𝑘∗ 
 
We now show that ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) > ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�� and that  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�� <
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) hold.  
 
Proof: 
Let us assume that ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) > ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�� does not hold. In other words, 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�� or ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�� hold. We 
know from monotonicity of the cost difference that  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�� < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)� 
always holds and thus  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)�. In this case, the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 type will have a strict 
preference to mimic the HL type, which contradicts our assumption in (A40). The same logic applies 
when ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�� holds. A similar argument proves the claim that 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝑞𝑞 �
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�� < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)� holds. 
 
Therefore, if there is no large difference between ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � and ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 �, that is, if the 
value of 𝑘𝑘∗ is within the following interval: 
 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝑞𝑞( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), 𝑑𝑑( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)� − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) < 𝑘𝑘∗ < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�� 
 
then we always have 𝑓𝑓(0) > 0 and 𝑓𝑓(1) < 0 implying that 𝑓𝑓(0)𝑓𝑓(1) < 0 and, by the Intermediate 
Value Theorem, there is certainly a 0 < 𝜆𝜆∗ < 1 satisfying (A46). QED.  
 
ii. The 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type is more marginally inefficient than the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: to analyse this case suppose that 
 
𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
> 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
 for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
 
187
which implies  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � > 𝑘𝑘∗, where 𝑘𝑘∗ is as in (A46), defined in the case 
(i), so ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � belongs to the interval (𝑘𝑘∗,∞). This means that there is a 
constant 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝑘𝑘∗,∞) for which ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = 𝑘𝑘 holds.  
 
Then, in a similar way to (A47) we can write the following equation: 
 
                                          𝑓𝑓(𝜆𝜆) = ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − 𝑘𝑘 = 0         (A48) 
 
(A48) is the same as (A47), except that the constant is now 𝑘𝑘 rather than 𝑘𝑘∗ where 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝑘𝑘∗,∞). Thus, 
the same approach used to prove that 𝑓𝑓(0) > 0  and 𝑓𝑓(1) < 0 for (A47) can also be used for (A48). 
We avoid repeating this step and only present the acceptable range of 𝑘𝑘 that guarantees the existence 
of 0 < 𝜆𝜆∗ < 1  that satisfies (A48): 
 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝑞𝑞 �
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�� − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)� < 𝑘𝑘∗ < 𝑘𝑘< ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)� − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�� 
 
iii. The HL type is more marginally inefficient than the LH type: to analyse this case suppose that  
 
∂∆LH
HH(qHH, tHH)
∂zHH < ∂∆HLHH(qHH, tHH)∂zHH  for z ∈ {q, t} 
 
This means ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � < 𝑘𝑘∗ where 𝑘𝑘∗ is as in (A46) same constant as in case 
(i). In a similar manner to the previous case there is a 𝑘𝑘′ ∈ (−∞,𝑘𝑘∗)  for which  ∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � −
∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � = 𝑘𝑘′.  
 
This means we need prove that there is a 0 < 𝜆𝜆∗ < 1  that satifies equation below. 
 
                                𝑓𝑓(𝜆𝜆)= ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 � − 𝑘𝑘′ = 0 
 
Repeating the previous proof procedure we show that the acceptable range of 𝑘𝑘′ that guarantees the 
existence of 0 < 𝜆𝜆∗ < 1  as a root to above equation is: 
 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝑞𝑞( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), 𝑑𝑑( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)� − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)� < 𝑘𝑘′ < 𝑘𝑘∗ < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿), 𝑑𝑑( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)� 
 
The above results show that irrespective of how marginal cost differences are (i.e., ∂∆LH
HH(qHH,tHH)
∂zHH
=
∂∆HL
HH(qHH,tHH)
∂zHH
 or  ∂∆LHHH(qHH,tHH)
∂zHH
> ∂∆HLHH(qHH,tHH)
∂zHH
  or ∂∆LHHH(qHH,tHH)
∂zHH
< ∂∆HLHH(qHH,tHH)
∂zHH
  ), there is always a 𝜆𝜆 
that satisfies (A40). The condition for the existence of  𝜆𝜆 across three aforementioned subcases can be 
compactly presented as follows: 
 
188
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝑞𝑞 �
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�� − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)� < 𝑘𝑘′ < 𝑘𝑘∗ < 𝑘𝑘 < ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞(0), 𝑑𝑑(0)) − ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 �𝑞𝑞 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� , 𝑑𝑑 �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�� 
 
Case 3: 
Let 𝜆𝜆1 = 1, 𝜆𝜆2 = 0, 𝜆𝜆3 = 0 in (A28), (A29), (A30) to obtain equations (9a-9c) in the main text. 
Case 4: 
Let 𝜆𝜆1 = 0, 𝜆𝜆2 = 1, 𝜆𝜆3 = 0 in (A28), (A29), (A30) to obtain equations (10a-10c) in the main text. 
 
A4. Equations for the simulation in Section 4 
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas specification 
𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑) = 𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗1−𝛼𝛼 
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡� = �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽�𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�1−𝛽𝛽�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝛾𝛾 
A4.1 Output levels 
1. For the inefficient (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) type: 
 
From: 
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
= 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
+ (𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻+ 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
 
With respect to  𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽+ (𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽��+ (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽��+ 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�� 
Let: 
𝐾𝐾1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 
𝐾𝐾2 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽� 
189
𝐾𝐾3 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽� 
𝐾𝐾4 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽� 
The expression is now: 
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾1 + (𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾3+ 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾4 
From which a closed form solution for 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 can be derived: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝐾𝐾1 + �λ1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 + �λ2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐾𝐾3 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾4�� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  (A48) 
• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
 
Likewise, with respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
 
𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻−𝛼𝛼= (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽+ (𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽��+ (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽��+ 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�� 
Recall that: 
𝐾𝐾1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 
𝐾𝐾2 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽� 
𝐾𝐾3 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽� 
𝐾𝐾4 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽� 
The expression is now: 
𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾1 + (𝜆𝜆1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 + (𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾3 +
𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾4  
From which a closed form solution for 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 can be derived: 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝐾𝐾1 + �λ1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 + �λ2 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐾𝐾3 + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾4�� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 (A49) 
2. For the middle (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) type: 
190
From: 
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
= 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
+ 𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  
for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
 
With respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝛼𝛼−1𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
1−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 + �𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 −
�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞
𝐿𝐿�
𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�  
Let: 
 𝑄𝑄1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 
 𝑄𝑄2 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�  
and we have: 
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝛼𝛼−1𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
1−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑄𝑄1 + �𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑄𝑄2 
A closed form solution for 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 is: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝑄𝑄1 + �λ1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑄𝑄2�� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  (A50) 
• 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
With respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 +
�𝜆𝜆1
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�  
Recall that: 
 𝑄𝑄1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 
 𝑄𝑄2 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�  
to obtain: 
𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑄𝑄1 + �𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑄𝑄2 
A closed form solution for 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 is: 
191
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝑄𝑄1 + �𝜆𝜆1  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑄𝑄2�� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 (A51) 
3. For the middle (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) type: 
From: 
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
= 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
+ 𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿  
for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝛼𝛼−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
1−𝛼𝛼= (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽+ �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽� 
Let: 
 𝑅𝑅1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 
 𝑅𝑅2 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�  
A closed form solution for 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 is: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝑅𝑅1 + �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅2�� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  (A52) 
• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
 
𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻−𝛼𝛼= (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽+ �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽� 
Recall that: 
𝑅𝑅1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 
 𝑅𝑅2 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�  
𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝑅𝑅1 + �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� (𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝑅𝑅2  
A closed form solution for 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 is: 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝑅𝑅1 + �𝜆𝜆2  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑅𝑅2�� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 (A53) 
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4. For the efficient (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) type: 
From : 
 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � = 0 
for 𝑧𝑧 ∈ {𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑} 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿: 
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝛼𝛼−1𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
1−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 
Let: 
 𝑆𝑆1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 
to obtain 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 𝑆𝑆1� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾   (A54) 
• 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿: 
𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿−𝛼𝛼 = (𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 
Recall that: 
 𝑆𝑆1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 
to obtain: 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑆𝑆1� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 (A55) 
 
A4.2  Cases 
Case 1: Positive correlation  
Focus on the 𝜆𝜆s: 
The solution to the system of equations is: 
𝜆𝜆1 =  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)+𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)�  
More compactly: 
193
𝜆𝜆1 =  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 �1 + 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)� −  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 � 
 
 
𝜆𝜆2 =  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿− 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)+𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)�  
More compactly: 
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• The numerator of 𝜆𝜆1 is: 
𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇1 
• The numerator of 𝜆𝜆2 is: 
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇1 
where 𝑦𝑦 = �𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻   
𝑇𝑇1 = 𝛾𝛾 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽� +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽  (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�+  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�� 
Recall that the full expressions are: 
With respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
• The numerator of 𝜆𝜆1 is: 
𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽� +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�+  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�� 
• The numerator of 𝜆𝜆2 is: 
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽� +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�+  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽�� 
With respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
• The numerator of 𝜆𝜆1 is: 
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3. Consider the  numerator in the expression for 𝜆𝜆3: 
 
� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝜕𝜕∆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿)− 𝜕𝜕∆𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�1−  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�� 
 
The full expression is: 
 
• With respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
 
� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽��  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)
− �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽��  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)� 
Recall that: 
𝑥𝑥 = �𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�𝛾𝛾−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝐾𝐾2 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽� 
𝐾𝐾3 = 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽� 
And substitute to obtain: 
� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − (𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾2) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) − (𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾3) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)� 
• With respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
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− �(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)𝛾𝛾−1𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾 ��𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)1−𝛽𝛽 − �𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻�𝛽𝛽 (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽��  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)� 
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� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − (𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾2) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) − (𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾3) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)� 
Finally, the 𝜆𝜆s are: 
• With respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑥𝑥� 
𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑥𝑥� 
 
𝜆𝜆3 =  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − (𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾2) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) − (𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾3) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑥𝑥�  
 
• With respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑦𝑦� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑦𝑦� 
𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑦𝑦� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑦𝑦� 
𝜆𝜆3 =  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − (𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾2) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) − (𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾3) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(1 −  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑦𝑦� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑦𝑦�  
 
Focus on the output levels: 
The 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
To obtain 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 numerically, plug the 𝜆𝜆s and substitute for 𝑥𝑥 into: 
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼−1𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝑥𝑥 𝐾𝐾1 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑥𝑥�  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑥𝑥 𝐾𝐾2
+ � 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑥𝑥�  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑥𝑥 𝐾𝐾3
+  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − (𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾2) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�1−  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�− (𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾3) 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�1−  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑥𝑥�  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑥𝑥 𝐾𝐾4 
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• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
To obtain 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 numerically, plug the 𝜆𝜆s and substitute for 𝑦𝑦 into: 
  
𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻−𝛼𝛼= 𝑦𝑦 𝐾𝐾1 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(1 + 𝐾𝐾4( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝑦𝑦) − ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3)𝑦𝑦)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑦𝑦 𝐾𝐾2+ � 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(1 + 𝐾𝐾4( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝑦𝑦) − ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3)𝑦𝑦)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾3
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The 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
Use the closed form solution derived above and plug λ1 (with respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) to obtain: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝑄𝑄1 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑥𝑥�  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄2��
1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
• 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
 
Use the closed form solution derived above and plug λ1 (with respect to 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) to obtain: 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼) �𝑄𝑄1 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(1 + 𝐾𝐾4( 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝑦𝑦) − ( 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3)𝑦𝑦)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄2�� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 
 
The 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
Use the closed form solution derived above and plug λ2 (with respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) to obtain: 
 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝑅𝑅1 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�1 + 𝐾𝐾4� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥� − � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾3�𝑥𝑥�  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅2��
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𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
 
• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
Use the closed form solution derived above and plug λ2 (with respect to 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) to obtain: 
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Case 2: Weak correlation  
In case 3, simply let  λ1 = λ , λ2 = 1 − λ and λ3 = 0 and plug these values into the closed form solutions 
derived above. 
For computational purposes, it is convenient to use the following expressions:  
For the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝑄𝑄1 + �λ  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄2�� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
• 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼) �𝑄𝑄1 + �λ  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄2�� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 
For the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�𝑅𝑅1 + �(1 − λ)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿��𝑅𝑅2�
1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝑅𝑅1 + �(1 − λ)  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅2��
1
1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿
𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼
1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 
For the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�𝐾𝐾1 + �λ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 + �(1 − λ) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐾𝐾3��
1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
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𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝐾𝐾1 + �λ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 + �(1−λ) 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐾𝐾3�� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼  
 
 
Case 3: Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 type 
It holds when λ1 = 1 and  λ2 = λ3 = 0: 
For the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝑄𝑄1 + �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄2�� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
• 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼) �𝑄𝑄1 + �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄2�� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 
For the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 𝑅𝑅1� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼) (𝑅𝑅1)� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 
 
For the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝐾𝐾1 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐾𝐾3��
1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾
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• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
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𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝐾𝐾1 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐾𝐾3��
1
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Case 4: Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 type 
It holds when λ2 = 1 and  λ1 = λ3 = 0: 
For the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 𝑄𝑄1� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
• 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻: 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑄𝑄1� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 
 
For the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝑅𝑅1 + �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅2�� 1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿: 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼) �𝑅𝑅1 + �  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅2�� 11−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 
 
For the 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 type: 
• 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝐾𝐾1 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐾𝐾3��
1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼−1
𝛼𝛼−𝛾𝛾  
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• 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = � 1𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝐾𝐾1 +  𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐾𝐾2 + � 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿� 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  𝐾𝐾3��
1
1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼
1−𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼 
 
 
A5. Incentive compatibility constraints for simulation results 
 
Case 1 (positive correlation): 
 
Distribution 1A: where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.5, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.5, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.25  
 
• The efficient is simultaneously indifferent between his contract, the inefficient’s (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), and the two 
middle types’ (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 and 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻): 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.04, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.04 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.04, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.02, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.02 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.04, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.02, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.02 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 2.90  
 
 
Distribution 1B: where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.49, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.01, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.01, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.49, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.24 
When the principal fixes 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 2: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.08, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.08 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.08, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.05, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.03 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.08, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.05, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.03 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 2.84  
When the principal fixes 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 4: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.13, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.13 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.13, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.08, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.05 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.13, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.08, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.05 
203
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 2.83  
 
When the principal fixes 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 6: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.19, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.19 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.19, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.11, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.08 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.19, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.11, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.08 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 2.82  
 
Distribution 1C: where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.45, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.05, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.05, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.45, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.20 
When the principal fixes 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 2: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.40, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.40 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.40, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.23, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.17 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.40, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.23 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.17 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 2.62  
 
 
When the principal fixes 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 4: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.92, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.92 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.92, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.54, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.38 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.92, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.54 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.38 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 2.47  
 
When the principal fixes 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 6: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1.55, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 1.55 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1.55, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.91, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.64 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1.55, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.91 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.64 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 2.23  
 
Case 2: Weak correlation 
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Distribution 2A where where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.3 , 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.25 , 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.19 , 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.26 , 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.03 . For 𝜆𝜆 =0.57, the following output levels hold and satisfy equation (7): 
The efficient is indifferent between his contract and that of any of the two middle types:  
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.51, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.01, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.50 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.51, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.01, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.50 
However, the efficient’s incentive compatibility constraint with respect to the inefficient does not 
bind:  
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.55, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.01 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 1.96  
 
Distribution 2B where where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.28, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.22, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.22, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.28, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0.03. For 𝜆𝜆 =0.50, the following output levels hold and satisfy equation (7). 
The efficient is indifferent between his contract and that of any of the two middle types:  
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.55, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.01, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.54 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.55, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.01, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.54 
However, the incentive compatibility constraint with respect to the inefficient does not bind:  
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.55, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.02 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 1.84  
 
 
Case 3: Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 type 
Distribution 3A where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.125, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.5, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.25, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.125, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = −0.11 
The efficient is indifferent between his contract and that of the LH type: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.98, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 0.98 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 1.34  
 
Distribution 3B where where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.08, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.74, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.08, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = −0.11 
The efficient is indifferent between his contract and that of the LH type: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1.24, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻) = 1.24 
Expected profit is 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋) = 1.2  
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Case 4: Negative correlation with asymmetry towards the 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 type 
Distribution 4A, where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.125, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.25, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.5, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.125, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = −0.11 
The efficient is indifferent between his contract and that of the HL type: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.98, 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 0.98 
 
 
Distribution 4B, where 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 0.04, 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.05, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0.87, 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.04, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = −0.04 
The efficient is indifferent between his contract and that of the LH type: 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿), because 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1.38, 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 = 0, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 , 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿) = 1.38 
 
A6. MATLAB script files to compute simulation results 
 
For Case 1 (Positive Correlation): 
%**************************************************% 
%       Parameters of the cost function            % 
%**************************************************% 
A = 5; 
alpha = 0.5; 
beta = 0.5; 
gama = 0.6; 
%**************************************************% 
%       Distribution of types                      % 
%*************************************************** 
pll = 0.45; 
plh = 0.05; 
phl = 0.05; 
phh = 0.45; 
%**************************************************% 
%      Asymmetric information parameters           % 
%**************************************************% 
theta_qL = 2; 
theta_qH = 4; 
theta_tL= 4; 
theta_tH= 8; 
%**************************************************% 
%        Deltas                                    % 
%*************************************************** 
delta_HH_LH = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HH_HL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
206
delta_HH_LL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_LH_LL = ((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HL_LL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
%**************************************************% 
  
K1 = gama*((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
K2 = gama*delta_HH_LH; 
K3 = gama*delta_HH_HL; 
K4 = gama*delta_HH_LL; 
  
  
Q1 = gama*((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
Q2 = gama*delta_LH_LL; 
  
R1 = gama*((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
R2 = gama*delta_HL_LL; 
  
S1 = gama*((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
  
T1 = gama*(plh*delta_HH_LH + phl*delta_HH_HL + phh*pll*delta_HH_LL); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%               Lambdas wrt q                      % 
%**************************************************% 
  
syms qhh 
  
thh = 6; 
  
  
lambda1 = (plh * (plh * (gama*((qhh*thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LH) + ... 
                 phl * (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_HL)+ ... 
                 phh*pll*(gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LL)))/... 
                 ((phh - (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_HL)*phl ... 
                 + (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LL)*phh*phl - ... 
                 (gama*((qhh*thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LH)*plh +... 
                 (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LL)*phh*plh)* pll);   
              
lambda2 = (plh * (phl * (gama*((qhh*thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LH) + ... 
                 phl * (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_HL)+ ... 
                 phh*pll*(gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LL)))/... 
                 ((phh - (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_HL)*phl ... 
                 + (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LL)*phh*phl - ... 
                 (gama*((qhh*thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LH)*plh +... 
                 (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LL)*phh*plh)* pll); 
              
 lambda3 = (phh*pll - (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_HL)*phl*(1-
phh) - ... 
           (gama*((qhh*thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LH)*plh*(1-phh))/... 
           ((phh - (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_HL)*phl ... 
                 + (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LL)*phh*phl - ... 
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                 (gama*((qhh*thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LH)*plh +... 
                 (gama*((qhh *thh)^(gama-1))*thh*delta_HH_LL)*phh*plh)* pll); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%        Numerical computation of qhh              % 
%**************************************************% 
  
x= (((qhh*thh)^(gama-1))*thh); 
  
qhh = vpasolve(A*alpha*(qhh^(alpha - 1))*(thh^(1 - alpha)) == x*K1 ... 
     + ((lambda1*pll + plh)/phh)*(x*K2)... 
     + ((lambda2*pll + phl)/phh)*(x*K3)... 
     + ((lambda3*pll)/phh)*(x*K4),qhh, [0,0.1]); 
  
 qlh = qhh; 
 qhl = qhh; 
  
%**************************************************% 
%       Computing qlh, given tlh and lambda        % 
%**************************************************% 
  
tlh = 6; 
  
    
qlh = (((1/(A*alpha))*(Q1 + lambda1*(pll/plh)*Q2))^(1/(alpha - gama)))*... 
    tlh^((gama + alpha - 1 )/(alpha - gama)); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%    Computing qhl, iven tlh and lambda            % 
%**************************************************% 
  
thl = 6; 
  
qhl = (((1/(A*alpha))*(R1 + lambda2*(pll/phl)*R2))^(1/(alpha - gama)))*... 
    thl^((gama + alpha - 1 )/(alpha - gama)); 
  
% %**************************************************% 
% %                Computing qll                     % 
% %**************************************************% 
  
tll = 6; 
  
qll = (((1/(A*alpha))*S1)^(1/(alpha - gama)))*... 
    tll^((gama + alpha - 1 )/(alpha - gama)); 
  
 
For Case 2 (Weak Correlation): 
%**************************************************% 
A = 5; 
alpha = 0.5; 
beta = 0.5; 
gama = 0.6; 
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thh = 6; 
tlh = 6; 
thl = 6; 
tll = 6; 
%**************************************************% 
pll = 0.3; 
plh = 0.25; 
phl = 0.19; 
phh = 0.26; 
%**************************************************% 
theta_qL = 2; 
theta_qH = 4; 
theta_tL= 4; 
theta_tH= 8; 
%**************************************************% 
delta_HH_LH = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HH_HL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HH_LL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_LH_LL = ((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HL_LL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
  
%**************************************************% 
  
K1 = gama*((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
K2 = gama*delta_HH_LH; 
K3 = gama*delta_HH_HL; 
K4 = gama*delta_HH_LL; 
  
  
Q1 = gama*((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
Q2 = gama*delta_LH_LL; 
  
R1 = gama*((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
R2 = gama*delta_HL_LL; 
  
S1 = gama*((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
  
T1 = gama*(plh*delta_HH_LH + phl*delta_HH_HL + phh*pll*delta_HH_LL); 
%**************************************************% 
%  Finding the lambda that satisfies eq. A40       % 
%**************************************************% 
%  
 init_guess=[0 1]; 
% %    
 syms lambda  
% %     
 vpasolve( ((( ((((1/(A*alpha))*(K1 + ((lambda*pll + plh)/phh)* K2 + ... 
       (((1 - lambda)*pll + phl)/phh)*K3))... 
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        ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*thh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama))) * 
thh)^(gama))*delta_HH_LH) + ((( ((((1/(A*alpha))*(Q1 + (lambda * 
pll/plh)*Q2))... 
        ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*tlh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama))) 
*tlh)^(gama))*delta_LH_LL)   == ((( ((((1/(A*alpha))*(K1 + ((lambda*pll + 
plh)/phh)* K2 + ... 
         (((1 - lambda)*pll + phl)/phh)*K3))... 
         ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*thh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama))) 
*thh)^(gama))*delta_HH_HL) + ((( ((((1/(A*alpha))*(R1 + ((1-lambda) * 
pll/phl)*R2))... 
         ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*thl^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama))) 
*thl)^(gama))*delta_HL_LL), lambda, init_guess) 
  
%**************************************************% 
%         Computing output levels                  % 
%**************************************************% 
  
lambda = 0.56818181818181817247476191987596;      
      
%**************************************************% 
%  Output levels for the inefficient (HH) type     % 
%**************************************************% 
%  
  qhh = ((((1/(A*alpha))*(K1 + ((lambda*pll + plh)/phh)* K2 + ... 
                (((1 - lambda)*pll + phl)/phh)*K3))... 
                ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*thh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - 
gama))); 
 
% %**************************************************% 
% %  Output levels for middle (LH) type              % 
% %**************************************************% 
%  
   qlh = ((((1/(A*alpha))*(Q1 + (lambda * pll/plh)*Q2))... 
            ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*tlh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama))); 
% %**************************************************% 
% %  Output levels for middle (HL) type              % 
% %**************************************************% 
%  
     qhl = ((((1/(A*alpha))*(R1 + ((1-lambda) * pll/phl)*R2))... 
           ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*thl^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama))); 
% %**************************************************% 
% %  Output levels for efficient (LL) type              % 
% %**************************************************% 
 
qll = (((1/(A*alpha))*S1)^(1/(alpha - gama)))*tll^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha 
- gama)); 
  
For Case 3 (Asymmetry towards the 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 type): 
%**************************************************% 
A = 5; 
alpha = 0.5; 
beta = 0.5; 
gama = 0.6; 
%**************************************************% 
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pll = 0.08; 
plh = 0.74;  
phl = 0.1; 
phh = 0.08; 
%**************************************************% 
theta_qL = 2; 
theta_qH = 4; 
theta_tL= 4; 
theta_tH= 8; 
%**************************************************% 
delta_HH_LH = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HH_HL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HH_LL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_LH_LL = ((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HL_LL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
%**************************************************% 
  
K1 = gama*((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
K2 = gama*delta_HH_LH; 
K3 = gama*delta_HH_HL; 
K4 = gama*delta_HH_LL; 
  
  
Q1 = gama*((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
Q2 = gama*delta_LH_LL; 
  
R1 = gama*((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
R2 = gama*delta_HL_LL; 
  
S1 = gama*((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
  
T1 = gama*(plh*delta_HH_LH + phl*delta_HH_HL + phh*pll*delta_HH_LL); 
  
  
%**************************************************% 
%                Computing qhh                     % 
%**************************************************% 
  
thh = 6; 
  
qhh = (((1/(A*alpha))*(K1 + ((pll + plh)/phh)*K2 + ... 
    (phl/phh)*K3))^(1/(alpha - gama)))* thh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - 
gama)); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%                Computing qlh                     % 
%**************************************************% 
tlh = 6;  
   
211
  
qlh = (((1/(A*alpha))*(Q1 + (pll/plh)*Q2))... 
    ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*tlh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama)); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%                Computing qhl                     % 
%**************************************************% 
  
thl = 6;  
   
qhl = (((1/(A*alpha))*(R1))^(1/(alpha - gama)))... 
    *thl^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama)); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%                Computing qll                     % 
%**************************************************% 
  
tll = 6; 
%  
 qll = (((1/(A*alpha))*S1)^(1/(alpha - gama)))*tll^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha 
- gama)); 
  
 
For Case 4 (Asymmetry towards the 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 type): 
%**************************************************% 
A = 5; 
alpha = 0.5; 
beta = 0.5; 
gama = 0.6; 
%**************************************************% 
pll = 0.125; 
plh = 0.25; 
phl = 0.5; 
phh = 0.125; 
%**************************************************% 
theta_qL = 2; 
theta_qH = 4; 
theta_tL= 4; 
theta_tH= 8; 
%**************************************************% 
delta_HH_LH = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HH_HL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HH_LL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_LH_LL = ((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
delta_HL_LL = ((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta))... 
    -((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
%**************************************************% 
  
K1 = gama*((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
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K2 = gama*delta_HH_LH; 
K3 = gama*delta_HH_HL; 
K4 = gama*delta_HH_LL; 
  
  
Q1 = gama*((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tH)^(1-beta)); 
Q2 = gama*delta_LH_LL; 
  
R1 = gama*((theta_qH)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
R2 = gama*delta_HL_LL; 
  
S1 = gama*((theta_qL)^beta)*((theta_tL)^(1-beta)); 
  
T1 = gama*(plh*delta_HH_LH + phl*delta_HH_HL + phh*pll*delta_HH_LL); 
  
  
  
%**************************************************% 
%                Computing qhh                     % 
%**************************************************% 
  
thh = 6; 
  
qhh = (((1/(A*alpha))*(K1 + (plh/phh)*K2 + ... 
    ((pll+phl)/phh)*K3))^(1/(alpha - gama)))* thh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha 
- gama)); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%                Computing qlh                     % 
%**************************************************% 
tlh = 6;  
   
  
qlh = (((1/(A*alpha))*(Q1))... 
    ^(1/(alpha - gama)))*tlh^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama)); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%                Computing qhl                     % 
%**************************************************% 
  
thl = 6;  
   
qhl = (((1/(A*alpha))*(R1+(pll/phl)*R2))^(1/(alpha - gama)))... 
    *thl^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha - gama)); 
  
%**************************************************% 
%                Computing qll                     % 
%**************************************************% 
  
tll = 6; 
%  
 qll = (((1/(A*alpha))*S1)^(1/(alpha - gama)))*tll^((gama - 1 + alpha)/(alpha 
- gama)); 
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1 Introduction
At the height of the financial crisis, central banks throughout the world were in the
difficult position of supplying liquidity to troubled banks while accounting for the different
qualities of collateral they possessed. In particular, the Bank of England (BoE) asked for the
advice of Paul Klemperer, who came up with an auction format - the Product-Mix Auction
(PMA) - in which buyers and sellers perceive the traded goods as imperfect substitutes. In
his proposal, Klemperer (2010) suggests that the more traditional multiple round format
is “impractical” because financial markets are fast-paced, bidders may change their minds
in the auction rounds and financial market themselves may be influenced by the results.
Klemperer’s suggested format is closely related to a number of existing mechanisms in the
Economics literature and has a number of “easy extensions” which he left as avenues for
future research. The central goal of this paper is to develop these extensions.
To this end, I introduce Product-Mix Exchanges (PMEs): double, multi-unit combina-
torial auctions in which buyers and sellers report substitutable preferences over bundles of
goods, and participants buy and sell without having a fixed role, effectively swapping over
the two sides of the market. Moreover, the paper analyzes some of the incentive properties
of PMEs, with an emphasis on efficiency, and studies a relevant application, namely the
Delta Energy market design in which power system flexibility originating from Flex-Offers
is traded.1
PMEs extend and generalize PMAs, which are direct mechanisms that allow participants
expressing preferences over sets of goods, perceived by bidders as imperfect substitutes.
In the PMA original formulation, a seller asks buyers to submit bids containing mutually
exclusive offers for different varieties of a good on sale, together with a single, maximum
quantity to acquire. Bidders are allowed to submit one or more bids and, within each bid,
to decide if they want to make offers for one, some or all of the varieties. Designed in
1Flex-Offers are, essentially, load profiles that describe the supply or demand of any flexibility-enabling
asset in the grid, including the time and amount flexibility. Further details can be found in the paper by
Bosca´n (2016).
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this way, one-to-one substitutable preferences are imposed such that bidders approximate
multiple-variety demand correspondences which, upon aggregation, cross with a seller-defined
multiple-variety supply correspondence. For each variety, the mechanism simultaneously
determines highest-loser, uniform prices that clear the market, such that bids below are
rejected and bids above are accepted. In general, the mechanism allocates at most one of
the varieties to each bidder and selects the one that gives the bidder the highest payoff, given
the market clearing prices.
The best -if not the only- documented application of PMAs is in the BoE’s Indexed
Long-Term Repo operations, introduced in June 2010. In this implementation, the BoE is
the seller, while banks, building societies and broker dealers are the buyers. The central
bank privately determines its funding supply preferences across loan types, which are backed
by different qualities of collateral. Naturally, because of risk considerations, loans that have
lower quality collateral require the borrower to pay higher interest rates than the ones that
have a superior kind.2
However, the applicability of PMAs is considerably wide and exceeds the realm of financial
markets. Harbord et al. (2011), for example, have considered it as one of the alternatives to
auction natural gas contracts in Colombia. Similarly, although not explicitly referred to as a
PMA, the “multiple bid auction” discussed by SEM (2014) as one of the options to procure
system services in the Irish Electricity Market corresponds to one. Furthermore, according
to Klemperer (2010), the initial PMA design can be easily extended in the following ways:
1. There can be multiple buyers and multiple sellers
2. Swap bids, which allow market participants to exchange one variety for another at the
market clearing price difference, can be implemented
2After a number of extensions to the framework applied by the BoE, implemented since February 2014,
the number of collateral qualities was extended from two to three and two automatic supply responses
were introduced. First, if there is greater demand for loans backed by a certain collateral quality, the fund
allocation for this variety will increase. Second, total supply is not exogenously fixed by the seller but is
dependent on the overall demand. For further details on the BoE’s implementation, see Frost et al. (2015)
218
3. In a given bid, bidders can be allowed to ask for different amounts of the available
varieties, as opposed to the basic implementation where bidders express preferences
over the same amount of any of the available varieties
4. Variable total quantity offered by the seller can be made dependent on prices, as in
the BoE’s current implementation
As mentioned before, Klemperer has not hitherto developed any of the extensions. In-
stead, Baldwin and Klemperer (2012, 2016) have made a more fundamental contribution.
They have developed geometric techniques and results that underpin the original PMA and
any possible extension to it. More generally, their work facilitates the analysis of agents’
preferences in matching and market design and establishes a pioneering link between Tropical
Geometry and Economics. Applying the results emerging from this nascent connection and
establishing a link between PMAs and combinatorial auctions, I take on the task of imple-
menting the first three extensions to PMAs suggested by Klemperer (2010) in the previous
enumeration.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I describe PMAs and its connection
to other existing mechanisms described in the economics literature. To fix ideas and to
illustrate the difference between PMAs and PMEs, I present two simple examples: one for
each of them. The section ends with a detailed description of the basic notation, assumptions
and bid expression used throughout the paper.
Section 3 discusses the notions of substitutable preferences relevant for PMEs, its con-
nection with the well-known Gross Substitutes (GS) condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982),
and introduces the essential concepts in tropical geometry, which are relevant for the un-
derstanding of the following sections. There are no new results in this section because the
focus is on applying existing concepts. Thus, the interested reader is referred to the original
sources for proofs and further details. The section contains several examples that show how
substitutable preferences can be represented with the aid of tropical geometric techniques.
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The remaining sections contain the central contributions of the paper. In section 4, I deal
with the winner determination problem of PMEs and the existence of equilibrium with both
indivisible and divisible goods. Notably, the linear programs presented there are of practical
relevance, given that these allow estimating the equilibrium allocations and associated sup-
porting prices in all variations of PMEs. Furthermore, proposition 4.8, which builds on the
linear programming proof to Baldwin and Klemperer (2012, 2016)’s unimodularity theorem
done by Tran and Yu (2015), is a straightforward way to verify if a set of valuations can be
expected to have equilibrium with indivisibility.
Section 5 deals with incentive issues in PMEs, a topic that has not been dealt with
before but for which a number of existing results characterizing the incentive properties of
combinatorial auctions can be readily applied. The central message of this section is that
because the GS condition holds in all variations of the PME, the Vickrey outcome is always
in the core. Furthermore, if non-linear pricing is allowed for, it is always possible to run
PMEs in which Vickrey payments are implemented. Once again, this is a result of practical
relevance: when markets are thin and thus prone to manipulation, resorting to a mechanism
in which bidding truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy safeguards efficiency.3
Finally, section 6 illustrates how PMEs can solve a relevant application. Delta Energy
markets, where the energy associated to Flex-Offers is traded, can be cleared with PMEs.
In this section, I illustrate how this market design proposal for flexibility can accommodate
relevant flexibility-enabling products such as quantity flexibility and time shifting. Section
7 presents concluding remarks.
3Subsection A.3 in the Appendix contains a number of PME market-clearing examples in which VCG
payments are implemented as supporting prices for the PME.
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2 From Product-Mix Auctions to Product-Mix Ex-
changes
The extensions to PMAs proposed by Klemperer (2010) have already been addressed by
Milgrom (2009) in parallel work. He introduces assignment messages and exchanges, which
extend the classic assignment model by Shapley and Shubik (1971). Assignment messages
are linear programs that express agents’ substitutable preferences to reduce the length of
report problem in direct mechanisms, while the exchanges are Walrasian mechanisms where
participants are restricted to reporting assignment messages. In this framework, PMAs are
special cases of Milgrom (2009)’s model who defines these as an “. . . assignment auction
design (which) . . . is simply an exchange with one seller and many buyers or one buyer and
many sellers”.
Yet, there is a fundamental difference between Milgrom’s approach and PMAs: the latter
are inextricably linked to their geometric representation, whereas the former aren’t. The
focus on geometry works in favor of the increased applicability of PMAs, as it facilitates the
bid expression of agents participating in the mechanism and provides an alternative way to
determine the conditions under which equilibrium with indivisibilities is guaranteed to exist.
Clearly, there is a connection between PMEs and PMAs because of their common reliance
on tropical geometry. Also, PMEs and assignment messages and exchanges have similarities
because they both extend the original PMA.4 However, there is an important contrast with
both approaches. In contrast to Klemperer’s original PMA formulation and to Milgrom’s
assignment exchanges, who focus on bids over goods, but in a similar fashion to Tran and Yu
(2015) and Lee et al. (2015), I emphasize on the combinatorial nature of PMAs to implement
PMEs. Therefore, the following definition:
Definition 2.1 A Product-Mix Exchange is a multi-unit combinatorial auction with multiple
buyers and multiple sellers who are restricted to reporting substitutable preferences. Market
4In fact, the term “exchange” in the Product Mix-Exchange is used in Milgrom (2009)’s sense to highlight
the double auction nature of PMEs and the equivalence of his model with mine.
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participants in a Product-Mix Exchange can be on the supply side or the demand side of the
market, or both.
In combinatorial auctions, bidders place bids on combinations of items or “packages”
rather than on individual items (Cramton et al., 2006). Consequently, the winner determi-
nation problem must account for the fact that participants are allocated indivisible bundles
of goods, potentially imposing computational complexity.
Focusing on packages reflects the large number of possible applications of PMEs with
indivisible goods as well as the emphasis placed by existing studies on the PMA on the
existence of equilibrium with indivisible goods (e.g. Tran and Yu (2015)). On the other
hand, the best known application of PMAs is for a divisible good, i.e., money. But even if
goods are divisible, focusing on bundles of goods facilitates the desired extensions of PMAs,
as a simple linear programming relaxation can straightforwardly determine the winning bids.
As in PMAs, the key characteristic of PMEs is that participants interpret good bun-
dles in a bid as imperfect substitutes. It is well established, though, that the notion of
substitutability is not unique in economics (Milgrom and Strulovici, 2009). To allow for a
sufficiently rich bid expressiveness by market participants while ensuring desirable proper-
ties, such as the existence of equilibrium and supporting prices, I restrict bidders to having
“strong substitutes” or “ordinary substitutes” demand types (Baldwin and Klemperer, 2012,
2016).
The divisibility of the traded goods together with the substitutability concept considered
gives rise to four variants of the PME:
Strong Substitutes (SS) Ordinary substitutes (OS)
Indivisible goods Variant 1 Variant 3
Divisible goods Variant 2 Variant 4
Table 1: Variants of a PME
The strong substitutes demand type refers to the situation in which goods of the same type
are regarded as distinct Milgrom and Strulovici (2009). In this case, goods can potentially
222
have their own prices, and substitutability may fail. This is precisely the assumption imposed
on the original BoE PMA implementation, where participants were limited to expressing
one-to-one substitution rates: banks bid to obtain loans backed by two different kinds of
securities, the “strong” and the “weak”. Some banks (buyers) would be willing to report
interest rates (prices) at which they would substitute one kind of loan (good) for the other,
but always for the same amount of money. Each participating bank is allocated to one or
the other loan, but not both. Other participating banks, in contrast, would want to express
interest for only one kind of loan, actually indicating that the goods are not substitutes for
them.
The ordinary (also known as weak in Milgrom and Strulovici (2009)’s terminology) substi-
tutes demand type allows participants to express trade-offs among goods that are considered
distinct and satisfies the price-theoretic notion of substitutes in a multi-unit context. That
is: whenever the price of a certain commodity in a class of goods increases, demand for an
alternative commodity will weakly increase. As a conventional textbook example, consider
the case of a consumer of fruits in a world of apples and oranges only. Whenever the price
of an apple increases, the consumer will buy fewer apples and possibly more oranges, ad-
justing his consumption bundle. Section 3 discusses the implications of each substitutability
assumption in a geometric context, together with its relevance for the PME design.
2.1 Simple examples
To illustrate the topic, in this subsection I present a concrete example of a PMA, as
implemented by the BoE. A second example - of a PME - is also presented to emphasize the
fact that PMAs are special cases of PMEs
Example 2.2 (Product-Mix Auction) Consider a PMA in which there are two indivisible
goods on sale. For simplicity, we refer to each good as “commodity 1” and “commodity
2”, respectively. In this example, there are 20 bids (shown in figure 1) and each one is
represented in price space with coordinates denoting the price at which the buyer wishes to
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acquire commodity 1 (abscissa) or commodity 2 (ordinate) and a mutually exclusive quantity
demanded. So, for example, the “bubble” marked with 29 shows that the buyer wishes to
acquire either 29 units of commodity 1 or commodity 2. If the buyer acquires commodity 1,
he pays at most 37 units of money but if he acquires commodity 2, he is willing to pay at
most 25. Similarly, a buyer willing to buy only commodity 1 may place a bid as the one with
a 28 on the abscissa which indicates that he would pay at most 45 for commodity 1 but would
pay nothing for commodity 2.
Note that total demand adds up to 600 units but the seller fixes supply at 200 for com-
modity 1 and 250 for commodity 2, therefore rejecting 150 units of any of the two goods on
sale. This choice determines the seller-defined two-commodity supply correspondence, drawn
in figure 2 as three line segments that determine which bids are allocated to what commodity.
The seller’s problem is to optimally determine which bids to reject and the prices to charge
for each commodity. Figure 2 shows the optimal solution to the seller’s problem, which con-
sists on rationing the bids marked with 35, 22 and 33 while rejecting all bids below price
coordinates of (28,30).
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Figure 2: Example 1 (PMA): market clearing
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Example 2.3 (Product-Mix Exchange) Now consider a PME with two indivisible goods on
sale, as before. In this specific example, there are 20 selling bids and 20 buying bids, but
buyers and sellers can be on either side of the market: the same agent can place buying
bids or selling bids with no restriction. Figure 3 shows demand-side bids in solid gray and
supply-side bids with red circles, in price space. As before, every demand “bubble” represents
a mutually exclusive quantity to acquire (at most) at the prices denoted by the corresponding
coordinates. Supply side bubbles represent a maximum quantity to sell (at least) at the prices
indicated by the coordinates.
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Figure 3: PME: bids in price space
In this example, total demand adds up to 600 units and supply adds up to 450 units.
However, roughly 220 units of commodity 1 and 183 units of commodity for a total of 404
units can be matched at prices (28,33). In this case, there is no demand for the two highest
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supply-side bids. Figure 4 shows accepted and rejected demand-side bids and the supply
correspondence, which unlike the PMA, in this case is defined by the supply- side of the
market.
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Buyers of commodity 2
Figure 4: PME: market clearing (Demand-side bids)
Figure 5, on the other hand, shows the supply side of the market indicating the rejected
and the accepted bids. In this case, there is a demand correspondence defined by the aggregate
demand of all buyers in the economy.
An alternative view of market clearing is shown in figures 6 and 7, where all the prof-
itable trades for each commodity in the exchange are shown. In figure 6 note that buyers of
commodity 1 pay at least 28, while sellers are paid 28 or less. Similarly, in figure 7, buyers
of commodity 2 pay at least 33 and sellers are paid 33 or less.
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Figure 5: PME: market clearing (Selling-side bids)
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Figure 6: PME:profitable trades of commodity 1
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Figure 7: PME: profitable trades of commodity 2
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2.2 Basic notation, assumptions and bid expression
In a PME, there is a set of commodities N = {1, . . . , N}, indexed by n, and a set of
market participants J = B ∪ S . The set B = {1, . . . , B} contains buyers, indexed by b, and
the set S = {1, . . . , S} is composed of sellers, indexed by s. Any participant, buyer or seller,
is indexed by j.
A1: All participants have concave valuation functions uj : Aj → R over a finite domain
Aj ⊂ RN+ .
Note that while I refer to uj as a participant’s valuation throughout the paper, when
referring to sellers, it is more accurate to think of us to think in terms of cost. Moreover, a
buyer’s valuation ub is usually positive, whereas a seller’s is usually negative. This is because
of the distinction between buyers and sellers I have introduced in the model.
The organizer of the exchange - a clearinghouse - calls participants to report their bids.
Note that, without loss of generality, the described setting encompasses situations in which
there is one seller and many buyers (a PMA), one buyer and many sellers (a procurement
PMA) or many buyers and many sellers (a PME). In all cases, the clearinghouse has a
valuation of zero for all commodities and its unique goal is to ensure an efficient allocation.
Bids are composed of pairs (q, uj(q)) where q = (q1, . . . , qN) is a bundle in the
participant’s domain and uj is her valuation for the bundle q. That is, bids are sets
{(q, uj(q)) | ∀q ∈ Aj}. In the sequel, I refer to qn as the quantity of commodity n in
the bundle q. But in all cases:
A2: All participants have the zero bundle in their domain: q = 0 ∈ Aj, ∀j ∈ J
Depending on the kind of substitute preferences allowed for in the PME, the clearinghouse
restricts the participants’ domains, but Aj can be generally written as a cartesian product:5
5The representation of market participants’ domains as cartesian products is similar to Milgrom and
Strulovici (2009).
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Aj =
∏
n∈N
xn
where xn is a set containing all possible quantities of each commodity.
When the clearinghouse imposes strong substitute preferences, each participant j is re-
stricted to having a binary domain, where each bundle in the domain Aj either has zero or
K units of each good n. Therefore:
xn = {0, K}
Example 2.4 (Binary domain)
The set of commodities is N = {A,B} and thus N = 2. Bidder j has defined K = 3 and
thus xA = {0, 3}, xB = {0, 3}. In consequence:
Aj =
∏
n ∈N
xn = {(qA, qB) | qA ∈ xA, qB ∈ xB}
= {(0, 0), (3, 0), (0, 3), (3, 3)}
If the exchange establishes ordinary substitute preferences, each participant j has a multi-
unit domain, where each bundle in the domain Aj contains up to Kn units of each good n.
Thus the sets containing all possible quantities of the n goods are:
xn = {0, 1, . . . , Kn}
Example 2.5 (Multi-unit domain)
As in the previous example, there is a set of commodities N = {A,B} in the exchange
and participant j defines KA = 2, KB = 1. So, xA = {0, 1, 2} and xB = {0, 1}
Aj =
∏
n ∈N
xn = {(qA, qB) | qA ∈ xA, qB ∈ xB}
= {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 0), (2, 1)}
The role of the clearinghouse is to allocate bundles q ∈ Aj and to define a price P : J →
RN , that is, the prices that each agent in the exchange pays for (or gets paid for) a bundle
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of goods.6 As Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002, 2006), in this paper I consider two kinds of
prices, namely:7
• A non-anonymous, (possibly) non-linear and, consequently, discriminatory price P j =
pj, where the amount paid for an allocated bundle qj depends on the identity of agent
j and may not satisfy linearity. That is, for any price vector p and bundles q,q′ it
may be that p · (q + q′) 6= p · q + p · q′.
• An anonymous and linear price where P j = p,∀j ∈ J
A3: All participants have quasi-linear utility υj(q, P j) , which depends on the bundle of
goods q ∈ Aj allocated to the participant and the price P j.
Thus, for buyers:
υb(q, P b) =
{
ub(q)− P b · q} , ∀q ∈ Ab
And for sellers:
υs(q, P s) = {P s · q + us(q)} , ∀q ∈ As
The demand correspondence for the b-th buyer, Dub(P
b), and the supply correspondence
for the s-th seller, Sus(P
s) are respectively:
(1)Dub(P
b) = arg max
q∈Ab
{
ub(q)− P b · q}
(2)Sus(P
s) = arg max
q∈As
{P s · q + us(q)}
The value function (indirect utility or dual profit function) for buyers is:
(3)pib max
q ∈Ab
{
ub(q)− P b · q}
while that of sellers is:
(4)pis = max
q∈As
{P s · q + us(q)}
6Alternatively, I write qj to refer to a bundle that belongs to the j’s participant domain
7This is an important distinction because a PME with VCG payments, a topic discussed in section 5
cannot be implemented unless prices are non-anonymous.
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The assumptions introduced so far are equivalent to the extensions to the PMA discussed
by Klemperer (2010) and the model by Milgrom (2009), where agents can buy and sell
without having a fixed role. The setting I describe is, however, more general than what
is described by Tran and Yu (2015), because any PME with one seller and many buyers
is a PMA, and any PME with one buyer and many sellers is a procurement PMA. It is
convenient, therefore, to emphasize that:
A4: Participants of a PME can bid as buyers or as sellers, or both
Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that the cardinality of J is equal to the
number of bids, i.e.,“one bidder, one bid”. This, however, does not restrict the number of bids
that a bidder can place. From an auctioneer’s perspective, bids are treated independently,
as if each bid were placed by a different bidder, even if they aren’t. This is in contrast
to assignment exchanges (Milgrom, 2008), where the number of bids placed by a bidder is
known by the auctioneer.
LetA be the set of all possible aggregate bundles in the economy, defined as the Minkowski
difference of the aggregated individual valuation domains in the demand side of the economy∑
b∈B
minus those in the supply side
∑
s∈S
As:
A =
∑
b∈B
Ab −
∑
s∈S
As
.
Note that A, which I also refer to as the aggregate valuation domain, contains all the
possible aggregate outcomes of the exchange, including the ones in which total demand
is not equal to supply. Naturally, any element in A can be disaggregated into individual
bundles.
The aggregate valuation function U : A→ R is the total surplus derived from trading any
bundle in A. Given buyers’ and sellers’ reported valuations over bundles in their respective
domains, U is constructed as the maximum valuation taken over all possible decompositions
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of an aggregate outcome in A. Thus, for an arbitrary bundle y ∈ A, U is:
U (y) = max
{∑
b∈B
ub(qb)−
∑
s∈S
us(qs) | qb ∈ Ab,qs ∈ As,y =
∑
b∈B
qb −
∑
s∈S
qs
}
Given U , the clearinghouse’s problem is to find an efficient outcome q∗ ∈ A such that:
q∗ = arg max
q∈A
{
U (q) | q =
∑
b∈B
qb −
∑
s∈S
qs = 0
}
(5)
In other words: of all the possible decompositions that add up to q = 0 ∈ A, q∗ is the
efficient aggregate bundle that solves the clearinghouse’s problem of maximizing the gains
from trade U . Because q∗ = 0, it can be decomposed as:
(6)q∗ =
∑
b∈B
qb∗ −
∑
s∈S
qs∗ = 0
where qb∗,q
s
∗ are the efficient allocations to buyers and sellers.
As De Vries and Vohra (2003) note, the problem in (5) amounts to solving a problem
without knowing the objective function, given that participants need not report their true
valuations.
A dual problem is that of finding a price P∗ that supports the allocation q∗, i.e., finding
P∗ such that:
q∗ ∈
{∑
b∈B
Dub(P
b
∗ )−
∑
s∈S
Sus(P
s
∗ ) = 0
}
To summarize, any PME works as follows:
1. There is a set N goods and the clearinghouse calls all the participants to report their
sealed bids
2. The j-th bid is a set {(q, uj(q)) | ∀q ∈ Aj} and each bid is always allocated at most
one bundle. Therefore, it is assumed that q = 0 ∈ Aj, such that losing bids are also
part of the optimal aggregate allocation
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3. If the clearinghouse imposes strong substitute preferences on the bids reported by
participants, every participant has a binary valuation domain. Otherwise, if ordinary
substitute preferences are allowed for, participants have multi-unit valuation domains
4. The optimal aggregate allocation q∗ is the one that maximizes the aggregate valuation
function U . Associated to q∗, there is a market clearing price vector, such that q∗ ∈
DU (P
∗). Depending on the specific application, prices can be linear and anonynous
or non-linear and non-anonymous
3 The tropical geometry of substitutable preferences
In a two-commodity economy, the price-theoretic notion of substitute goods for demand
states that increasing the price of one good does not decrease the demand for the other
(Milgrom and Strulovici, 2009).
For example, if the set of commodities is N = {A,B} as in examples 2.4 and 2.5, a
buyer that observes an increase in the price of A will not reduce its demand for B. On the
contrary, its demand for B will weakly increase. Similarly, a seller that observes an increase
in the price of A will not increase its supply for B, but will weakly decrease it instead. More
precisely:
Definition 3.1 (Substitutable preferences)8
Let P b, P˜ b be prices perceived by a buyer b such that P b ≤ P˜ b:
• If there is a bundle q˜ such that q ≤ q˜, where q ∈ Dub(P b) and q˜ ∈ Dub(P˜ b), then
buyer b has substitutable preferences.
Likewise, consider a seller s who faces prices P s, P˜ s, such that P s ≤ P˜ s:
• If there is a bundle q˜ such that q ≥ q˜, where q ∈ Sus(P s) and q˜ ∈ Sus(P˜ s), then seller
s has substitutable preferences.
8For the sake of precision note that if q ≤ q˜ then qn ≤ q˜n for all n ∈ N . Similarly, if q ≥ q˜ then qn ≥ q˜n
for all n ∈ N .
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Note, however, that the Gross Substitutes (GS) condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982)9
is more restrictive. Roughly stated, the GS condition is satisfied if an increase in the price of
substitute goods never leads a participant to modify its demand or supply for goods whose
prices have not risen. Formally:
Definition 3.2 (Gross Substitutes)
Let P b, P˜ b be prices perceived by a buyer b such that: P b ≤ P˜ b and q ∈ Dub(P b), q˜ ∈
Dub(P˜
b) hold. Likewise, let P s, P˜ s be prices perceived by a seller s such that: P s ≤ P˜ s and
q ∈ Dus(P s), q˜ ∈ Dus(P˜ s) hold.
The GS condition holds if the bundle q˜ satisfies:
• qn = q˜n if and only if pbn = p˜bn for some n ∈ N , in the case of buyers
• qn = q˜n if and only if psn = p˜sn for some n ∈ N , in the case of sellers
As noted in section 2, the different variants of a PME depend on the kind of substitute
preferences imposed by the clearinghouse on market participants and the indivisibility of the
goods. Both the Ordinary Substitute (OS) and the Strong Substitutes (SS) concepts are
special cases of definition 3.1 and satisfy the GS condition. The distinction between them,
however, can only become entirely clear after some essential tropical geometric concepts, as
recently applied in Economics by Baldwin and Klemperer (2012, 2016), are introduced.
In the discussion that follows I focus on agents that have substitutable preferences and
introduce some basic concepts required to analyze these with tropical geometry.10 Hopefully,
the reader will be convinced that the application of geometric concepts pays off as they
provide considerable visual intuition into an individual agent’s preferences but also describe
very well the joint preferences of a group of agents, regardless of the fact that each agent
expresses substitutable, complementary or other kind of preferences. Besides the visual
9Which plays a central role in theoretical economics because the existence of equilibrium with indivisi-
bility depends on it
10The interested reader is referred to detailed expositions of the subject, e.g. the book by Maclagan
and Sturmfels (2015). Note, in addition, that the appendix (section A.1.1) of this paper contains a brief
exposition of polyhedral geometry concepts that can facilitate the understanding of the concepts that follow.
237
intuition, the mathematical structure underlying such representation of agents’ preferences
has been shown by to determine the existence of equilibrium in environments like the PME,
a topic that is discussed in section 4.
As examples 2.2 and 2.3 show, PMEs rely on the representation of bids in price space.
Therefore, to draw the supply or demand correspondence of an individual market participant
as well as the market’s aggregate supply correspondence or aggregate demand correspondence,
it is important to determine how supply and demand vary in accordance with price variations.
Specifically, for a particular buyer, the demand correspondence in price space is the locus
where demand varies as a result of changes in price. Formally:
(7)
{
P b | #Dub(P b) > 1
}
where # stands for “number”. That is, for buyer b, who has valuation ub, it is the set
of prices P b at which the demand correspondence in equation (1) varies. The depiction is
of economic interest as long as demand changes and, therefore, the requirement that the
number of demand correspondences is greater than one.
Similarly, for an individual seller, a supply correspondence in price space is defined as:
(8){P s | #Sus(P s) > 1}
Namely: for seller s and valuation us, it is the set of prices P s at which the supply
correspondence in equation (2) varies.
Note that the geometric structures just defined are anything but new to economics. For
example, in their exposition of the kind of preferences that imply the GS condition, Kelso
and Crawford (1982) (page 1501, figures 1 and 2) show demand correspondences in price
space when, respectively, preferences are subadditive and superadditive and there are only
two goods in the economy.11 Similarly, in an example shown in chapter 11 of Murota (2003)
(discussed later by Baldwin and Klemperer (2012, 2016)) similar structures are drawn to
analyze the conditions when a pricing equilibrium with indivisibility fails.
11Kelso and Crawford (1982) explain that, in a two-good economy, whenever preferences are subadditive,
the GS condition holds but it never does when preferences are superadditive. They also emphasize that if
there are more than two goods in the economy, subadditivity does not generally imply the GS condition.
238
What is new to the economics literature is the realization that such structures are much
more than several lines partitioning the price space according to valuations that result in
optimal demand or supply bundles. Indeed, both demand and supply correspondences are
tropical hypersurfaces (THs) associated with market participants’ valuations:
Definition 3.3 (Adapted from Baldwin and Klemperer (2016)) The tropical hypersurface
Tu associated with any valuation u is a weighted rational polyhedral complex such that:
1. Its underlying set is
{
P b | #Dub(P b) > 1
}
in the case of buyers and
{P s | #Sus(P s) > 1} in the case of sellers.
2. The weight wF of the facet F is the integer number defined by wF ·v = q′−q in which
bundles q,q′ are uniquely demanded at each side of the facet and form Unique Bundle
Regions (UBRs), and v is the primitive integer normal vector (i.e. a vector whose
greater common divisor is one) pointing from q′ to q.
The aforementioned definition contains terminology that can be best understood by way
of examples:
Example 3.4 (Demand-side correspondence for a buyer with binary domain) Let N =
{A,B} be the set of commodities in the PME and consider a buyer b with the binary domain
of example 2.4, i.e. Ab = {(0, 0), (3, 0), (0, 3), (3, 3)}. Suppose that this buyer’s valuation
function is: ub(0, 0) = ub(3, 3) = 0;ub(0, 3) = 9;ub(3, 0) = 12.
Figure 8 shows the demand correspondence in price space for this buyer, which has the
structure of a TH associated to the buyer’s valuation. Specifically, note that there are three
facets (solid red lines) dividing the price space and at each side of the facet there are three
distinct UBRs: one corresponding to the (0, 0) bundle, another for the (3, 0) bundle and
another one for the (0, 3) bundle.12
12Strictly speaking, figure 8 is a demand correspondence restricted to prices in which the participant is
limited to buying. Indeed, with the specified valuation function, and given price vector P b = (−3,−4), the
participant would be indifferent about selling bundles (3, 0), (0, 3) and (3, 3). In practical applications, there
is nothing that prevents the buyer to exclude the (3, 3) bundle from its domain, if he does not wish to show
any valuation for it.
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Observe, for example, that whenever the difference between the price for commodity A
and commodity B equals one, the buyer is indifferent between bundles (3, 0) and (0, 3). Also,
whenever P b = (pbA > 4, p
b
B > 3), the buyer will optimally demand bundle (0, 0).
Standing at each of the UBRs, a simple calculation shows that the weight of all facets is
wF = 3. For example, using the same notation of definition 3.3, let q
′ = (0, 3),q = (3, 0)
and it follows that q′ − q = (−3, 3). Clearly, the integer wF satisfying wF · v = q′ − q
is wF = 3 and v = (−1, 1). Similar calculations show that the set of all primitive integer
vectors is (−1, 1), (1,−1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (−1, 0), (0,−1).
pbA
pbB
(0, 3)
(3, 0)
(0, 0)
1 4
3
Figure 8: Demand-side correspondence for a buyer with binary domain, example 3.4
Example 3.5 (Supply-side correspondence for a seller with binary domain)
As before, let N = {A,B} be the set of commodities in the PME and suppose that
the seller s also has the binary domain of example 2.4. Specifically, suppose that As =
{(0, 0), (3, 0), (0, 3), (3, 3)} and that the seller’s valuation function is: us(0, 0) = 0;us(0, 3) =
−6;us(3, 0) = −3;us(3, 3) = −60.
Figure 9 shows the supply correspondence in price space for this seller. Its TH has
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Figure 9: Supply-side correspondence for a seller with binary domain, example 3.5
three facets (solid blue lines) dividing the price space and at each side of a facet there are
three different UBRs: one for the (0, 3) bundle, another for the (3, 0) and one for the (0, 0)
bundle.13
Note that, for instance, if the price vector P s = (psA < 1, p
s
B < 2) the buyer will optimally
supply the bundle (0, 0) and whenever psA − psB < 1, the seller is indifferent between offering
bundle (0, 3) and bundle (3, 0).
A simple calculation shows that the weight of all facets in this example is wF = 3, as in
example 3.4. For example, using the same notation of definition 3.3, let q′ = (3, 0),q = (0, 0)
and thus q′ − q = (3, 0). Clearly, the integer wF satisfying wF · v = q′ − q is wF = 3 and
v = (1, 0). Similar calculations show that the set of all primitive integer vectors for this
example is (−1, 1), (1,−1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (−1, 0), (0,−1).
Besides the possibility to represent an individual participant’s demand and supply, an
13A comment similar to the one in footnote 12 applies: figure 9 is restricted to prices in which the supplier
has a trade-off between selling (0, 3), (3, 0) and (0, 0) but at price vector P s = (18, 19) the seller would be
indifferent between offering bundles (0, 3), (3, 0) and (3, 3). Likewise, there is nothing that prevents the seller
to exclude the (3, 3) bundle from its domain, if he does not wish to show any valuation for it.
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interesting feature of THs is that they “encode” all that is required to determine the kind of
preferences of a given market participant. That is, any TH is enough to describe the demand
type of a market participant’s valuation:
Definition 3.6 (Baldwin and Klemperer (2016)) A valuation is of demand type D if all the
primitive integer normal vectors to the facets of its associated TH lie in a set D of primitive
integer vectors in ZN , such that if v ∈ D then −v ∈ D.
As an illustration, consider the demand type D of examples 3.4 and 3.5. It fol-
lows immediately from definition 3.6 that the demand type of these is the set D =
{±(1, 0),±(0, 1),±(1,−1)}.
Armed with the concepts described so far, I state that the substitute concept relevant for
PMEs is what Baldwin and Klemperer (2016) have defined as Ordinary Substitutes (OS):
Definition 3.7 (Adapted from Baldwin and Klemperer (2016)) A valuation uj is Ordinary
Substitutes (OS) if:
• In the case of buyers: For any prices P b ≤ P˜ b in a UBR, Dub(P b) = {q} and
Dub(P˜
b) = {q˜} we have qn ≤ q˜n for all n such that p˜bn = pbn
• In the case of sellers: For any prices P s ≤ P˜ s in a UBR, Sus(P s) = {q} and
Sus(P˜
s) = {q˜} we have qn ≥ q˜n for all n such that p˜sn = psn
Note that, unlike definition 3.1, definition 3.7 focuses on demand and supply correspon-
dences composed of singletons, such that each one corresponds to a UBR. Furthermore, it
also ensures that the GS condition holds. In terms of demand types, the OS condition can
be easily described as follows:
Definition 3.8 (Baldwin and Klemperer (2012))14 A demand type D is Ordinary Substitutes
(OS) if it consists of vectors in ZN with at most one positive and at most one negative entry,
and all others are zero.
14Proposition 3.3 in Baldwin and Klemperer (2016) also gives a proof of this fact.
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Furthermore, note that the SS valuation type is a special case of the OS valuation type:
Definition 3.9 (Baldwin and Klemperer (2012)) A demand type D is Strong Substitutes
(SS) if it consists of vectors in ZN with at most one +1 and at most one −1 entry, and all
others are zero.
From definition 3.9, it follows that the valuations of examples 3.4 and 3.4 are of the SS
demand type.
The following two propositions, which complete the minimum set of results required to
analyze substitutable preferences, allow extending the results presented so far to an aggregate
set of valuations. First, the sum of individual demands over the set of all buyers, and the
set of individual supplies over the set of sellers, results in aggregate demand and aggregate
supply:
Proposition 3.10 Given buyers’ aggregate valuation UB, aggregate demand DUB(P )
is the sum of individual demands over the set of buyers B, DUB(P ) =
∑
b∈B
Dub(P
b)
Likewise, given sellers’ aggregate valuation US , aggregate supply SUS (P ) is the sum of
individual demands over the set of sellers S, SUS (P ) =
∑
s∈S
Sus(P
s)
Proof See the appendix, section A.1.2.
While there is nothing surprising about Proposition 3.10, it is relevant because a simple
superimposition of individual participants’ THs results in an aggregate TH. That is, an
aggregate demand or supply correspondence in price space also has the structure of a TH.
In consequence, demand types are preserved under aggregation:
Proposition 3.11 (Adapted from Baldwin and Klemperer (2016)) Valuations uj are of de-
mand type D for all j ∈ J if and only if the aggregate TH (TU) is of demand type D.
As hinted in the introductory discussion about PMAs and PMEs in section 2 of the paper,
the SS demand type is equivalent to what Milgrom and Strulovici (2009) have defined as
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strong substitutes valuation because it satisfies their “binary substitutes” property. Similarly,
the OS demand type corresponds to their weak substitute valuation, as it satisfies their
“multi-unit substitutes property” 15.
The following example illustrates how can tropical geometry be employed to analyze
substitutable preferences in an aggregate setting:
Example 3.12 16 Consider, as in the earlier examples, a set of commodities N = {A,B}.
Let the set of buyers be B = {b1, b2} and the set of sellers be S = {s1, s2} and suppose all
participants have multi-unit valuation domains and are restricted to expressing OS prefer-
ences.
Focusing on the demand side of the market:
• Buyer b1’s domain is Ab1 = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 2)} and has valuation function: ub1(0, 0) =
0;ub1(1, 0) = 6;ub1(0, 2) = 8. His TH is depicted in figure 10 and has demand type
Db1 = {±(1,−2),±(1, 0),±(0, 1)}, and so is of the OS demand type. All the facet
weights are wF = 1, except for the facet between (0, 0) and (0, 2) which has a weight of
wF = 2.
• Buyer b2’s domain is Ab2 = {(0, 0), (3, 0), (0, 2)} and has valuation function: ub2(0, 0) =
0;ub1(3, 0) = 9;ub1(0, 2) = 4. Figure 11 shows his TH which has demand type Db2 =
{±(1, 0),±(0, 1),±(3,−2)}, which is of the OS type. The weight of the facets are:
wF = 3 for the one between (3, 0) and (0, 0), wF = 2 for the facets between (0, 0) and
(0, 2), and wF = 1 for the facets between (3, 0) and (0, 2).
• Now consider the aggregate TH (see figure 12) for the set of buyers B in the exam-
ple. It contains six UBRs, one for each aggregate bundle that can be uniquely de-
composed as a sum of demands. The demand type of the aggregate TH is: DB =
{±(1,−2),±(3,−2),±(1, 0),±(0, 1)}, clearly an OS demand type.
15See definitions 3 and 4 (page 216) in Milgrom and Strulovici (2009)
16Further details about this example can be found in the Appendix, subsection A.3.3.
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(0, 2)
(0, 0)
6
4
Figure 10: Demand-side correspondence for buyer b1, example 3.12
pb2A
pb2B
(3, 0)
(0, 2)
(0, 0)
3
2
Figure 11: Demand-side correspondence for buyer b2, example 3.12
Focusing on the supply side of the market:
• Seller s1’s domain is As1 = {(0, 0), (4, 0), (0, 1)} and has valuation function::
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pBA
pBB
6
4
3
2
(0, 0)
+
(0, 0)
=
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
+
(0, 0)
=
(1, 0)
(1, 0)
+
(3, 0)
=
(4, 0)
(0, 2)
+
(0, 0)
=
(0, 2)
(0, 2)
+
(0, 2)
=
(0, 4)
(0, 2)
+
(3, 0)
=
(3, 2)
Figure 12: Aggregate demand-side correspondence for the set of buyers B, example 3.12
us1(0, 0) = 0;ub1(4, 0) = −8;ub1(0, 1) = −3. His TH is depicted in figure 13 and
has demand type Ds1 = {±(4,−1),±(1, 0),±(0, 1)}, and so is of the OS demand type.
All the facet weights are wF = 1, except for the facet between (0, 0) and (4, 0) which
has a weight of wF = 4.
• Seller s2’s domain is As2 = {(0, 0), (3, 0), (0, 6)} and has valuation function: us2(0, 0) =
0;ub1(3, 0) = −12;ub1(0, 6) = −18, His TH, shown in figure 14, has demand type
Ds2 = {±(−1, 2),±(1, 0),±(0, 1)}, and so is of the OS demand type. The facet weights
between bundles (0, 0), (3, 0), and between bundles (0, 6), (3, 0) are wF = 3, whereas
the facet weight between bundles (0, 0), (0, 6) is wF = 6.
• Now consider the aggregate TH for the set of sellers S in figure 15. Because of the way
in which individual THs intersect, there are five and not six UBRs in the aggregate
TH, one for each aggregate bundle. The demand type for the sellers’ TH is DS =
{±(−1, 2),±(4,−1),±(1, 0),±(0, 1)}
Finally, visual inspection can help to visually determine in which UBR can this PME
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ps1A
ps1B
(4, 0)
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
2
3
Figure 13: Suply-side correspondence for seller s1, example 3.12
ps2A
ps2B
(3, 0)
(0, 6)
(0, 0)
4
3
Figure 14: Suply-side correspondence for seller s2, example 3.12
clear. Note in figure 16, in which non-essential facets are erased, that this PME clears if
buyer b1 obtains bundle (1, 0) and buyer b2 buys (3, 0), while seller s1 sells (4, 0) and seller
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pSA
pSB
2
3
4
(0, 0)
+
(0, 0)
=
(0, 0)
(4, 0)
+
(0, 0)
=
(4, 0)
(4, 0)
+
(3, 0)
=
(7, 0)
(4, 0)
+
(0, 6)
=
(4, 6)
(0, 1)
+
(0, 6)
=
(0, 7)
Figure 15: Aggregate supply-side correspondence for the set of sellers S , example 3.12
s2 offers (0, 0), i.e. nothing. DLP6 in section 4 shows that this allocation is possible if the
price vector is P = (2.34, 2.54).
pJA
pJB
2.34
2.54
(4, 0)
+
(0, 0)
=
(4, 0)
(1, 0)
+
(3, 0)
=
(4, 0)
Figure 16: Market clearing in example 3.12
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4 Winner determination problem and pricing equilib-
ria in Product-Mix Exchanges
One of the advantages of formulating PMEs as combinatorial auctions is that a number of
existing results in the vast literature on this topic can be readily applied or simply modified
for the problem at hand. Tran and Yu (2015) proposed a weighted set packing formulation
for the winner determination problem in PMAs which I modify to account for multiple buyers
and multiple sellers.
The following integer program, in decision variables y(q, b), y(q, s), solves the clearing-
house’s problem stated in equation (5), which consists on ensuring an efficient allocation:
max
∑
b∈B
∑
q∈Ab
ub(q)y(q, b) +
∑
s∈S
∑
q∈As
us(q)y(q, s)
s.t.
∑
q∈Ab
y(q, b) = 1 ∀b ∈ B
∑
q∈As
y(q, s) = 1 ∀s ∈ S
∑
b∈B
∑
q∈Ab
y(q, b)q−
∑
s∈S
∑
q∈As
y(q, s)q = 0 ∀n ∈ N
y(q, b), y(q, s) ∈ {0, 1}
(9)
If the decision variable y(q, b) = 1, the clearinghouse sells bundle q ∈ Ab to buyer b, and
refer to the bundle in question as qb∗. Likewise, if y(q, s) = 1 the clearinghouse buys bundle
q ∈ As from seller s, and write qs∗. As noted in section 2.2, in these cases we refer generally
to qb∗,q
s
∗ as the efficient allocations to buyers and sellers. The summation of allocations to
buyers over the set B minus the summation of allocations to sellers over the set S equals
the efficient aggregate bundle q∗, as equation (6) shows. Else, if the bundles are not part of
the efficient allocation, y(q, b) = 0, y(q, s) = 0.
The first constraint in (9) restricts each buyer to be allocated exactly one bundle of
goods, while the second constraint ensures the same condition for each seller. The third
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constraint imposes that for each commodity traded in the exchange, total supply must equal
total demand and, therefore, its right-hand side equals zero. This formulation is sufficiently
general to account for all versions of PMEs.
Also, the model in (9) is closely related to the models in Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002,
2006) and can be considered as an extension of their work into the multi-unit combinatorial
auction framework, which is described, for example, by De Vries and Vohra (2003) and
Leyton-Brown et al. (2000). A relevant innovation in the work of Bikhchandani and Ostroy
is that, following the theory of personalized trading developed by Makowski (1979), they
introduce the notion of non-linear and non-anonymous pricing in a competitive setting.
Accordingly, I adopt their definition of pricing equilibrium:
Definition 4.1 (Pricing equilibrium, adapted from Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2006)) A
pricing equilibrium is (q∗, P∗) if:
• Each buyer b ∈ B maximizes utility and obtains pib = maxq∈Ab
{
ub(q)− P b · q}
• Each seller s ∈ S maximizes profit and obtains pis = maxq∈As {P s · q + us(q)}
• The market clears: q∗ ∈
{∑
b∈B
Dub(P
b
∗ )−
∑
s∈S
Sus(P
s
∗ ) = 0
}
Note that this definition is more general than Walrasian equilibrium, which holds when
the pricing rule is linear and anonymous:
Definition 4.2 (Walrasian equilibrium, adapted from Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2006)) A
pricing equilibrium (q∗, P∗) is Walrasian if P∗ = p∗ ∀j ∈ J
Unlike Bikhchandani and Ostroy, recent work on PMAs emphasizes the geometric nature
of equilibrium with indivisibilities, based on the duality between quantity space and price
space explained in section 3. Therefore, the following definition - which does not collide
with pricing equilibria - is also relevant for the study of PMEs when the traded goods are
indivisible:
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Definition 4.3 (Equilibrium with indivisibility, adapted from Tran and Yu (2015)) A set of
agents J with valuations {uj} has competitive equilibrium at aggregate bundle q∗ ∈ conv(A)∩
ZN (read conv(A) as the convex hull of aggregate domain A) if there exists a price P∗ ∈ RN
such that q∗ ∈
{∑
b∈B
Dub(P
b
∗ )−
∑
s∈S
Sus(P
s
∗ ) = 0
}
There are two interesting aspects of this definition. The first one refers to the fact that
the aggregate bundle at which equilibrium exists is in the convex hull of A. More than
just another geometric condition, this is in accordance with the notion of pseudo-equilibrium
introduced by Milgrom and Strulovici (2009) which is relevant in auctions, e.g. ascending,
where sellers are willing to adjust their supply to obtain prices that support the efficient
allocation. The second interesting feature is that, although in their work, Tran and Yu
(2015) assume a linear pricing rule to obtain the prices that support the outcome q∗, a
discriminatory pricing rule also serves the purpose, as I show in section 5.
As in the original PMA, PMEs are also applicable when the goods are divisible. The cor-
responding definition of equilibrium is less restrictive than its counterpart for the indivisible
case.
Definition 4.4 (Equilibrium with divisibility) A set of agents J with valuations {uj} has
competitive equilibrium at aggregate bundle q∗ ∈ A if there exists a price P∗ ∈ RN such that
q∗ ∈ {DU(P∗)− SU(P∗) = 0}
The conditions under which linear programming relaxations to integer programs yield
integer solutions has received considerable attention over the course of decades. Specifically,
with respect to (9), Tran and Yu (2015) proved that a competitive equilibrium with indi-
visibility exists at the (aggregate) seller-supplied bundle if and only if the optimum of the
linear programming relaxation and that of the integer program coincide. Note that in the
case of the PME formulation, the aggregate allocation corresponds to the zero bundle in
the aggregate domain. For simplicity, in the remainder of the paper, I refer to the Linear
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Programming (LP) relaxation of integer program (9) as LP6, which is the same model as
(9) replaced with the conditions that y(q, b), y(q, s) ≥ 0).
Knowing that it is possible to drop the integrality constraint in (9) and use LP6 instead
is important for applications. First, there are situations in which the computational cost
can become a burden, and this becomes more manageable if it is possible to solve LP6 and
still be able to find an allocation with indivisibilities. On the other hand, being able to
compute the dual of the relaxed program allows for the application of linear programming
duality theory which, inter alia, permits estimating the supporting prices of an allocation
when goods are indivisible or not. Consider thus the dual to the relaxation of (9), to which
I refer to as DLP6 in the remainder of the paper:
min
∑
b∈B
pib +
∑
s∈S
pis
s.t. pib + P b · q ≥ ub(q) ∀b ∈ B,q
pis − P s · q ≥ us(q) ∀s ∈ S ,q
pib, pis, P b, P s unrestricted
(10)
The decision variables in DLP6, i.e. in (10), are the dual profit function of each buyer pib,
each seller pis and the prices paid by buyers P b and to sellers P s for each for each valuation
ub(q), us(q) reported to the exchange. The solutions to this linear program yield the pricing
equilibria of definition (4.1).
4.1 The indivisible goods case
Rather than asking if it is possible to obtain an efficient allocation with indivisible goods
with the model in (9) or with its linear programming relaxation, a question of greater eco-
nomic interest relates to the conditions under which participants’ valuations result in an
equilibrium with indivisibility. The following theorem gives an answer:
Theorem 4.5 (Danilov et al. (2001), Baldwin and Klemperer (2016),Tran and Yu (2015))
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The set D is unimodular if and only if every collection of concave utility functions
{uj | ∀j ∈ J } of demand type D has a competitive equilibrium (with indivisibility).
Tran and Yu (2015) give an alternative proof of this theorem and illustrate its geomet-
ric implications. Although not new, their result is relevant because they were the first to
establish a connection between the theorem and linear programming, which makes it more
amenable to applications. In this subsection, I restate their model, give an economic in-
terpretation to it and prove an ancillary result: a linear programming approach to test the
unimodularity of a set of valuations.17
In their paper, Baldwin and Klemperer (2016) refer to the longest-standing definition
of unimodularity: a set of linearly independent vectors with which a nonsingular, integral
matrix with determinant ±1 can be constructed. To check if a set of valuations has the
property, they suggest constructing square matrices with the primitive integer vectors in a
demand type D and then calculate the determinants, something that can be readily done
in most cases. However, in practical applications where the number of dimensions and the
number of participants increases or the geometric intuition is not immediately evident, the
process can easily become cumbersome.
Moreover, the concept of unimodularity can be generalized to not necessarily nonsingular
matrices, as the following definitions in increasing order of generality show:
Definition 4.6 (Unimodular matrices, Schrijver (1998)) A matrix V is unimodular if:
1. It is integral, square and has determinant ±1
2. It is integral, has dimension M ×N , full row rank and each of its nonsingular subma-
trices of order M has determinant ±1
3. It is integral, has rank R, and for each submatrix of rank R the greatest common divisor
of its subdeterminants is 1.
17The work by Tran and Yu (2015) is aimed at mathematicians. In their abstract, they claim that “We
introduce auction theory for a mathematical audience . . . ”. My contribution is to present the same result
to an economics audience.
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By definition, a TH is a polyhedral complex: a collection of polyhedra called cells satisfy-
ing certain conditions.18 Therefore, assuming that participants in an exchange have revealed
their valuations together with their preferred bundles of goods, it is possible for the clearing-
house (or a single seller) to precisely define the prices at which participants prefer one bundle
over another. This can be represented with a simple inequality description, i.e. finitely many
half-spaces that upon intersection form a polyhedron containing the prices at which a given
allocation is feasible. Given a fixed bundle of goods, it is then straightforward to write it as
a linear function of the prices and maximize it over the polyhedron. This, clearly, amounts
to maximizing the revenue of the clearinghouse (or seller), a distinct objective to the one in
(5) or (9).
Specifically, for each buyer b ∈ B and bundles q,q′ ∈ Ab such that each bundle constitutes
a unique demand region, write:
ub(q)− P bq ≥ ub(q′)− P bq′
So, at prices P b the buyer weakly prefers bundle q over bundle q′ and the inequality can
be re-written as:
P b · (q− q′) ≤ ub(q)− ub(q′) (11)
Likewise, for sellers s ∈ S participating in the exchange and bundles q,q′ ∈ As at two
sides of a facet, write:
P s · q + us(q) ≥ P s · q′ + us(q′)
Equivalently:
18The reader is referred to A.1.1 for a definition of a polyhedral complex but, more generally, I suggest
reading Maclagan and Sturmfels (2015) for an introduction to the topic of Tropical Geometry.
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P s · (q′ − q) ≤ us(q)− us(q′) (12)
Note that (q− q′) in the left hand side of inequality (11) and (q′ − q) in inequality (12)
can be written as the product of the weight of a facet times a primitive integer vector. For
example, (q − q′) = wF · v, where wF is the weight of a facet and v is a primitive integer
vector. Not only is this the essential information required to determine the prices at which a
participant wishes to cross a facet but, when several inequalities like the ones just described
are included, they encode the demand type D of a valuation.
By the same principle, given that the union of individual THs results in an aggregate TH,
it is also possible to construct a cell describing the prices required for an aggregate bundle to
be feasible. That is, for a set of buyers, and assuming a linear price p, aggregate valuation
U and bundles q =
∑
b∈B
Dub(p) and q
′ =
∑
b∈B
Dub(p) in the aggregate domain A, it is possible
to write:
p · (q− q′) ≤ U(q)− U(q′) (13)
Similarly, for a set of sellers and bundles q =
∑
s∈S
Sus(p) and q
′ =
∑
s∈S
Sus(p) in A:
p · (q′ − q) ≤ U(q)− U(q′) (14)
More generally, suppose that there are M such inequalities - one for each facet - and let
V be a M×N constraint matrix, where each row is composed of (q−q′) in the case of buyers
and (q′ − q) in the case of sellers. Define a M -dimensional column vector u containing the
right hand sides of the inequalities just described, e.g. U(q′)− U(q). Fix a bundle, say q∗,
and write the following linear program in decision variable P∗:
max P ∗q∗
s.t. VP∗ ≤ u
(15)
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Which has the following dual:
min uᵀx
s.t. Vᵀx = q∗, x ≥ 0
(16)
Clearly, when goods are indivisible, V is an integral matrix and even if they are not,
bundles are usually formed by integers. Therefore, the following lemma can be applied:
Lemma 4.7 (Schrijver, 1998) Let A be an integral matrix. Then Aᵀ is unimodular if and
only if both sides of the linear programming duality equation
max {cx|Ax ≤ b} = min {yb|y ≥ 0; yA = c}
are attained by integral vectors x and y, for all integral vectors b,c (where y, c are row
vectors and x, b are column vectors.
As defined, V corresponds to facets of a TH in price space and Vᵀ corresponds to vertices
of an Subdivided Newton Polytope cell defined in quantity space.19 By linear programming
duality, it is also possible to define the vertices of an SNP cell as in Vᵀ and obtain the facets
of a TH. Furthermore, by focusing on concave valuations, it can be assured that no bundle
is “hidden” between facets in the TH or in a SNP cell. Or, in geometric terms, by focusing
on concave valuations, it is possible to ensure that any given bundle is a marked point of the
SNP cell. All of this in accordance with the theory developed by Baldwin and Klemperer
(2016). 20
The result is summarized in the following:
Proposition 4.8 A set of concave valuations {uj} that can be described in price space by
a matrix V is unimodular if and only if the linear programming duality equation holds with
integral vectors P ∗, x,u,q∗:
19An SNP is also a polyhedral complex, dual to a TH.
20The example in subsection A.4 of the Appendix shows duality between the TH and an SNP.
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max {P∗q∗|VP∗ ≤ u} = min {uᵀx|Vᵀx = q∗ ≥ 0;x ≥ 0}
Proof A simple application of lemma 4.7
The linear programs in (15) and (16) have a clear economic interpretation. For a given
bundle of goods, the primal solves revenue maximization for a clearinghouse (or seller) and
the dual solves the optimal allocation of bundles among participants. The rows of V can
be interpreted as the “effectiveness” coefficient described by Milgrom (2009): a substitution
rate among commodities in an exchange. In theorem 4, he claims that if the constraints
that describe the substitution rate among commodities fail to have a “tree”structure, sub-
stitutability among goods fails. The unimodularity condition is clearly simpler to verify.
Furthermore, linear programming model (15) relates to existing results on dominant
strategy incentive compatibility (Vohra, 2011). Although not interpreted here in this way
- as I have not introduced a set of types - the model responds the important question of
how to compensate different types of agents participating in a direct revelation mechanism,
such that it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to reveal their type. The dual in
(16) is precisely the problem of finding an all-pairs shortest path, the key to proving that a
mechanism is incentive compatible as in Rochet (1987).21
4.2 The divisible good case
When goods are divisible, the requirements for the existence of equilibrium are consid-
erably less restrictive than the indivisible goods case. A simple computation of LP6 will
ensure an efficient allocation and supporting prices can be computed with DLP6. Further-
more, Milgrom and Strulovici (2009) have proven that whenever goods are weak substitutes
(a condition equivalent to the OS condition), Walrasian equilibria exist, the Vickrey outcome
is in the core and submodularity of dual profit functions is ensured.
21All of these are avenues for future research.
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5 Efficiency, the core and Vickrey Clarke Groves pay-
ments in Product-Mix Exchanges
In the previous section I discussed the winner determination problem and the conditions
under which pricing equilibria are guaranteed to exist in PMEs. As noted earlier, the goal of
the clearinghouse is ensuring an efficient allocation: that buyers who value bundles the most
trade with sellers who offer them at the lowest cost. Thus, gains from trade are maximized
for all participants.
When goods are indivisible, by theorem (4.5), LP6 is guaranteed to have an integral so-
lution. If goods are divisible, an integer solution is not required, and LP6 always determines
the efficient aggregate bundle q∗. Furthermore, regardless of the substitutability concept im-
posed on participants’ preferences - SS or OS - LP6 determines the efficient aggregate bundle.
In all variants of a PME, DLP6 allows calculating supporting prices for the allocation. The
following proves that every pricing equilibrium in a PME is efficient:
Proposition 5.1 All pricing equilibria (q∗, P∗), where q∗ is obtained from LP6 and prices
P∗ are obtained from DLP6, are efficient for all variants of a PME.
Note that Proposition 5.1 applies to non-anonymous, non-linear prices and to Walrasian
prices, which are anonymous and linear.
To deepen the discussion, I associate a coalitional game with transferable payoff to the
winner determination problem of PMEs and to this end I introduce additional notation.
The set of players is the set J of market participants and the characteristic function of the
game is V , which coincides with the gains from trading in a PME. In particular, let V (J )
be equal to the optimal value of the objective function of LP6 (see the model in (9)) when
all market participants are included which, by LP duality, equals to the optimal objective
function value of DLP6. That is, V (J ) are the maximum possible gains from trade in a PME:
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V (J ) = max
∑
b∈B
∑
q∈Ab
ub(q)y(q, b) +
∑
s∈S
∑
q∈As
us(q)y(q, s)
= min
∑
b∈B
pib +
∑
s∈S
pis
Furthermore, let C be a coalition of market participants, such that C ⊆ J . Define
CB = {B ∩ C} and CS = {S ∩ C} as, respectively, the set of buyers and sellers in the
coalition C.
It follows that V (C) are the gains from trade in a PME, when only the members of a
coalition trade among themselves:
V (C) = max
∑
b∈CB
∑
q∈Ab
ub(q)y(q, b) +
∑
s∈CS
∑
q∈As
us(q)y(q, s)
= min
∑
b∈CB
pib +
∑
s∈CS
pis
The following are the assumptions of the coalitional game:
1. If no buyers or no sellers participate, i.e. if CB = ∅ or CS = ∅, the coalition produces
no value, i.e. V (C) = 0
2. If C1, C2 are any two coalitions such that C1 ⊂ C2, then V (C1) ≤ V (C2)
3. V is superadditive, i.e., if C1 ∩ C2 = ∅ then V (C1) + V (C2) ≤ V (C1 ∪ C2)
Let pib, pis be the payoffs (i.e. imputations) to buyers and sellers, respectively. A set of
payoffs
{
pib, pis
}
is in the core of the game, denoted as core(J , V ), if:
(17a)
∑
b ∈CB
pib +
∑
s ∈CS
pis ≥ V (C), ∀C ⊆ J
(17b)
∑
b ∈B
pib +
∑
s ∈S
pis = V (J )
The first requirement states that every coalition of market participants should obtain at
least as much as V (C). That is, a set of payoffs {pib, pis} is in the core if no coalition of
participants in a PME can deviate to obtain a better outcome for all its members.
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Proposition 5.2 All pricing equilibria (q∗, P∗) of PMEs, where q∗ is obtained from LP6
and prices P∗ are obtained from DLP6, lead to payoffs that are in the core, i.e.
{
pib, pis
} ∈
core(J , V ).
It is convenient at this stage to introduce the marginal product of each market participant
j ∈ J , which is its contribution to V (J ). To this end, note that the dual variables corre-
sponding to the first (buyers’) and second (sellers’) constraint in LP7, namely pib, pis have,
respectively, V (J )− V (J \b) and V (J )− V (J \s) as upper bounds. Thus, the following:
Proposition 5.3 Let the pair
{
pib∗, pi
s
∗
}
be part of the optimal solution to DLP6. Then the
buyers’ payoffs are pib∗ ≤ V (J )− V (J \b) while the sellers’ are pis∗ ≤ V (J )− V (J \s)
It is also possible to derive the expressions for the participants’ marginal product from the
definition of the core, (17a - 17b). For buyers, consider a coalition that excludes a particular
buyer, say b′, such that C = {J \b′}:∑
b ∈(CB\b′)
pib +
∑
s∈CS
pis ≥ V (J \b′)∑
b∈B
pib +
∑
s∈S
pis = V (J )
Negating the first expression and adding it to the second yields:∑
b∈B
pib −
∑
b∈(CB\b′)
pib
+(∑
s∈S
pis −
∑
s∈CS
pis
)
≤ V (J )− V (J \b′)
Similarly, for sellers define a coalition that excludes a seller s′: C = {J \s′}, such that:∑
b ∈CB
pib +
∑
s ∈(CS\s′)
pis ≥ V (J \s′)∑
b∈B
pib +
∑
s∈S
pis = V (J )
As before, negating the first expression and adding it to the second results in:(∑
b∈B
pib −
∑
b∈CB
pib
)
+
∑
s∈S
pis −
∑
s∈(CS\s′)
pis
 ≤ V (J )− V (J \s′)
In summary:
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Definition 5.4 The marginal product for buyer b is:
V (J )− V (J \b)
The marginal product for seller s is:
V (J )− V (J \s)
Note that V (J \b), V (J \s) requires the solution of linear programs that, respectively,
exclude a buyer b and a seller s. Therefore, to obtain the marginal values of all participants
J of a PME, the clearinghouse must solve (B +S) + 1 optimization problems, where B +S
is the total number of participants in a PME (Bikhchandani et al., 2002).
However, a key question relates to the conditions under which all market participants
simultaneously obtain payoffs equal to their marginal product. Specifically, I am interested
in defining the conditions under which participants of a PME are able to trade with Vickrey
Clarke Groves (VCG) payments as supporting prices of the efficient allocation (Vickrey
(1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)).
The VCG payment P bV CG that a buyer b pays for an efficient allocation q
b
∗ is the one
that ensures that the buyer obtains its marginal product:
pib∗ = u
b(qb∗)− P bV CG = V (J )− V (J \b)
where P b∗q
b
∗ is substituted for P
b
V CG in the corresponding (buyers’) constraint of DLP6.
Noting that V (J ) = ub(qb∗) +
∑
j∈(J \b)
uj(qj∗) leads to the following expression:
(18)P bV CG = V (J \b) −
∑
j∈(J \b)
uj(qj∗)
The VCG payment P sV CG that is payed to a seller s for an efficient allocation q
b
∗ is derived
in a symmetric way:
pis∗ = P
s
V CG + u
s(qs∗) = V (J )− V (J \s)
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where P s∗q
s
∗ is substituted for P
s
V CG in the corresponding (i.e. sellers’) constraint of DLP6.
Because V (J ) = us(qs∗) +
∑
j∈(J \s)
uj(qj∗), it follows that:
(19)P sV CG =
∑
j ∈(J \s)
uj(qj∗)− V (J \s)
Note that VCG payments are always non-anonymous and non-linear, which amounts to
introducing price discrimination among participants of a PME. Furthermore, the payments
in (18) and (19) do not depend on the seller’s or buyer’s own valuation, implying that these
cannot be manipulated by a single participant. It is well known that the VCG mechanism
produces an outcome that is individually rational, as every participant obtains its marginal
product as payoff, and truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy. The same holds for
PMEs with VCG payments:
Proposition 5.5 Truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy in PMEs with VCG pay-
ments.
A well-known condition for the existence of VCG payments in the core of the coali-
tional game associated to the auction dates back to Shapley (1962) and has been further
investigated byBikhchandani and Ostroy (2002, 2006), Bikhchandani et al. (2002) and Vohra
(2011), among others. Usually termed as the “Agents are Substitutes Condition” or “Bidders
are Substitutes Condition”, it has typically been stated for single seller environments. The
condition conveys the intuition that a coalition of agents can benefit more by cooperating
than by acting individually. For example, a union of workers can obtain better terms via
collective bargaining than by negotiating individually with a firm. In accordance with this
condition, I define the Participants Are Substitutes condition (PSC), which applies to the
multiple-buyer and multiple-seller environment of PMEs:
Definition 5.6 The PSC holds if for any coalition of participants C ⊆ J ,
V (J )− V (J \C) ≥
∑
j∈C
[V (J )− V (J \j)]
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That is, the marginal product of the coalition C is at least as large as the sum of the
marginal products of all of its members. Note that this applies equally to buyers and sellers.
Proposition 5.7 In a PME with VCG payments: if the PSC holds, then there is a point
in the core of the associated coalitional game such that all participants simultaneously obtain
their marginal products. That is, a pair of payoffs
{
pib∗, pi
s
∗
} ∈ core(J , V ) such that pib∗ =
V (J )− V (J \b) for all b ∈ B and pis∗ = V (J )− V (J \s) for all s ∈ S.
The result is relevant because the PSC is implied by the GS condition, and a number of
proofs exist in the literature:
Lemma 5.8 (Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Bikhchandani et al. (2002), Vohra (2011)) If
the value function of each participant satisfies the GS condition, then PSC holds
This implies that it is always possible to implement PMEs with VCG payments. However
possible, this comes at a possibly non-negligible computational cost.
6 An application of Product-Mix Exchanges: Delta
Energy Markets
This section contains an example application of PMEs. Specifically, it shows one of
the possible ways in which the capabilities of PMEs can be utilized to create a potential
marketplace for flexibility services based on the FlexOffer systems information concept.22
The following is a simplified description in “Q&A” (Question & Answer) format of a
Delta Energy marketplace (see figure 17):
1. What is the traded product? The traded product is Delta Energy, which is the available
energy contained in a Flex-Offer, relative to a baseline assignment, determined by its
22The problem of designing power system flexibility-enabling products based on this concept is discussed
by Bosca´n (2016).
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Figure 17: A Delta Energy marketplace. Source: TotalFlex internal documents
issuer. In the simplest possible terms, a Flex-Offer is a load profile23 associated to the
operation of a device in the power system (e.g. electric vehicles, heat pumps), which
describes the time and quantity flexibility with which it can operate. Figure 18 shows
an instance of a Flex-Offer, which contains quantity flexibility only but no flexibility
in the time dimension. The yellow line indicates a baseline assignment for this Flex-
Offer and the red and blue portions of the drawing, which respectively correspond
to positive and negative flexibility, are the Delta Energy contained in the Flex-Offer.
More generally, and for the purpose of this section, it suffices to say that the traded
product is the deviation in energy consumption relative to a reference plan of operation
of a device in the power system. To achieve a sufficiently large scale, the Delta Energy
contained in several Flex-Offers are aggregated and are then offered in the marketplace.
Furthermore, because the product is measured in units of energy (say kWh), it clearly
is indivisible in nature and I assume this is the case.24
2. Who buys the product? Buyers of flexibility in a marketplace can be Distribution Sys-
tem Operators (DSOs), Transmission System Operators (TSOs) who are final users of
23A load profile is a graph that depicts load in the abscissa (measured in kW, for example) versus time
in the ordinate
24For technical reasons, it may be necessary to restrict this assumption.
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flexibility or Balancing Responsible Parties (BRPs), who trade for portfolio optimiza-
tion purposes 25
3. Who sells the product? Large-scale suppliers of flexibility (such as industrial con-
sumers) may access the market directly, together with aggregators who act as inter-
mediaries between small-scale suppliers and the marketplace.
Figure 18: A Flex-Offer with quantity flexibility only. Source: TotalFlex internal documents
In the exposition, I focus on two specific products, namely quantity flexibility and time
shifting. To this end, let the set of commodities in the PME be N = {“Now”, “Later”},
i.e. there are two periods and these are the commodities of the PME. That is, the set J
of market participants buy and sell units of Delta Energy and place bids for “Now” and for
“Later”26. Note that this simplified, two-period framework can be easily extended to several
periods. Furthermore, in what follows, I assume that the set S has S = 10 sellers and that
the set B has B = 10 buyers.
In addition, suppose that each market participant has a domain composed of only three
bundles, namely 0,q and q′ :
Aj = {0,q,q′} , for all j ∈ J
25For further details on who buys, who sells power system flexibility and their motives, the reader is
referred to Bosca´n (2016) Bosca´n and Poudineh (2016).
26Using the Flex-Offer terminology, I assume here that Flex-Offers like the one shown in figure 18, which
contain quantity flexibility only and no time flexibility, are mapped into the bids of this example.
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where 0 = (0, 0), q = (Now, 0), q′ = (0, Later) and that the domain is binary, meaning
that there is a quantity of energy K such that Now = Later = K. In other words, the clear-
inghouse imposes SS preferences and bidders are restricted to buying or selling an amount
of energy K. Thus, the clearinghouse will optimally decide if a participant obtains a bid
containing “Now” or containing “Later”. This follows from the fact that in PMEs at most
one bundle can be allocated to each market participant.
6.1 Quantity flexibility
How can the described framework accommodate offers to increase consumption and offers
to decrease consumption relative to a specified baseline assignment? In other words: how can
the described framework accommodate quantity flexibility, given that the set of commodities
in the PME refers to the time dimension?
One simple and logical approach, which I follow here, is to map the “positive flex” of
figure 18, which is an increase in consumption relative to the baseline, to an offer to buy
Delta Energy. Symmetrically, the “negative flex” of 18, which is a decrease in consumption
relative to the baseline, can be mapped to an offer to sell energy.27
Because each participant can restrict its bid to only one of the available commodities,
i.e. to one of the periods, buyers and sellers of Delta Energy can offer quantity flexibility for
one period only. For buyers, this is achieved by specifying a valuation equal to zero for the
bundle that it does not. So, for example, a buyer willing to increase consumption relative
to the baseline “Now” will submit a positive valuation for bundle q, i.e. ub(q) 6= 0 and a
valuation of zero for bundle q′, i.e. ub(q′) = 0.
For sellers, a converse approach can be applied. Suppose that a seller wishes to offer
Delta Energy in only one of the periods: this can be done by specifying an arbitrarily high
valuation for the bundle it does not want. For example, if the seller wishes to offer Delta
27Increasing energy consumption relative to a baseline is equivalent to increasing the quantity demanded,
thus it amounts to buying Delta Energy. Similarly, decreasing consumption relative to a baseline is equivalent
to reducing the quantity demanded or increasing production. Therefore, it amounts to selling Delta Energy.
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Energy “Now”, it will submit a negative valuation for bundle q, i.e. ub(q) ≤ 0 and an
arbitrarily low valuation for bundle q′, e.g. ub(q′) = −1000.28
Table 2 contains all demand-side bids. The first column indexes the bid by b, the second
is the valuation for bundle q, which contains an amount K of Delta Energy “Now” and 0
Delta Energy “Later”; the third column contains bids for bundle q′, containing an amount
of 0 Delta Energy “Now”and K units of Delta Energy “Later”; the fourth column contains
the quantity K, which is to be placed either “Now” or ”Later”. In this example, there are
624 units of Delta Energy being sold.
b ub(q) ub(q′) K
1 36 0 56
2 37 29 78
3 0 38 49
4 36 31 60
5 19 32 34
6 32 0 85
7 33 28 85
8 0 36 53
9 0 34 80
10 28 32 44
Total 624
Table 2: Demand-side bids in the Delta Energy Market example (quantity flexibility)
For example, the first bid (b = 1) shows no interest for “Later” and is an offer to buy
56 units of Delta Energy “Now”. Symmetrically, the eight bid (b = 8) shows no interest for
“Now” and is an offer to buy 53 units of energy “Later”. In contrast, the fourth bid (b = 4)
shows interest for either 60 units of Delta Energy “Now” or “Later”.
In a similar way to table 2, table 3 contains all supply-side bids. Note that bid s = 2
contains an arbitrarily high cost (i.e. low valuation) for Delta Energy “Now”, meaning that
the seller has interest for Delta Energy “Later” only. Bid s = 6 has an arbitrarily high cost
for Delta Energy “Later”, effectively showing interest for “Now” only. In contrast to both
28Recall from subsection 2.2 that sellers submit negative valuations, i.e., they report their cost to the
clearinghouse. A very low valuation is equivalent to a very high cost in this model.
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s = 2 and s = 6, s = 8 presents an actual trade-off to sell between both periods.
s us(q) us(q′) K
1 -19 -1900 40
2 -2700 -27 87
3 -28 -24 85
4 -23 -29 70
5 -2400 -24 35
6 -29 -2900 46
7 -30 -20 65
8 -26 -22 75
9 -22 -2200 86
10 -25 -32 35
Total 624
Table 3: Supply-side bids in the Delta Energy Market example (quantity flexibility)
The solution to the clearinghouse’s allocation problem is shown in tables 4 and 5, which
were calculated with LP6. Market-clearing prices, calculated with DLP6, are P∗ = (29, 32).
b qb∗ q
′b
∗ K
1 1 0 56
2 1 0 78
3 0 1 49
4 1 0 60
5 0 1 34
6 1 0 85
7 1 0 85
8 0 1 53
9 0 1 80
10 0 1 44
Total 624
Table 4: Efficient allocations (demand-side) in the Delta Energy Market example (quantity
flexibility)
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s qs∗ q
′s
∗ K
1 1 0 40
2 0 1 87
3 0.55 0.45 85
4 1 0 70
5 0 1 35
6 1 0 46
7 0 1 65
8 0.53 0.47 75
9 1 0 86
10 1 0 35
Total 624
Table 5: Efficient allocations (supply-side) in the Delta Energy Market example (quantity
flexibility)
6.2 Time shifting
Under the same assumptions as before, in which two commodities (“Now” and “Later”)
are traded in a PME, it is also possible to specify another flexibility-enabling product, which
originates from Flex-Offers, namely time-shifting.
With respect to the quantity flexibility example just discussed in subsection 6.1, the
main difference is that a participant buying or selling time shifting needs to secure that
he will obtain an opposite position in the other commodity, i.e. in the other period. This
requires “swap bidding”, one of the extensions mentioned by Klemperer (2010) in his initial
description of PMAs, which is now achieved under PMEs.
So, for example, a buyer of time shifting willing to buy energy “Now” will want to make
sure he is able to sell “Later”. Similarly, a seller willing to sell energy “Later” needs to
secure that he is buying “Now”. Furthermore, the only rational thing to do for a buyer or
seller is to buy at low prices and sell at high prices. In consequence, bidders require a price
difference and not a specific price for the time shifting product. Unlike before, this is a
case of complementarity between commodities (i.e. complementarity between time periods),
which can be expressed via substitutable preferences, a feature discussed by Milgrom (2009)
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29.
How to use the bidding language built into PMEs to deal with these kind of bids? The
numerical example that follows attempts to give an answer:
1. There are four demand-side bids in the market. Two of these (b = 1 and b = 2) are to
buy Delta Energy (see table 6). On the supply side (see table 7), there are also four
bids, where bids s = 1 and s = 2 are to sell Delta Energy. These bids for Delta Energy
are in the exact same way as described in subsection 6.1.
2. Consider the case of a market participant willing to time shift by buying “Now” and
selling “Later” for a price difference of 5.
3. Bid b = 3 is the demand side of a time shifting bid: an offer to buy 70 units of Delta
Energy at an arbitrarily high price, such that the price of “Later” is 5 units higher than
what it is “Now”. This bid will make sure that he buys “Now” if the price difference
is of at least 5. He will buy “Later” otherwise.
4. Note that this time shifting bid would be incomplete without the supply side of the
time shifting: the bidder that placed b = 3 needs to secure that he is able to sell
“Later”. Therefore, the clearinghouse must assume that he has already won (i.e. that
he is endowed) the right to sell 70 units “Later”. This corresponds to bid s = 3 on the
supply side of the market (see table 7). Note that this bid contains a valuation of zero
for bundle q′, i.e. the bundle that contains “Later”, and an arbitrarily high cost (i.e.
low valuation) for bundle q, i.e. the bundle that contains “Now”. In this way, “Later”
is always a winning bid and “Now” is always a losing bid.
5. By placing these bids, the time shifter makes sure that he ends up with nothing if the
29Milgrom (2009) states that “The ability to report swap bids makes the integer assignment exchange
applicable to some resource allocation problems involving complementary goods for which package exchange
mechanisms might have been thought necessary. This is, perhaps, surprising given that assignment messages
can directly only express substitutable preferences.” Recall from the discussion in section 2 that Milgrom’s
assignment exchanges are equivalent to PMEs.
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price difference is less than 5 and with the desired position (buy “Now”, sell “Later”)
if the price difference is of at least 5.
6. To complete the example, there is another market participant willing to shift by selling
“Later” and buying “Now”. He places a positive bid on the supply side of the market
(bid s = 4, table 7), i.e. instead of getting paid, the seller offers to pay. To secure the
opposite position he places an arbitrarily high bid on the demand side of the market
(bid b = 4, table 6), which ensures his right to buy “Now”.
7. Note that the bidder requires a price difference of at least 4 to time shift. And if he
doesn’t secure this price difference, his position cancels out.
8. According to DLP6, the PME clears at P∗ = (23, 29).
9. As a result, both time shifters in this example are able to secure their preferred positions
as can be verified in tables 7 and 8, which contain. Note that if the time shifters’
preferred price difference had not been as they wished, their positions would have
cancelled out completely.
b ub(q) ub(q′) K
1 26 34 80
2 22 29 60
3 (Time shifting) 120 125 70
4 (Endowment for bid s = 4) 1000 0 70
Total 280
Table 6: Demand-side bids in the Delta Energy Market example (time shifting)
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s us(q) us(q′) K
1 -19 -25 80
2 -17 -24 60
3 (Endowment for bid b = 3) -1000 0 70
4 (Time shifting) 8 4 60
Total 280
Table 7: Demand-side bids in the Delta Energy Market example (time shifting)
b qb∗ q
′b
∗ K
1 0 1 80
2 0 1 60
3 1 0 70
4 1 0 70
Total 280
Table 8: Efficient allocations (demand-side) in the Delta Energy Market example (time
shifting)
s qs∗ q
′s
∗ K
1 1 0 80
2 1 0 60
3 0 1 70
4 0 1 70
Total 280
Table 9: Efficient allocations (supply-side) in the Delta Energy Market example (time shift-
ing)
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7 Conclusions
This paper has developed extensions to PMAs, which were initially proposed by Klem-
perer (2010) in the context of the financial crisis as a solution to the BoE’s problem of
supplying liquidity to troubled banks in the UK. The extensions are generalized under the
encompassing term of “Product-Mix Exchanges” (PMEs) which share similarities with Mil-
grom (2009)’s model of assignment messages and exchanges, and the original formulation
proposed by Klemperer. Specifically, Klemperer (2010)’s formulation is a special case of the
PME studied in this paper.
However, Product-Mix Exchanges have an important difference relative to both PMAs
and Milgrom (2009)’s Assignment Messages and Exchanges. Specifically, PMEs are multi-
unit combinatorial auctions in which market participants report substitutable preferences over
bundles of goods, without having a fixed role. By formulating PMEs in this way, a wealth of
existing results in the combinatorial auction literature can be readily applied.
For example, the winner determination problem of PMEs, discussed in section 4, has
a remarkably simple structure, which allows estimating the efficient allocations under all
different variants of a PME, which result from the interaction of the substitutability con-
cept imposed on PMEs and the divisibility of the traded goods. When goods are divisible
or indivisible, strong substitutes or ordinary substitutes preferences are imposed on mar-
ket participant, a single linear program and its dual are enough to determine the efficient
allocation and the supporting prices. The main contribution of section 4, however, is not
the linear programming itself or the analysis of the conditions under which equilibrium with
indivisibility does not fail. Instead, the main contribution of that section is a simple, linear
programming approach that verifies if a set of concave valuations has or not an equilibrium
with indivisibility.
The incentive issues of PMEs, with a particular emphasis on efficiency, are the topic
of section 5. The key result of that section is that, due to the fact that PMEs rely on
substitutable preferences, the Vickrey Clarke Groves(VCG) outcome is always in the core
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of the associated coalitional game with transferrable utility considered in the section. Thus,
VCG payments - which ensure that each market participant obtains its marginal product as
payoff - can be straightforwardly computed with the aid of the linear programs presented in
section 4. Of course, the computation of VCG payments to support the allocation comes at
a computational cost, which may be non-negligible: (B + S) + 1 linear programs must be
computed (where B + S is the number of market participants in the PME).
However, being able to support the PME allocation with VCG payments is an important
result that facilitates the applicability of PMEs in contexts where efficiency is the main
goal of the clearinghouse. Not only is truthful bidding a weakly dominant strategy if VCG
payments are applied, but the possibility of avoiding manipulation of results when there are
market thickness concerns is important.
Finally, a concrete application of PMEs is shown in section 6, where the Delta Energy
market design is described. In this section, I show how relevant flexibility-enabling products,
such as quantity flexibility and time shifting can be accommodated into this framework.
One limitation of the approach presented in that section is, however, that the role of VCG
payments was not explored.
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A Appendix
A.1 Further details about results of section 3
A.1.1 Some notions of polyhedral geometry
The following concepts appear in Maclagan and Sturmfels (2015):
1. A polyhedron P ⊂ RN is the intersection of finitely many closed half spaces:
P = {x ∈ RN |Ax ≤ b}
2. A polyhedral complex is a collection Σ of polyhedra satisfying two conditions:
i. If the polyhedron P is in Σ, then so is any face of P . A “face” is what Baldwin
and Klemperer (2012, 2016) refer to as facets in the main text.
ii. If polyhedra P and Q lie in Σ, then their intersection P ∩Q is either empty or
a face of both P and Q
3. The polyhedra in polyhedral complex Σ are called the cells of Σ.
4. The support of a polyhedral complex is the set
{
x ∈ RN |x ∈ P ,P ∈ Σ}
A.1.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.10
1. To see the first claim, define the buyer’s aggregate utility at bundle x ∈ ∑
b∈B
Ab as:
UB(x) = max
{∑
b∈B
ub(qb)|qb ∈ Ab,x =
∑
b∈B
qb
}
The sum of individual demands is:
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∑
b ∈B
Dub(P
b) =
∑
b∈B
arg max
q∈Ab
{
ub(qb)− P bq}
= arg max
q∈Ab
{∑
b∈B
ub(qb)−
∑
b∈B
P bqb
}
The buyers’aggregate demand is:
DUB(P ) = arg max
x∈∑
b∈B
Ab
{
UB(x)− P · x}
= arg max
x∈∑
b∈B
Ab
{
max
{∑
b∈B
ub(qb)|qb ∈ Ab,x =
∑
b∈B
qb
}
− P · x
}
= arg max
qb∈Ab
{∑
b∈B
ub(qb)−
∑
b∈B
P bqb
}
2. Likewise, to see the second claim define seller’s aggregate utility at bundle x ∈ ∑
s∈S
As
as:
US(x) = max
{∑
s∈S
us(qs)|qs ∈ As,x =
∑
s∈S
qs
}
The sum of individual supplies is:
∑
s ∈S
Sus(P
s) =
∑
s∈S
arg max
q∈As
{
P sq− ub(qb)}
= arg max
q∈As
{∑
s∈S
P sqs −
∑
s∈S
us(qs)
}
The sellers’ aggregate supply is:
SUS (P ) = arg max
x∈∑
s∈S
As
{
P · x− US(x)}
= arg max
x∈∑
s∈S
As
{
P · x−max
{∑
b∈B
ub(qb)|qs ∈ As,x =
∑
s∈S
qs
}}
= arg max
qs∈As
{∑
s∈S
P sqs −
∑
s∈S
us(qs)
}
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A.2 Proofs of section 5
Proof of Proposition 5.1
First, consider the case when the commodities are indivisible. By theorem (4.5), if the
demand type D of a concave set of valuations is unimodular, LP6 is guaranteed to have an
integral solution and DLP6 can be obtained to determine supporting prices. Thus, whenever
each market participant has SS valuations, there will always be an integral allocation. But
if valuations are OS, unimodularity may fail (see Theorem 3.5.11 in Baldwin and Klemperer
(2012)) but if does not, an integral solution is guaranteed to exist.
Let {y(q, b), y(q, s)|∀b ∈ B,∀s ∈ S} be an optimal solution to LP6, i.e. a set of zeroes
and ones that determine the efficient allocations to buyers and sellers, qb∗,q
s
∗. By LP duality,
there are pib∗, pi
s
∗ and prices P∗ such that the objective function of DLP6 is minimized.
Because of complementary slackness, the following must hold:
(ub(q)− pib − P b∗q)y(q, b) = 0, for buyers
(us(q)− pis + P s∗q)y(q, s) = 0, for sellers
If y(q, b) = 0, y(q, s) = 0,the corresponding bundles are not efficient allocations and the
slack in the dual is always negative.
In contrast, if y(q, b) = 1 for b ∈ B, the clearinghouse sells the bundle to the buyer b and
it is part of the efficient allocation. Then:
pib = (ub(qb∗)− P b∗qb∗)
Similarly, if y(q, s) = 1 for s ∈ S , the clearinghouse buys the bundle from the seller s
and it is part of the efficient allocation. Thus:
pis = (P s∗q
s
∗ + u
s(qs∗))
But note that because of the formulation of LP6, in which only one bundle will be
allocated to each participant:
pib = max
q∈Ab
{
(ub(qb∗)− P b∗qb∗)
}
, which corresponds to the buyer’s value (indirect utility) function
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pis = max
q∈As
{(us(qs∗) + P s∗qs∗)}, which corresponds to the seller’s value (indirect profit) function
Thus, suppose that the clearinghouse was able to ask each participant to mention their
preferred bundle at prices
{
P b∗ , P
s
∗
}
. The bundles would clearly be the ones indicated by
LP6.
The same line of reasoning applies to the divisible goods case. The only difference is that
the optimal solution to LP6 need not be integral.
Proof of Proposition 5.2 To prove the claim, in the same way as in the proof of Proposition
5.1, consider first the indivisible goods case. Thus, let {y(q, b), y(q, s)|∀b ∈ B,∀s ∈ S} be an
optimal solution to LP6, i.e., a set of zeroes and ones that determine the efficient allocations
to buyers and sellers, qb∗,q
s
∗. By duality, there are pi
b
∗, pi
s
∗ and prices P∗ such that the objective
function of DLP6 is minimized.
In addition, from the definition of the core ((17a) in the main text) write:∑
b ∈CB
pib +
∑
s ∈CS
pis =
∑
b∈CB
{
ub(qb∗)− P b∗qb∗
}
+
∑
s∈CS
{P s∗qs∗ + us(qs∗)} ≥ V (C)
where the inequality follows from the fact that (P b∗ , P
s
∗ ,q
b
∗,q
s
∗) are feasible solutions of DLP6
when restricted to coalitions C ⊆ J .
Likewise, from (17b):∑
b ∈B
pib +
∑
s ∈S
pis =
∑
b∈B
{
ub(qb∗)− P b∗qb∗
}
+
∑
s∈S
{P s∗qs∗ + us(qs∗)} = V (J )
where the equality follows from the fact that (P b∗ , P
s
∗ ,q
b
∗,q
s
∗) are optimal solutions to DLP6.
The divisible goods case is proved in the same way, where the optimal solution
{y(q, b), y(q, s)|∀b ∈ B,∀s ∈ S} is not necessarily integral.
Proof of Proposition 5.3 To prove the claim note that in LP6 that the first and sec-
ond constraints restrict each buyer and each seller to be assigned exactly one bundle, i.e.∑
q∈Ab
y(q, b) = 1 and
∑
q∈As
y(q, s) = 1. If the right hand sides of each of these constraints
are reduced to zero, then the corresponding dual variables, pib, pis disappear from DLP6. In
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consequence, if
{
pib, pis
}
are part of the optimal solution to DLP6, then pib∗ ≤ V (J )−V (J \b)
for each b ∈ B, and pis∗ ≤ V (J )− V (J \s) for each s ∈ S .
Proof of Proposition 5.5 Let uj(q) be participant j’s true valuation for the bundle q and
u˜j(q) its reported valuation to the clearinghouse and suppose that uj(q) 6= u˜j(q). Suppose
that the participant reports u˜j(q) to the clearinghouse, which (by LP6) determines that the
optimal aggregate bundle is q˜∗ and V (J ) = u˜j(q˜∗) + ∑
j∈(J \j)
uj(q˜∗).
Therefore, if participant j misreports its true valuation, its payoff in a PME with VCG
payments is: u˜j(q˜∗) + ∑
j∈(J \j)
uj(q˜∗)
− V (J \j) ≤ V (J )− V (J \j)
where the inequality follows from Proposition 5.3.
Proof of Proposition 5.7
Consider a PME with VCG payments and let
∑
b∈B
pib +
∑
s∈S
pis = V (J ) hold when all
participants trade.
Now consider a non-empty coalition C ⊆ J conformed of at least one buyer b and one
seller s. Then for the coalition to be in the core:∑
b ∈CB
pib +
∑
s ∈CS
pis = V (J )−
(∑
b∈CB
[V (J )− V (J \b)] +
∑
s∈CS
[V (J )− V (J \s)]
)
= V (J )−
∑
j∈C
V (J )−
∑
j∈C
V (J \j)

≥ V (J )− V (J \C)
where the inequality follows from the fact that the PSC holds.
A.3 Some detailed market clearing examples of PMEs
In the three examples that follow, the set of buyers is B = {b1, b2} is composed of B = 2
buyers and the set of sellers is S = {s1, s2} composed of S = 2 sellers.
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To simplify notation, let Aj = {0,q,q′} for all j ∈ J where 0 = (0, 0)
A.3.1 Example 1: An example with SS preferences and all facet weights are
wF = 1
In this example, all market participants have: q = (1, 0),q′ = (0, 1)
• Buyer b1 has the following valuation function:
ub1(0) = 0;ub1(q) = 5;ub1(q′) = 10
• Buyer b2 has the following valuation function:
ub2(0) = 0;ub2(q) = 8;ub1(q′) = 4
• Seller s1 has the following valuation function:
us1(0) = 0;us1(q) = −2;us1(q′) = −5
• Seller s2 has the following valuation function:
us2(0) = 0;us2(q) = −6;us2(q′) = −3
Participant j 0 qj∗ q
′j
∗
b1 0 0 1
b2 0 1 0
s1 0 1 0
s2 0 0 1
Table 10: Efficient allocations in Example 1 (subsection A.3.1)
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According to table 10, buyer b1 buys q′ = (0, 1), buyer b2 buys q = (1, 0). Seller s1 sells
q = (1, 0), seller s2 sells q′ = (0, 1). The efficient aggregate bundle is q∗ = (1, 1). Walrasian
prices that support the allocation are p∗ = (5.54, 6.03) and if these are implemented, V (J ) =
13.
Otherwise, if VCG payments are implemented, then V (J ) = 26. The VCG payments
supporting this allocation are:
• b1 pays P b1V CG = 3
• b2 pays P b2V CG = 2
• s1 gets paid P s1V CG = 8
• s2 gets paid P s2V CG = 10
A.3.2 Example 2: An example with SS preferences but facet weights are wF 6= 1
In this example, each market participant defines its own valuation domain but this is
restricted to being binary.
• Buyer b1 has q = (5, 0),q′ = (0, 5) and the following valuation function:
ub1(0) = 0;ub1(q) = 15;ub1(q′) = 35
• Buyer b2 has q = (3, 0),q′ = (0, 3) and the following valuation function:
ub2(0) = 0;ub2(q) = 12;ub1(q′) = 9
• Seller s1 has q = (3, 0),q′ = (0, 3) and the following valuation function:
us1(0) = 0;us1(q) = −3;us1(q′) = −6
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• Seller s2 has q = (5, 0),q′ = (0, 5) and the following valuation function:
us2(0) = 0;us2(q) = −30;us2(q′) = −15
Participant j 0 qj∗ q
′j
∗
b1 0 0 1
b2 0 1 0
s1 0 1 0
s2 0 0 1
Table 11: Efficient allocations in Example 1 (subsection A.3.2)
According to table 11, buyer b1 buys q′ = (0, 5), buyer b2 buys q = (3, 0). Seller s1 sells
q = (3, 0), seller s2 sells q′ = (0, 5). The efficient aggregate bundle is q∗ = (3, 5). Walrasian
prices that support the allocation are p∗ = (3.40, 3.94) and if these are implemented, V (J ) =
29.
Otherwise, if VCG payments are implemented, then V (J ) = 55. The VCG payments
supporting this allocation are:
• b1 pays P b1V CG = 15
• b2 pays P b2V CG = 6
• s1 gets paid P s1V CG = 12
• s2 gets paid P s2V CG = 35
A.3.3 Example 3: An example with OS preferences
30
In this example, each market participant defines its own valuation domain and this can
be of the multi-unit type.
30This example presents further details about example 3.12.
286
• Buyer b1 has q = (1, 0),q′ = (0, 2) and the following valuation function:
ub1(0) = 0;ub1(q) = 6;ub1(q′) = 8
• Buyer b2 has q = (3, 0),q′ = (0, 2) and the following valuation function:
ub2(0) = 0;ub2(q) = 9;ub1(q′) = 4
• Seller s1 has q = (4, 0),q′ = (0, 1) and the following valuation function:
us1(0) = 0;us1(q) = −8;us1(q′) = −3
• Seller s2 has q = (3, 0),q′ = (0, 6) and the following valuation function:
us2(0) = 0;us2(q) = −12;us2(q′) = −18
Participant j 0 qj∗ q
′j
∗
b1 0 1 0
b2 0 1 0
s1 0 1 0
s2 1 0 0
Table 12: Efficient allocations in Example 1 (subsection A.3.3)
According to table 12, buyer b1 buys q = (1, 0), buyer b2 buys q = (3, 0). Seller s1
sells q = (4, 0), seller s2 sells 0 = (0, 0), i.e. sells nothing. The efficient aggregate bundle is
q∗ = (4, 0). Walrasian prices that support the allocation are p∗ = (2.34, 2.54) and if these
are implemented, V (J ) = 7.
Otherwise, if VCG payments are implemented, then V (J ) = 14. The VCG payments
supporting this allocation are:
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• b1 pays P b1V CG = 2
• b2 pays P b2V CG = 6
• s1 gets paid P s1V CG = 13
• s2 gets paid P s2V CG = 0
A.4 An example that focuses on duality between a TH and a SNP
There are N = 2 indivisible, imperfectly substitutable goods in the economy, and B = 2
buyers, each with the following valuation functions ub : Ab → R:
Table 13: Valuation of buyer 1
q1 = 1 q1 = 0 u
1
10 0 q2 = 0
12 8 q2 = 1
Table 14: Valuation of buyer 2
q1 = 1 q1 = 0 u
2
8 0 q2 = 0
14 12 q2 = 1
The regular subdivision or Subdivided Newton Polytope (SNP)31 for the first buyer is in
19:
(0, 0), 0(1, 0), 10
(0, 1), 8(1, 1), 12
Figure 19: Regular subdivision (SNP) for agent 1
31According to terminology by Baldwin and Klemperer (2016), I call it SNP. Following their convention
(page 9), I draw the SNP with increasing values to the left and down
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The partition of price space (tropical hypersurface-TH) according to buyer 1’s valuation
is in figure 20:
p1
p2
(4, 2)
(10, 8)
(0, 1)
(1, 0)
(1, 1)
(0, 0)
Figure 20: Agent 1’s partition of price space induced by u1 (Buyer 1’s TH)
And the SNP corresponding to buyer 2 is in figure 21:
(0, 0), 0(1, 0), 8
(0, 1), 12(1, 1), 14
Figure 21: Regular subdivision (SNP) for buyer 2
Accordingly, buyer 2’s TH is in figure 22:
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p1
p2
(2, 6)
(8, 12)
(0, 1)
(1, 0)
(1, 1)
(0, 0)
Figure 22: Agent 2’s partition of price space induced by u2 (Buyer 2’s TH)
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The Minkowski sum of individual domains Ab gives the set of all bundles in the economy:
A = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)(2, 0), (0, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)}.The aggregate utility function U :
A→ R is:
Table 15: Aggregate valuation
q1 = 2 q1 = 1 q1 = 0 U
18 10 0 q2 = 0
24 22 12 q2 = 1
26 24 20 q2 = 2
And the regular mixed subdivision (aggregate SNP) is in figure 23:
(0, 0), 0(1, 0), 10(2, 0), 18
(0, 1), 12
(0, 2), 20(1, 2), 24(2, 2), 26
(1, 1), 22
(2, 1), 24
Figure 23: Mixed regular subdivision (aggregate SNP)
The TH dual to the mixed regular subdivision is for the aggregate valuation is in figure
24:
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p1
p2 (0, 0)
+
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
+
(0, 0)
(0, 0)+(0, 1)
(0, 1)+(0, 1)
(1, 0)+(0, 1)
(1, 0)+(1, 0)
(1, 0)
+
(1, 1)
(1, 1)
+
(0, 1)
(1, 1)
+
(1, 1)
Figure 24: Aggregate TH
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Conclusion
This PhD thesis has contributed to the economics of power system flexibility, a topic that is technical in
nature but can benefit from the fundamental economic insight that accounting for incentives is crucial. The
five chapters that compose the thesis gradually introduce the reader into a variety of topics and models that
lie at the forefront of a timely question: how to integrate renewables, while ensuring that power systems
operate reliably? As is the case with any problem approached from a (contract and market) designer’s
perspective, specific details cannot be ignored but once these are sufficiently understood, the responsibility
of the economic modeller is to try and derive conclusions of greater generality. In this effort, new economic
models are developed and connections with other problems of relevance can be established with greater
ease. I have humbly striven to achieve this goal in my PhD thesis.
In the first chapter, rather than going into the abstract world of economic models all at once, my co-
author (Rahmatallah Poudineh) and I looked at the real world to find out what kind of business innovation
that enables flexibility is actually happening. In an interesting exercise of documental research, we found
that technologically-led innovation is well and alive and is beginning to play a fundamental role in the
emergence of an entirely different electricity industry. One in which flexibility can be efficiently supplied,
as long as business models consolidate, while new activities are added to the traditional supply chain and
the role of incumbents is redefined. In summary, a creatively chaotic picture can be depicted. From this
chapter, two questions remain open. First, to further refine the partial taxonomy of new actors, new roles
and new business models presented. Second, to empirically assess the implications of the emergence of a
layer of innovation (entrants with innovative business models) on the structure of the electricity industry.
Specifically, are incumbents deterring the change or are they adapting to it? If they are adapting, does it
imply an expansion into related but different areas of economic activity within the electricity supply chain,
leading to economies of scope?
The second chapter of the thesis analyzed the existing body of work on power system flexibility, and
concluded that while an important set of questions have been answered by engineers, industry stakeholders
and policymakers preoccupied with the integration of VRE, another important set of questions have so far
remained unanswered. In particular, I found that the question of incentivizing the provision of flexibility,
rather than assuming that it is an exogenously given trait of a power system, has largely remained unad-
dressed. Informed by its technical characteristics and by the fact that its economic properties have not
been studied so far, I proposed a set of economic postulates that should guide the modelling of flexibility
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as well as the desirable properties that a product design to enable flexibility should have. Rather than
an abstract exercise, these normative suggestions are meant to guide concrete solutions. However, one
limitation of this chapter is that the desirable properties of a flexibility product design are not easily tested
unless these are associated to measurable features of the market. Thus, an open task is to conduct robust
empirical analyses of the impact of such product designs on concrete market features. For example, to
test the relevance of the CAISO flexible ramping product, one could investigate if more or less regulation
services have been activated.
In Chapter 3, my co-authors (Peter Bogetoft and Peter Møllgaard) and I made a first approximation
to modelling power system flexibility from a microeconomic perspective with a focus on demand-side
resources. Based on a set of mildly restrictive but reasonable assumptions, we set up a simple model of
bilateral bargaining between a consumer and an aggregator of flexible loads. Relaxing the most relevant
assumptions in turn, we obtained a set of clear economic intuitions. First, provided that a transaction cost-
reducing technology is in place, single-shot trading of flexibility increases the welfare of the parties involved.
This is the consequence of two effects: consumers who derive utility not from energy consumption itself but
from the comfort it provides, and aggregators who have increased chances of managing the risk they face
when flexibility is provided. Second, in a longer term perspective and accounting for the role of investment
costs associated to the transaction cost-reducing technology, consumer and aggregator must trade for a
sufficiently long period to be able to gain from trading flexibility. Third, the model shows that whenever
the aggregator is able to control more loads, it is able to offer the consumer a better deal for the flexibility
it sells. By extension, this could indicate that economies of scale are present. While the model presented in
chapter 3 is plausible, it remains to test its applicability for concrete policy analysis. For example, a debate
that has recently attracted the attention of Nordic energy regulators is what aggregation model adapts best
to the existing regulatory framework of countries like Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark. Given that
all these countries require anyone acting on behalf of final consumers to assume balancing responsibility,
it has been preliminarily suggested that retailers are best suited for this task. However, this conclusion
has overlooked the fact that retailers would be endowed with an incumbent position that would deter the
entry of independent aggregators. The model of Chapter 3 can be easily adapted to answer a question like
this. However, it is a pending task.
In the fourth chapter of the thesis, my co-author (Rahmatallah Poudineh) and I account for the economic
properties of flexibility to design efficient procurement contracts in environments characterized by bi-
dimensional asymmetric information. Such a modelling effort reflects the fact that flexibility services may
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be traded bilaterally when competition among suppliers is not feasible. In addition, the model accounts
for the imperfect substitutability of the elements that compose flexibility, which justifies the assumption of
non-separability in the gross utility and cost of both principal and agent. The thermostat-based demand-
response programs implemented by utilities in conjunction with technology providers are good real-world
examples of the situations that this paper models. Consequently, we show via simulations how the model
can be implemented to design efficient contracts for this purpose. Nonetheless, a question that this paper
has not addressed is how the model developed can be adapted to situations in which competition is
feasible. Furthermore, it also remains to show how the conclusions derived for flexibility trading apply to
more general procurement situations.
The fifth and last chapter of the thesis was motivated by the need to find a solution to the practical
problem of designing a marketplace for flexibility based on the Flex-Offer information technology concept.
As a result, I extended the Product-Mix Auction format which had many desirable properties but was not
completely adequate for the task at hand. The extensions are summarized under the encompassing term of
Product-Mix Exchanges, which are double, multi-unit combinatorial auctions in which market participants
are able to simultaneously place bids on the two sides of the market. When developing the extensions, I
relied upon a number of existing results and Tropical Geometric techniques, which allow expressing and
analyzing the kind of substitutable preferences imposed on PME participants. Furthermore, I studied
the conditions under which Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments could support the efficient allocation
and found that because the well-known Gross Substitutes condition always holds for participants of a
PME, the VCG outcome, i.e. the one in which all market participants obtain their marginal product as
payoff, is in the core. Finally, this paper illustrated the specific application for which it was originally
meant, i.e. a Delta Energy market in which two specific flexibility-enabling products are traded. The work
presented in this chapter could be extended in two directions. On the theoretical front, a more careful
analysis of the impact of payment rules on bidding behavior should be developed. In particular, rather
than proposing VCG payments as a solution against strategic manipulation, it is important to understand
bidding behavior in the absence of it. It would also be relevant to develop results that help understanding
the role of PMEs when optimality, and not efficiency, is the goal of the organizer of the exchange. With
an applied perspective in mind, it would also be interesting to analyze whether the framework could be
applied in settings where capacity and not energy is the traded good.
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